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Ph.D. Thesis

University of Durham 1969-1971

A Study of Some Relationships Between Religious Belief,
Feelings of Guilt and Self-Evaluation

Paul F.B. Fiske, B.A.

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SUMMARY

It is hypothesised that there are some interrelationships among the principal variables of the thesis namely: religious belief, guilt feelings, and self-evaluation. Christian religious belief is considered as a significant, albeit non-unitary, variable. A comparison between committed Christians ($n = 154$) and a non-Christian control group ($n = 48$) shows that, relative to the non-Christian group, the Christians are more moralist, more self-accepting and less prone to feelings of guilt and self-recrimination. Significant differences are also found to exist between groups of Christians. 'Dogmatic Christians' tend to be more moralist and self-accepting. 'Sacramentalist Christians' are more prone to self-criticality and to sensitive feelings of guilt, whereas nonconformists manifest fewer feelings of guilt. These results are discussed in relation to doctrinal differentials and also in terms of a 'repressor-sensitiser' hypothesis and a 'social desirability' hypothesis. Both linear and curvilinear relationships are found between the variables of self-criticality or self-ideal discrepancy and some measures of guilt. A factor analysis of the manifest guilt questionnaire items is described and discussed and also a factor analysis of 39 variables extracted from the nine questionnaires is referred to. A shorter manifest guilt questionnaire is proposed and some criticisms of the study and suggestions for further research are noted.

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CHAPTER I

"The Thesis" - An Introduction to its Three
Principal Variables

Chapter I


"The Thesis"

An Introduction to the Principal Variables

The title of the Thesis presupposes that there are some interrelationships among the three principal variables: "self evaluation", "guilt feelings" and "religious belief". The object of this Thesis is to discover what these interrelationships are and to test for their significance and reliability. The three principal variables do, however, span a very broad field of study, and so to bring the research within practicable limits various crucial delimitations must be superimposed by way of operational definitions. The necessary restrictions imposed upon such a thesis, whilst permitting a comprehensive research within the defined limits also do not preclude the expansion of ideas and empirical investigations beyond the scope and confines of this present study. This study is therefore not only an attempt to answer questions and thus to "close a file" but also attempts to be a generative source of further questions, ideas and hypotheses.

Logically there are three basic approaches to this "study of relationships". The first approach to be mentioned takes into account the uniqueness of the three principal variables, and by examination of each in a unilateral way, one attempts, by the insights gained thereby, to suggest why it is likely that they will be interrelated. The second possible approach attempts a bilateral study by investigating the correlations

between pairs of variables. In this case the principal aim is to discover whether or not there is any 'common variance' or communality in the bilateral comparison. The third approach involves the consideration of the principal variables in a trilateral comparison. In this way each variable is supposed to affect each other. Hence the link between the variables comprises an interaction involving all combinations of pairs of variables, in a two-dimensional schema, rather than a one-dimensional sequential, temporal or causal relationship. This trilateral relationship is illustrated below, the direction of the arrows linking the component variables can be either way and represent interaction rather than causal relationships.



This trilateral representation is preferred to the 'dependent' sequential relationship; for example:

Religious Belief \longrightarrow Guilt Feelings \longrightarrow Self Evaluation

Here the arrows represent causal relationships. A weakness of this relationship is that any conclusions as to the relationship between religious belief and self evaluation 'depends on' the consideration of an

intermediate variable which may, or may not be the principal interconnecting component. However, there is a rather more fundamental point as to the nature of relationships between variables such as these. From a strictly empiricist point of view it is improper to suppose that there is a 'causal relationship' between pairs of variables. Thus the consideration of bilaterality in the representation of the principal variables must not presuppose more than the simple statement that they are "associated with each other". One cannot say that: "Religious Belief 'leads to', or 'causes' feelings of guilt". However, one might observe the 'coincidence' or 'proximity' of these two factors. Any further conclusions that might be drawn from this would strictly be beyond the scope of the empiricist. However, certain relationships will be proposed between the principal variables, according to certain hypotheses based on known doctrinal differentials between groups of Christians. Thus it may be hypothesised that certain kinds of religious attitudes and practices tend to be found to be associated with certain self-attitudes. An example of an unjustifiable hypothesis would be: "If 'A' leads to 'B', and 'B' leads to 'C', then 'A', indirectly leads to 'C'." The two criticisms are, firstly, the stated relationship: 'leads to', and secondly the assumption that 'A' and 'C' are associated because of 'B'. So in such a sequential relationship one can never be sure that the variable of religious belief is the ultimate cause of the self-critical assessment because of the enhancement of feelings of guilt. Likewise if the order of components is changed one is still left

with an 'intermediate' component which may be in an artificial position only, - by virtue of the presuppositions of the hypothesis.

If this sequential or temporal order is excluded from the analysis then the component variables must be examined independently, bilaterally or tri-laterally without presupposing at this stage any sequential or causal relationships involving all three principal variables.

It has already been suggested that some insights into the inter-relationships among variables can be achieved by comprehending the nature of the variables themselves. This unilateral examination necessitates the careful definition of the variables.

A. Religious Belief

In this research the concept of 'religious belief' is restricted to 'Christian' beliefs, attitudes and practices. The measures employed in the empirical investigation accordingly indicate how strongly each respondent is prepared to identify with the Christian Faith. However, bearing in mind the many differing denominations and doctrines within the 'Christian Church' as a whole, one may conclude that these different doctrinal emphases constitute an important differential in the interrelationships of Christian Belief and other variables.

Christian belief is not, therefore, a simple unitary variable. The Christian Faith, because of disparate doctrinal emphasis appears to produce two widely divergent effects on its adherents or 'Believers'. This 'dual' effect can be identified by distinguishing between 'positive' or 'healthy'

doctrines and 'negative' or 'unhealthy' doctrines. This distinction is implied by Pfister (177) in his book "Christianity and Fear". He states that religion can be 'therapeutic', that is peace-giving and healthy; where God is portrayed as non-moralistic, loving and abounding in grace. Pfister outlines the doctrine of the love of God and the freely given grace and mercy in this way:

"God is no longer: 'God devouring the Sinner', He seeks him out, He brings aid, He is full of kindness and mercy, He is the bringer of salvation." (p.188f).

Allport (12, p.93) asserts that the Christian Faith provides love and affiliation. He concludes that the need for love, security and affiliation, i.e. - the need for acceptance, is of paramount importance and Christianity helps satisfy these needs. Allport (12 preface p.xiii) goes so far as to state that Christian religious belief may contribute successfully to the establishment and good integration of mature personality and to a well-balanced and well-integrated self-system.

However, there may be another side to the coin. It has already been suggested that Christian religious belief may have a dual character - that is both positive and negative aspects - it may 'liberate' or 'suppress'. In as much as Christian belief emphasises the love and forgiveness of a 'caring God' - so it serves to fulfil needs for love, security and affiliation. One could thus define Christian belief as a system of


attitudes mediated by a benevolent, loving creator, faith in whom brings 'hope' and 'love'. However, Allport (12, p.152) compares this form of Christianity with a 'moralistic' religious belief that is saturated with the idea of taboos and which pictures God as a threatening being. This form of religion can only awaken fear and: "set in motion the sinister mechanism of obduracy, revolt and wickedness". The problem for the Christian apologists is to balance the moralistic aspects of Christianity with the 'liberating' or 'loving' aspects. It seems reasonable to suppose that the bias of particular doctrinal emphasis will play a vital part in determining the attitudes and practices of Christian believers. One can define Christianity as a 'Religion of Love' or a 'Religion of Law'. In practice, however, one has to define Christianity on the basis of source texts - tenets of Faith that derive from a commonly accepted source of belief - the Bible. Ideally one should not begin with the presupposition that Christianity is a 'religion of love' or that Christianity is a 'religion of law and moralism'.

The conflict between good and evil, or sinfulness and righteousness is an essential aspect of Christian Belief and underlines the condemning and accepting aspects of the Faith. St. Paul (Romans 7, vv.19,24) depicts man's inescapable guilt and despair: "I do not the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do wretched man that I am!" In this statement self-condemnation accompanies the 'awareness' of 'sinfulness' or falling short of personal values and standards. But in the second part of this chapter despair is swept away in the sentences: "Thanks be to God


through Jesus Christ our Lord!" and "There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus." (Romans 8, v.I).

The removal of condemnation is thus contingent upon the acceptance of 'Christ'. The Christian Faith offers 'security', 'assurance' and 'acceptance' through the doctrine of the grace and forgiveness of God. The balance is thus tilted away from the disruptive, conflict producing aspects of Christian belief - such as awareness of feelings of sinfulness, to the reassuring, comforting aspects which provide security and stability.

If the Christian belief is benevolent and self-satisfying on balance, then the influence in the trilateral relationship will be positive:



Hence Christian belief is here represented as a 'positive' influence to facilitate the reduction of feelings of self-punishment and self-recrimination. However, by way of contrast, if Christian belief tends to emphasise the 'negative', condemning, aspects of Christian doctrine such as 'sinfulness' and 'unworthiness' then, unless the balance is restored by reassurances of forgiveness and acceptance, the following representation of the relationships may be hypothesised:



Thus religious belief is hypothesised to be a multifarious variable. This quality of Christian religious belief is underlined by a consideration of some other characteristic dichotomies which exist. These are basically three 'bipolar' orientations of Christian religious belief which illustrate the multidimensionality of the variable. These 'bipolar' orientations will figure to a large extent in the development of this present thesis, and in the discussions of the results.

1. The dogmatic - nondogmatic dichotomy

Broen (47) in a factor analytic study of religious belief reported evidence for a "fundamentalism-humanitarianism" factor. Both 'fundamentalism' and 'dogmatism' are terms which express uncritical acceptance of the traditional Christian precepts, as compared with the tendency to critically re-evaluate the traditional beliefs of Christianity and to reinterpret them in the light of modern discovery and conventional society. This latter more 'liberal' approach is quite distinct from the 'authoritative' assertions of the 'dogmatist' or the 'fundamentalist'. The dogmatist has a very singleminded view of Christian belief and will brook no compromise.

2. The 'committed - consensual' dichotomy

To some extent this is related to the preceding bipolar dimension since dogmatism may well be a characteristic of the "committed" religious person. Basically this dichotomy is expressed by Allport's (13) distinction between 'Extrinsic' and 'Intrinsic' religion. Extrinsic religion is described by Allport as a "self-serving, utilitarian form of religious outlook, which provides the believer with comfort and salvation at the expense of out-groups". On the other hand Allport describes 'Intrinsic religion' as: "Marked by the life that has interiorised the total creed of his faith without reservation. A person of this sort is more interested in serving his religion than in making it serve him."

Allen and Spilka (7) list a number of bipolar orientations described in the literature. Some of these, including Allen and Spilka's specific "committed/consensual" dichotomy are summarised in the following table. The amount of church-going does not automatically signify the extent of commitment and devotion. Though there will be a strong correlation of devotional practices such as 'prayer' with the extent and intensity of religious commitment. (table on page 10.)

3. The sacramentalist/nonsacramentalist dichotomy

This dichotomy in no way relates directly to the two preceding dichotomies. Dogmatism can be expected to cut across a sacramentalist/non-sacramentalist orientation. The essence of this dichotomy is the disparity between the sacramentalist and nonsacramentalist interpretation of the doctrine of the 'Grace of God'. The principal doctrines of the Christian

Bipolar Characteristics of Christian Belief

Reference	Committed	Consensual
Woodruff (215)	Higher value system	Lower value system
Adams et al (2)	Personal and internalised religion	Conventional, externalised and neutralised religion
Allport (13)	"Intrinsic" Total creed of faith is internalised without reservation	"Extrinsic", utilitarian, self-serving
Lenski (140)	devotional orientation	Conventional orientation
Allen and Hites (6)	emphasis on personal relation to deity	emphasis on religious rites and practices
Allen and Spilka (7)	Religious certitude certainty about a religion which is more individually authentic personalised, and salient to daily activities and religious practices.	Lack of assurance - regarding the importance and authentic nature of an interiorised, integrative religious outlook which has ultimate importance in their life and daily activities
	('committed')	('consensual')

(Characteristics of committed and consensual religion noted in the literature).

Faith hinges on the 'love and divine favour' allegedly shown by God to the world through the salvatory birth, life and death of Christ. The question left to be answered then is: "How do individuals receive this 'grace' - how do they become recipients of divine favour?" The nonsacramentalists, more popularly referred to as 'nonconformists' tend to emphasise that God's love is freely given to all who ask for it through Christ - humbly and sincerely. This is the "Gratia, Gratis data" - 'grace freely given' concept. Thus forgiveness for falling short of divine injunction and divinely ordained standards is freely given to the repentent person without the necessity of invoking some 'intercessor' or 'priest' - or any rite that may contrive to obtain the favour of God.

In contrast to this, the sacramentalist position traditionally has emphasised certain ceremonial and ritual observances as: 'outward and visible signs of inward and spiritual grace.' The Anglican Church has just two sacraments, those of Baptism and the Eucharist, which it claims were ordained by Christ. They are signs of the Grace of God and also, it is believed by many in the Anglican Church, instruments whereby Grace is received from God. In the Roman and Eastern Orthodox Churches - other sacraments are added to these two. These are instituted by the Church rather than overtly and directly by Christ himself. These are: confirmation, penance, holy order (priesthood), matrimony and 'extreme unction'. The use of the confessional and the sacrament of 'penance' in the Roman Catholic Church emphasises the Roman view that sinfulness must be regularly and wholeheartedly confessed in order that forgiveness might be granted. Also,

the 'Mass' is an essential aspect of Roman Catholic worship - because through it the recipient receives the Grace of God. The sacramental churches emphasise the need for continual self-examination and confession far more than do the nonconformist churches. The elements of constant self-examination and ritual 'washing clean' of sins and guilt is a factor that differentiates most sacramentalist churches from most nonconformist churches. This disparity will be expounded rather more fully in the chapter on the "Christian Conscience".

'Hope' and 'Certitude' or assurance are terms more common to the nonconformist and evangelical Anglican churches. These Christian churches, because of their acceptance of the doctrine of "grace freely given" and "justification by Faith" tend to emphasise the importance of feelings of "assurance" - assurance that God guarantees forgiveness and life after death. This is summarised in the first line of a revivalist hymn: "Blessed Assurance Jesus is Mine". This describes the joyful experience of the assurance of God's forgiveness and the firm hope of ultimate life in Paradise. The sacramentalists on the other hand take a rather less positive and more circumspect approach to "Hope" and "assurance". Comparatively they emphasise rather more the "sinful state of man" to whom ultimate forgiveness is possible - but only through holy living and purgatory - according to the Roman Catholic viewpoint. For the Roman Catholic, entry into God's paradise is not an automatic 'right' of the Christian. Also unconfessed sins remain unforgiven and a stumbling block to spiritual progress. So one might conclude that the committed nonconformist tends to believe more in the

"assurance of the joyful Hope" whereas for many sacramentalists the nature of the rituals and liturgies encourages a preoccupation with self and self-objectification. This latter form of religious belief is sustained by private and liturgical confession of sinfulness, and in the Roman Catholic Church by the Sacrament of Penance.

In this foregoing discussion the Christians referred to are those who are both orthodox, in that they retain the traditional beliefs of the church, and also committed to the Christian Religion. This assumption is necessary in order to compare and contrast ^{the} two groups of Christians rather more clearly. Naturally, in reality there is considerable overlap of views and beliefs and practice between the various denominations. Many nonconformists may be preoccupied with feelings of sinfulness. However, the gist of the argument is that 'in general' the rituals and ordinances of the sacramentalist Church tend to predispose the believer to be more likely to be 'aware' of feelings of inadequacy and sinfulness. Whether or not the 'forgiveness' granted for confession of sins is sufficient, psychologically, to remove anxiety and guilt is another question which will be considered later.

The dichotomies inherent in the Christian Religion preclude any general definition of Christian Belief other than one based simply on Biblical texts and tenets of the Faith found in this primary source. However, if one can assume that 'orthodox' Christian belief can be deduced from the New Testament then this should be the normative guide to the delineation of Christian ideas. The bipolar orientations noted in the literature suggest

that these may be important factors in some of the considerations of inter-relationships between Christian religious belief, guilt feelings and self-evaluation.

B. Guilt Feelings

Before attempting a definition of "feelings of guilt" it is necessary to explore the origins of moral behaviour and 'conscience'. The limitations applied to this Thesis do not permit an exhaustive account of all the various theories of moral development and of the development of the conscience or 'superego'. Various ideas are considered, however, inasmuch as they contribute to a more comprehensive explanation of the nature of guilt and guilt feelings.

The present author is not biased to any one theoretical formulation of moral development and the aetiology of the emotions of guilt. The viewpoint favoured is that moral behaviour and guilt feelings can best be explained by a combination of ideas from various theoretical sources. This eclectic approach allows the acceptance of some of principles of learning theory without precluding the cognitive theories of moral development. Hence when such terms as 'reinforcement' or 'punishment' are discussed one can include under these concepts both 'physical' and 'psychological' rewards and punishments. Also it seems equally valid to talk in terms such as 'avoidance conditioning' and yet also to talk of the need of the child to keep the 'warmth' and 'affection' of the mother.

The 'learning theory' and 'cognitive theory' approaches together

together facilitate comprehension of the intricate process underlying the development of 'moral values' in the individual through the inculcation of parental values. Freudian psychodynamic theory emphasises the unconscious motivation and the psychic tension necessary to induce the introjection of parental values. This theory induces such ideas as the 'mythical' oedipus conflict, the 'unconscious threat of castration' of the boy by the father and the final resolution of the conflict by the introjection of the 'threatening and punishing' parent and his values. This theory is not included in the following discussions to any great extent, as the author prefers to think in terms of the 'conscious' identification of the child with the parents and their values. It is considered that 'discriminating punishment', both physical and psychological, the latter involving the withdrawal of love and affection, are consciously evaluated and reacted to by the child. The acceptance of the ideals of the parent and peer group involves considerable mediation by the child through the mechanisms of language and conceptual thought. One aspect of the 'learning' of moral behaviour is the cognition of 'wrong' and the child's subsequent verbalisation: for example "I'm a naughty boy" and the awareness of right: "I'm a good boy". The inculcation of the moral values of the parent enables the child to avoid punishment by others - by the anticipation and avoidance of behaviour that is likely to result in punishing consequences. Once the child has developed this autonomous morality ('satellization' Ausubel terms it (19)) - he is able to mediate his own rewards and

punishments by 'self-aggression' and by the withdrawal of 'self-love' for doing wrong, or by feelings of self-satisfaction - as the 'good-feeling' that comes from knowing he has done the 'right' thing.

Thus moral behaviour depends on the ability to discriminate between what is considered to be 'right' and what is considered to be 'wrong'. Gesell (102,104) describes four stages of development which comprise an explanation of how a concept of 'right and wrong' develops from the primary cognitions of 'goodness and badness'. At the first stage goodness and badness is seen by the child in relation to himself only, but at stage two, goodness and badness is seen by the child in relation to his parents. By the third stage goodness and badness is equated with his peer-groups standards and norms and at the fourth stage goodness and badness is equated with 'right and wrong' and the child can now act in a morally responsible way.

The ability to discriminate between right and wrong at first depends on the differential, selective punishment by the parents thus inducing the awareness of 'goodness and badness'. Eysenck (85) emphasises another theoretical approach tangential to the developmental theory of Gesell. Eysenck advocates the consideration of the 'learning process' aspect of moral development:

"It is argued that moral values are learned in the course of the child's development, and that consequently any theory regarding their development should be based on the known facts and principles of modern learning theory"

(85, p.11).

According to Eysenck then, 'conscience', as the faculty by which we know right from wrong, is a conditioned response built up during the child's 'formative' years by the pairing of conditioned stimuli (arising from aggressive, predatory and overtly sexual actions) and unconditioned stimuli (slaps, beatings, shaming and other punishments) - immediately following the conditioned stimulus. Eysenck says that, aided by a process of stimulus generalisation, this should, in the course of time, lead to an association between the conditioned stimulus and the fear, anxiety response appropriate to the unconditioned stimulus. Thus various 'negative' emotions become attached to the behavioural impulses, so that the impulse to act in a certain way elicits either a self-satisfied feeling or feelings of fear and anxiety associated with 'guilt', depending on whether the act is judged right or wrong respectively.

'Conscience' has already been defined as: "the faculty by which we know 'right from wrong'". Allport (12, p.101) warns against the reification of conscience. He points out that it is not: "a man within the breast" nor is it a separate department of personality. He states: "... rather it is the knife-edge that all our values press upon us whenever we are acting or have acted contrary to these values". The awareness of what is right and what is wrong is the essence of morality and conscience. This cognitive ability is necessary so that moral judgements can be made autonomously and successfully. The development of autonomous moral values depends upon the success of the learning or conditioning process whereby the values of parents and society are inculcated.

Guilt feelings depend upon the cognition of a discrepancy between the behaviour which is judged 'wrong' and the behaviour that would have been judged 'right' - that is, the behaviour that: "ought to be". Thus conscience has both a negative affect associated with the 'wrong' act and a positive affect associated with the cognition of the 'right' or ideal behaviour in any situation. The negative affect is the fear and anxiety produced by 'guilt' and the self-annoyance and regret for having 'fallen short' of the 'right' or 'ideal' of personal standards. The positive affect of conscience is a feeling of self-satisfaction or 'goodness'. In the latter case 'the conscience' thus encourages the perseverance of this state of self-satisfaction by thwarting 'attempts' to disrupt 'loving relationships' and 'self-love' or self-esteem. Hence conscience is not only an instrument of 'self-punishment' or 'warning' but also a mediator of 'morality' based on the positive end of 'love'. In Stafford-Clark's view, (190) "The ultimate source of morality as experienced in the conscience is not just the distilled or distorted relics of infantile experience and environment"; and Swainson emphasising instead 'love morality' states: (197)

"Morality is not just due to thwarted impulses, nor to just social pressure. Love morality is an integrating element in both society and the individual Child morality springs primarily from the positive impulse to love relationships within the Individual." If this is so, then the greatest threat to the child and indeed to the adult is the deprivation of love - and the deprivation of 'self-love'. The conscience by depriving the individual of the self-satisfaction necessary in the harmonious loving

relationship thereby facilitates negative feeling of intrapunitive and self-recrimination. Thus the cognition of wrongdoing elicits feelings associated with the concept of 'alienation' or loss of love.

Hence E.V. Stein (192, p.15) begins his study with the following omnibus definition of guilt:

"Guilt is the special form of anxiety experienced by humans in society, the warning tension of life principles violated, of conditions of human social existence transgressed, of socio-spiritual reality ignored or affronted, of God alienated, of self-being destroyed."

This definition raises a variety of interesting points and causes of guilt feeling which will be considered more fully later. Stein in fact does use a somewhat shorter definition of guilt feelings: (p.26) "A state of tension or anxiety over internalised aggression (self-hatred) or loss of self-love".

The loss of self-love produces anxiety because 'self-love' by definition provides a secure 'self-orientation', whereas 'self-hate' is a 'self-destructive' emotion.

Probably the greatest threat to a child is the withdrawal of a parents' love - thus creating considerable insecurity and anxiety. When the child does something wrong - the coldness and negative reaction of the parent deprives the child of the stabilising warm loving relationship. The parents' punishing actions, by association, become attached to the particular behaviour offending the parent and the child in the future 'feels' anxiety when he 'knows' he has done something wrong. The feelings of deprivation of

love gradually orientate towards a feeling of deprivation of 'self-love' as the child becomes 'self-critical' and 'self-punishing' with the development of an autonomous morality. Once the child is able to comprehend the rightness and wrongness of an act he is able to mediate his own punishment. This description of the development of conscience and self-mediated punishment is expressed by Mosher's (160) definition of guilt feelings as "The capacity for self-mediated punishment". This is the operational definition which is applied in this research. Guilt is regarded as the negative and punishing feelings associated with the contravention of moral codes of behaviour or the failure to reach personal 'life standards'. The moral codes of behaviour are conditioned in the first place by the attitudes, and differential punishments administered by, the parents, and then, secondly, by the attitudes and standards of the peer group and 'society in general'. In this latter rather nebulous phase one could include the 'morality' values and pressures of the 'Church' - particularly where the child, under the influence of Christian parents, is taught the Christian religion.

'Conscience' by virtue of the 'punishing' propensity of guilt feelings may act in both a 'constructive' or a 'destructive' manner. At first sight this may appear paradoxical, but guilt feelings act both as a necessary 'good' to socialisation and as a self-condemning emotion with associated persistent feelings of anxiety and insecurity. One could perhaps distinguish between the "fear of guilt", or the "threat of guilt" and the 'anxiety of guilt'. The threat of guilt acts as an aid to the maintenance

of moral behaviour, whereas the 'anxiety of guilt' expresses the morbid awareness of a state of guilt.

Guilt feelings as an aid to socialisation


In order to live in agreement with socially acceptable patterns and codes of behaviour it is necessary to accept the moral standards and values of society. This necessitates the learning of 'right and wrong' behaviours so that 'wrong' behaviours can be avoided. The process of punishing a child for doing wrong constitutes a type of negative reinforcement which predisposes that child to avoid repeating the guilt-producing behaviour. Thus in a schematic form, if behaviour 'B' is wrong in the minds of the parents, then its production by the child produces immediate punishment, which, if contiguous with the 'offence' acts as negative reinforcement 'R-'. Hence:

$$B \longrightarrow R-$$

At first the negative reinforcement produces the emotion of fear or anxiety - because of the punishment itself and because the punishment represents a loss of parental affection. Thus:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} B & \longrightarrow & R- \\ & & \downarrow \\ & & \text{Anxiety/Insecurity} \end{array}$$

Replication of the behaviour will produce anxiety irrespective of the immediacy of the negative reinforcement :-



Hence the threat of punishment, whether physical or 'psychological' induces the emotions that will inhibit the offending behaviour - so long as the child desires the love of the parents. When the child is able to associate the behaviour with the threat of punishment so:

$$(B \longrightarrow R_-) \longrightarrow I_B$$

where I_B is the inhibition of the Behaviour.

As soon as the child is capable of deciding independently on the rightness and wrongness of any act, then he can be said to possess a self-mediated, autonomous morality. The negative reinforcement will then be twofold. Firstly there is the fear of punishment by some 'other' and secondly there is the 'self-mediated punishment' which is represented by negative, self-condemning emotions for the failure to live up to accepted values and standards. These feelings of self-hate and remorse act as a form of negative reinforcement that can be now designated: feelings of guilt (R_G^-).

$$B \longrightarrow R_G^-$$

Self-mediated punishment resulting in loss of self-love and self-respect also precipitates feelings of anxiety and insecurity. For the morally autonomous individual, the continuance of moral behaviour depends on

the avoidance of 'B'. 'B' is inhibited by the anticipation of the awareness of the capacity for self-mediated punishment 'R_G⁻'. Thus:

$$(B \longrightarrow R_G^-) \longrightarrow I_B$$

For example, an aggressive act may be inhibited by the fear of disapproval and also by the negative 'self-feelings' originating because of the perceived violation of personal standards.

However, guilt feelings are not solely contingent on the 'wrong' behaviour taking place. The behavioural impulse (iB) is sufficient to elicit the negatively reinforcing feelings:

$$(iB \longrightarrow R_G^-) \longrightarrow I_B$$

Thus, the aggressive, sexual, or socially irresponsible impulse produces the feelings of guilt, in anticipation of the actual 'behavioural action', which reduces the likelihood of the behaviour occurring. At this stage, the individual, because of the negatively reinforcing propensity of guilt feelings, is able to avoid guilt-producing behaviour. Of course, what is 'guilt-producing' for one person may not be so for another. So the behaviour 'B' must be subjectively morally significant otherwise there will be no feelings of guilt - only, perhaps, fear of social disapproval.

The feeling of guilt thus depends on the evolution of the moral sentiment - that is some notion of how one ought and ought not to behave. Guilt implies 'wrongdoing' or at least the presence of the impulse to do wrong - and wrongdoing is in the last resort a kind of behaviour that hurts

other people (physically, mentally, socially). Thus there is the fear of retaliation or when this is morally justified - 'Punishment'. Actions that arouse guilt, being actions that hurt others, are therefore also actions that tend to involve us in punishment, and by an inevitable process of conditioning one learns to expect punishment when one feels guilty. Flugel (90, p.143) thus refers to guilt feeling as the state of 'tension' when a person is aware of wrongdoing or the impulse to do wrong. This state of tension is 'self-punishing' as it replaces 'self-esteem' and gives rise to the fear of punishment. There is thus a loss of 'self-love' added to the threat of the loss of the love of others - resulting in alienation and insecurity through the loss of emotional attachments.

As Ausubel says (20, 1955) guilt is thus one of the most important psychological mechanisms through which an individual becomes socialised in the ways of his culture. It is also an important instrument for cultural survival since it constitutes a most efficient watchdog with each individual, serving to keep his behaviour compatible with the moral values of the society in which he lives.

Guilt feelings and the "Ideal"

The preceding section attempted to show how guilt feelings as an affective reaction fulfil a positive, constructive function in maintaining an individual's moral standards. This serves to maximise self-satisfaction as the individual is aware that he is living in accordance with his moral ideals.

McDougall (152) claimed that the: "cornerstone of moral character" was the 'sentiment of self-regard'. This sentiment constitutes a standard or guiding light by which the individual regulates, or at least passes judgement on, his own conduct. The child, in order to win praise and escape blame must learn to anticipate the moral attitudes of others, and this process of anticipation involves the building up of a standard of behaviour that corresponds to the standards of those about him. It is this standard that gradually gives content to his 'ideal of self' and thus determines the nature of his self-regarding sentiment. Eventually his ideals become to a large extent independent of particular personalities and reflect to ^a greater or less degree the traditional code of the society in which he lives.

Thus the sentiment of 'self-regard' is closely associated with a concept of 'Moral Being' whereby a person is able to make moral judgements so that he can live in accordance with his ideals. Guilt feelings will thus arise if the individual becomes aware that his behaviour is not compatible with his 'ideal'. The conscience effectively alerts the individual to the state of disequilibrium and as a result self-satisfaction and self-respect are replaced by self-hatred and self-denigration. Self-respect and self-approbation depend on the attainment of the 'Ego Ideal' which is the existence of an ideal to which one's self-love is to some extent directed.

Freud has been criticised for concentrating almost exclusively on the introjective and aggressive factors of the 'superego'. He is thus

concentrating on the punishing and negative aspects of 'conscience' rather than on the 'Ego Ideal' as such. But to Freud as well, (97) the Ego Ideal was a moral factor primarily - just as the self-regarding sentiment was also very much a moral factor in McDougall's reasoning.

Adler (quoted in Flugel p.40f.) emphasised the ontological aspects of the 'Ego Ideal' which he termed the 'guiding fiction'. He said that this ideal corresponds to: "that which we are not but which we would like to be". This introduces the concept of 'ontological guilt'. Ontological guilt results from a failure to achieve goals set by the 'ideal' and this almost inevitably brings about a 'sense of guilt' and unworthiness unless such a failure is adequately explained away or camouflaged (cf. ^FFlugel p.47). White (212) and Horney (123) attach much importance to the influence of parents in determining these goals. Horney in particular stresses the necessity for 'keeping up' moral and cultural appearances. Thus positive self-feeling is related to the attainment of the 'ego ideal'; and negative self-feeling is related to failure or shortcomings. The 'negative self-feeling' or ontological guilt depends on the 'distance' between the real self and the ego ideal. This negative feeling would consist of a sense of dissatisfaction, inferiority and guilt. The 'conscience' then, not only acts to warn against the committal of 'wrong' acts, but also makes one aware of discrepancies between the real self and the ideal self.

Feelings of guilt both 'moral' and 'ontological' consequently act as a 'goad' to the perseverance of moral behaviour and good conduct so that

the individual can maintain his self-regard and self-esteem, and also so that society may exist on the basis of mutual acceptability. Hence what at first may seem an entirely negative emotion has a dual 'positive' function - that of controlling behaviour so that society can continue, and that of warning the individual of a threat to his own ideals and self-esteem so that he is able to avoid what would be a guilt-producing situation.

Noncreative, 'destructive' guilt feelings

In spite of the importance of guilt feelings in a 'normal' process of socialisation, it is obvious that where there is a system of morality maintained by the threat of self-punishment - or the threat of the loss of self-love, here there is the danger, in the extreme cases of guilt, of irrational and morbid feelings and of pathological depression and melancholia. Guilt feelings as the 'affective' consequence of the cognitions of falling short of standards and ideals acts to encourage morally compliant behaviour. To this extent the function of guilt can be talked of in terms of negative reinforcement and socialisation. However, beyond this 'constructive' function the punitive aspects of guilt feeling may act in a destructive manner. Self-discipline and self-control may be morally and socially desirable, but moral masochism as an extreme form of self-inflicted suffering in response to the 'demands of conscience' is certainly not 'socially approved' or beneficial to the individual. Morbid feelings of self-recrimination and self-hate act as a 'destructive' rather than as a 'controlling' or 'disciplining' agent.

a. Rigid moralism

'Moral masochism' would fall under this sub-category of 'rigid moralism'. Flugel says that guilt as the capacity for self-mediated punishment is distorted by the practice of punitive asceticism - which is a form of moral masochism. Here the element of self-inflicted punishment for guilt is the sole or predominant factor. Flugel (90, p.92) alleges that into this category fall a great number of more or less institutionalised religious practices such as fasting, penitence and many individual neurotic forms of suffering (cf. William James: "Varieties of Religious Experience" 126). In this case the cognition, rational or irrational, of shortcoming leads to the distorted affective reactions of self-punishment. Peck and Havighurst (1976) attribute this type of 'punitive asceticism' to one expression of immature morality as it follows from the rigid application of immutable regulations - leading to irrational feelings of guilt and anxiety. Hence the existence of an extremely dictatorial conscience is likely to result in much self-punishment for the violation of its dictates. This also implies that moral values are not subjected to critical enquiry but are accepted uncritically. This type of morality emphasises only the negative, inhibiting aspects of conscience and may be based on uncritical, irrational principles. Peck and Havighurst contrast this immature morality with their concept of the 'mature morality' where each action is judged on its situational merits - inferring that the individual builds up a firmly integrated moral system by critically and autonomously examining each behaviour and principle independent of rigid authoritarian influences.

The resultant morality is thus a positive 'altruistic' morality and not simply a restricting, threatening system. The characteristics of this rational and altruistic moral system are that the individual pays attention to his own and other people's feelings and to empirical facts of a 'hard kind' - such as consequences. A third characteristic is the ability to formulate and modify rules or moral principles. Such a 'rational-altruistic' man is clearly what Heidegger called an "authentic man". It is only at this level of rationality that feelings of guilt are confined to the negatively reinforcing propensity. If a person makes a mistake - he feels guilty about that alone and then takes steps to rectify the situation. This is to be contrasted with the distorted, irrational reaction of the person who having done something 'wrong' feels that he has committed an unpardonable act and accordingly suffers so much because he has violated one of his 'immutable regulations'. Thus rigid moralism is associated with a punitive conscience, and feelings of guilt will be proportionate to the extent and intensity of the moralism and nature of the violation of that moralism.

b. 'Free-floating' ontological guilt

The expression "free-floating guilt" implies unattached feelings of shortcomings and sinfulness that a person is conscious of from time to time. This infers that these feelings of guilt are 'ontological' rather than 'moral'. Lifton, in a book entitled "Thought reform and the Psychology of Totalism" (145) says that the most dangerous part of 'thought reform', as practised particularly by the Chinese Communists, is when the prisoner is confronted with his human limitations, with the contrast between

'what he is' and 'what he should be'. This type of ontological guilt, or existential guilt' as May (1955) calls it, is rooted in the fact of self-awareness. As has already been mentioned - ontological guilt provides the need or drive for consonance - by the attainment of moral and self-ideals. Ontological guilt can thus be defined as the outcome of dissonance between the 'self' and the 'ideal-self' - as subjectively perceived by the individual. This in itself does not necessarily predispose 'destructive' or 'morbid' feelings. However, the fact that individuals are aware of shortcoming, - creates the opportunity for the generation of pervasive, nonspecific feelings of guilt. This is done, successfully, by the use of 'thought reform' techniques, and perhaps even by some kinds of 'religious practice'. The awareness of shortcoming in this latter reference can develop into an all pervasive feeling of sinfulness which is then exploited by the evangelist.

Thus feelings of guilt do not only exist as a goad to the inhibition of unacceptable behaviour - but also, they exist as an indication of the individual's self-regard' or self-acceptance. The 'self' is thus assumed to be capable of 'judging the self'. This situation, asserts Tillich (1953, p.58f) produces the anxiety, which in relative terms is the 'anxiety of guilt' and in absolute terms is the 'anxiety of self-rejection or condemnation'. Tillich states that this anxiety of guilt is present in every moment of moral self-awareness and this can have the obviously 'self-destructive' consequence of driving the individual toward complete 'self-rejection', to the feeling of being condemned, not necessarily to an external punishment but to the "despair of having lost his destiny".

By 'destiny' Tillich means: "the actualisation of what a person potentially is". Tillich argues that to avoid this extreme situation, man tries to transform the anxiety of guilt into moral action - thus the 'affective' results in the 'conative' - regardless of the imperfection and ambiguity of this conation. However, the anxiety of becoming guilty, the horror of feeling condemned, may be so strong as to make responsible decisions and any kind of moral action almost impossible.

3. Neurotic Guilt

Many Psychiatrists point out that 'guilt' is an element in most pathologies and is associated with a "falling short" and consequent loss of self-esteem. According to Odier (169) a sign of neurotic guilt is when 'feeling' dominates judgement so that the 'sense of ought' tends to precede any intelligent weighing of the problem. He says:

"Blind obedience to the conscience is often reinforced by a fusion of the personal and the cosmic: 'I think I ought' may be experienced as 'God says I must'."

This sort of morality, which could just as well be described as immature moralism, is apparently quite egocentric, as obedience is not out of love of the good so much as an automatic response to preclude or overcome guilt and anxiety. This type of guilt may also be characterised by constant struggles with temptation and a preoccupation with evil. Mowrer (164) goes so far as to say that:

"Neurosis is just a medical euphemism for a state of unacknowledged and unredeemed real guilt."

Mowrer, by attributing neurosis to 'real guilt' rather than 'irrational' guilt seems, however, to be adding to the burden of the 'sinful neurotic' by not only confirming the neurotic's self-assessment that he has violated some genuinely held value - but by informing him that he is as worthless and despicable and worthy of self-hate as he feels he is! Mental suffering and self-hate is thus the price of forgiveness.

Neurotic guilt, by definition implies some kind of mental suffering and self-condemnation of a morbid and extreme variety. Mowrer has been criticised for suggesting that 'neurotic' guilt is a 'natural' reaction to perceived wrongdoing. The point should be made clear that 'Mowrer's' 'real guilt', that is moral remorse about the violation of the genuine conditions of community, should be present and recognised in any socialised human being. It should function in advance as a warning signal and in retrospect as 'guilty conscience' if the warning is ignored. This is an expected 'normal' reaction. In contrast to this, - which does not predispose 'neuroticism', there are occasions when the 'normal' reaction is distorted. The conscience may be artificially warped by 'over oppressive' parental upbringing or by the excessive demands of some other rigid and authoritarian social institutions. In this case the guilt feelings are distorted in an 'irrational' and unrealistic way. This distortion produces the neurotic symptoms of anxiety and depression. The concept of 'immutable regulations' and implacable agents of punishment will produce much anxiety of guilt far in excess of the property of 'negative reinforcement' possessed by the affective stimulus of guilt.

A note on the Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis

The term 'obsessive-compulsive' is used because most writers consider it to be one neurotic syndrome made up of varying kinds of cognitive and motor symptoms, with sometimes obsessive thought patterns, and sometimes compulsive acts dominating the picture. This type of neurosis implies the existence of unexpiated guilt feelings - the cause of which the 'patient' may no longer be aware. Alexander (cited in: Flugel 90, p.158) felt that the obsessions concerned essentially the "forbidden wishes and desires" and the compulsions essentially a 'reparation' for these. Stein (192, p.128) points out that through psychoanalytic study various claims have been made of the discovery of interrelationships between religious ritual and obsessive-compulsive acts. Divine objects, 'Totems' and words are hedged around with taboos which are isolated at the risk of death or 'eternal suffering'. Stein refers to ritual as closely connected with 'undoing' and reaction formation - that is the countering of an impulse with its opposite. 'Undoing' implies a kind of magical rite aimed at abolishing behaviour that has just been completed. Rituals may 'undo' the impure acts or life of the believer, or allay self-hostility. Stein also refers to 'verbal rituals' that he suggests act to 'undo' the hostile impulses that lie beneath the surface of the believer's feelings toward "the Father - God's demandingness". This takes up one of Freud's hypotheses concerning the nature of religious belief - as essentially a kind of projection of the oedipal conflict with all that this means in terms of fear, guilt and the acceptance of the authoritarian moral controls and sanctions. Rituals of sacrifice, atonement

and baptism are also sometimes regarded as possessing 'magical' properties and are religiously practised in order to 'undo' or expurgate the sinfully broken relationship or the proscribed act which has been performed. For the obsessive-compulsive neurotic, the constant preoccupation with orderliness, perfectionism and cleanliness appears to be associated with the inner struggle against just the opposite.

Guilt feelings may be the primary cause of some neuroses or they may act to exacerbate an already deteriorated or deteriorating psychological condition. In some cases it appears that religious behaviour is a kind of obsessive-compulsive practice in as much as the 'rituals' associated with the expiation of guilt and sinfulness appear to be conducted without rational thought and also with a fear of failing to perform the rites regularly. One does not suggest that all Christian religious behaviour is identifiable with the symptoms of obsessive-compulsive neurosis, however it will be pointed out in the third chapter that the doctrine of 'sinfulness' may well create feelings of guilt which require expiation and 'forgiveness'.

Thus guilt feelings in a moral and 'negatively reinforcing' context may be defined as self-mediated punishment. The factor of moral control in guilt feelings may be defined as the "generalised expectancy for self-mediated punishment for violating, anticipating the violation of, or failure to attain, internalised standards of proper behaviour". This latter definition is the one given by Mosher (160). The referents for guilt will include 'painful' negative feelings of self-criticism, self-blame and self-remorse which arise from violating or anticipating the violation of

internalised standards. Guilt will thus almost inevitably involve a lessening of self-esteem because of the failure to live in accordance with ideals of life and from the failure to attain certain "ought to" goals. So far, the referents mentioned principally relate to what should ultimately be a 'constructive' aspect of guilt feeling. However, other referents for feelings of guilt are of a rather more self-destructive or self-disparaging kind. These referents would include 'self-punishments' and 'ascetic denial', confessions of sinfulness and the fear of anticipated punishment and resultant feelings of anxiety and dejection. All pervasive feelings of worthlessness may also accompany violation of moral codes of conduct. These 'self-destructive' feelings may be associated with relatively minor offences where the principles violated are considered to be immutable and inviolable.

C. SELF EVALUATION

This is the last of the component variables to be introduced and discussed. The preceding two sections have already hinted at the interaction of both Christian belief and guilt feelings with self-esteem and self-respect.

It is right and proper that this section should attempt to define what the 'self' is and what it is supposed to consist of. Symonds (198) says that the 'Self' consists of four aspects:

1. How a person perceives himself
2. What he thinks of himself
3. How he values himself
4. How he attempts through various actions to enhance or defend himself.

The first three aspects listed above imply or presuppose that the individual is 'self-aware' and so able to evaluate himself. These aspects could collectively be termed the "self as object". Self-objectification is one of the principles on which any form of self-assessment depends. The 'self-as-object' denotes a person's attitudes, feelings, perceptions and evaluations of himself as an object. In this sense the 'self' is what a person thinks of himself. The fourth aspect is rather distinct from the other three and suggests that the self is also "a process". Some writers have adopted the convention of using the term 'ego' when they wish to refer to the group of psychological processes, and to reserve the term 'self' for the person's system of conceptions of himself. Symonds goes on to warn the reader against adopting the position that what a person says about himself is an accurate representation of his real feelings. However, it is doubtful whether a person could objectify himself to the extent whereby he is accurate in his 'self-perceptions' so the self-assessment of the individual may represent that individual's inaccurate 'self-perceptions'. Nevertheless, self-perceptions whether accurate or inaccurate are of psychological interest.

The awareness of 'self', as Sherif and Cantril (189) point out, comes through the acceptance of a constellation of attitudes such as: "What I think of myself; what I value; what is mine; what I identify with". In this way one can have ideas about various aspects of one's being-as Sarbin reiterates (186). One's ideas about oneself depend on the self image reflected by self-attitudes and emotions. To this extent, Hilgard (118)

says that self-evaluation produces an 'inferred' self in so far as this is what the individual is 'consciously' aware of anyway. Stephenson (193) believes that a person can think and talk about himself just as he thinks and talks about other things and that these self-reflections are as much a part of his behaviour as anything else the individual does.

Mead (156), however, emphasises that the 'Self' may not be a unitary thing - but in as much as it is 'socially formed' so many 'selves' may develop each of which represents a more or less separate set of responses acquired from different social groups. So a person becomes 'a self' in so far as he can take the attitude of another and "act toward himself as others act". According to Carl Rogers (182) the 'Self' is the awareness of one's being and functioning which develops through the organism's interaction with the environment. Thus the self may change as a result of maturation and learning. Rogers has relied very much on the self-reports of his 'clients' in order to understand them. The 'self-as-object' which is the central feature of Roger's theory is consciously experienced and these experiences it is assumed can be directly communicated to the investigator. The concept of unconscious motivation plays virtually no part in Roger's theory.

'Self-evaluation' as given in the self-report and self-assessment of respondents is taken as an indication, among other things, of self-esteem. Those respondents who record a self-satisfied, self-accepting response are basically manifesting what could be described as : "ego equilibrium". Equilibrium exists when the 'ego-ideal' or aspects of the self-regarding

sentiment are perceived to be comparable with the consciousness of real behaviour and impulses. This equilibrium is semantically equivalent to the term 'consonance'. Disequilibrium or dissonance exists when there are disparities and incompatibilities between the ideal and the real. The cognition of this produces a state of 'tension' which provides the 'need' for a restoration of the equilibrium state. With the restoration of equilibrium comes satisfaction - proportionate to the reduction in the anxiety and stress caused by the original dissonance or disequilibrium. Self-acceptance as a state of mind, and a favourable affective state, depends on the sustaining of the position of equilibrium. Self-criticality results when a dissonant element such as 'guilt' threatens the stability of the 'Self'.

The concepts of self-mediated punishment and self-esteem are mutually exclusive. Guilt feelings as dissonant elements must be reduced to restore consonance. The imbalance can be reduced by some method of expiating the guilt perhaps by accepting punishment commensurate with the guilt or by making suitable confession and reparation so that the guilt feelings are removed and positive self-feeling can be restored.

Fuster (100) emphasises the necessity for 'congruence' between perceived self and ideal self. Personal adjustment and consequently self-esteem and self-respect depends on 'harmonious relations with the environment'. The 'environment' here refers to one's psychological or behavioural environment (81) which thus includes one's perceived ideals. Self-ideal congruence was found by Butler and Haigh (57) to be related to

'adjustment'. They measured the self-ideal congruence in a group of 25 clients using "Q-sorts". The range of this congruence was from -0.47 to +0.59 with a mean of -0.01. At the same time they measured the same congruence in a group of 16 'adjusted' people - a control group roughly equivalent to the client group with respect to age, sex, and socioeconomic status. The range of the control group was from -0.01 to +0.86 with a mean of +0.58. Further, in a follow-up study carried out at six months to one year after the completion of 'counselling', the investigators measured the self-ideal of 17 clients who were judged to have improved. The mean congruence of only +0.02 for the precounselling stage had become +0.44 after counselling. A control group's 'congruence' had hardly changed at all, a mean of +0.59 had become +0.58. Hanlon (114) and McCabe (151) have also found strong relationships between 'adjustment' and self-ideal congruence as indeed does Fuster - who found a correlation between the two variables, of personality adjustment and self-ideal congruence, of $r = 0.66$.

Thus the self-concept and the 'self-regard' or 'self-esteem' factors are affected by the 'self-awareness' of either congruence or the lack of it. Thus a positive self-evaluation suggests that a person is 'well adjusted' whereas a negative self-evaluation suggests that a person is 'maladjusted' which will be reflected in the manifestation of dissonance between self-perceptions and the perception of the ideal. If an individual perceives that he is living in accordance with, or at least broadly in accordance with, his ideals, then his needs for self-acceptance and self-respect will be satisfied. To function adequately as a person it is necessary to be self-

accepting rather than self-rejecting. This is certainly the conclusion reached by Rogers (182) and Butler and Haigh (57). The self-accepting attitude is thus assumed to mirror a balanced and integrated personality - rather than the opposite. However, room in this argument must be left for the possibility that a strongly favourable self-assessment may reflect a 'defense' against disapproval and criticism - rather than an adjusted or integrated personality.

In this Introductory Chapter, the variables of principal interest have been introduced. This has been basically a unilateral presentation of each and has not therefore allowed for any considerable discussion of interrelationships among the variables. The following two chapters will attempt to rectify this by examining various hypothesised interrelationships among the three principal variables of the Thesis. The chapter immediately following this introduction, discusses the association of guilt feelings and self-evaluation; and the next chapter then goes on to consider the 'Christian Conscience' and some relationships between Christian religious belief and feelings of guilt.

CHAPTER 2


Guilt Feelings and Self Evaluation

'A study of some interrelationships'

Chapter 2


Guilt Feelings and Self-Evaluation

It has already been suggested that self-evaluation is affected by personal adjustment or maladjustment whichever the case may be. What is now to be considered is the mutual incompatibility of feelings of self-satisfaction, or self-acceptance, and feelings of guilt. This comparison is complicated by the fact that feelings of guilt as a form of self-mediated punishment involve an unfavourable or negative self-attitude - by definition. Consequently it is 'self-awareness' that mediates feelings of guilt, and feelings of guilt act to produce a certain self-awareness. For example, a person who is cognitively aware of discrepancy between his 'behaviour' and the 'ideal' will tend to feel guilty. Thus the proposed sequence of events is:



However, there is an important corollary to this. The emotional reaction, in itself, stimulates a form of self-awareness - arousing the person to consciousness of the significance of the discrepancy. Thus the affective reaction can be said to highlight the existence and extent of

the cognition of discrepancy. Hence:



Thus the cognition and the emotion are contiguous parts of the total self-awareness. Self-evaluation is accordingly based on an assessment of behaviours in relationship to ideals and also on assessment of resultant feelings. Thus if the self-assessment is: "I am immoral", "I offend my parents", "I don't get on with other people", "I am a failure" and so on, then the self-assessment as an 'affective' self attitude might be: "I hate myself". Thus the emotional reaction, as well as the cognition of attitudes and behaviours acts to produce a 'self-attitude'. This 'self-attitude' is in part dependent on such emotions as guilt feelings and cannot wholly be considered independently of these guilt feelings.

Ausubel (19) asserts that before guilt can 'operate' the individual must accept certain standards of right and wrong - or good and bad - as

his own. Secondly he must accept the obligation of regulating his behaviour to conform to whatever standards he has thus adopted, and must feel accountable for lapses from them. Also he must possess sufficient self-critical ability to recognise when a discrepancy between behaviour and internalised values occurs. Thus Ausubel asserts that self-critical self-awareness is an essential component of morality and feelings of guilt.

R.S. Albert (4) mentions three dimensions of self-attitude representing three aspects of feelings of guilt, which he says are operative in cases of 'moral anxiety'. The first dimension concerns whether the guilt feelings are specific or general in scope. This is the dimension of 'extensiveness'. "How much of his behaviour does the person feel guilty about?" This variable would influence whether or not certain information imparted to him from others or deduced by himself would be relevant to his self-evaluation. The second dimension calls into the question the individual's awareness of this particular aspect of his behaviour and whether or not he can adequately verbalise his feelings. The third dimension of self-attitude is 'intensity'. "To what degree does the person feel guilty?" Obviously it matters very greatly to the generation of a self-attitude as to whether the person felt a great deal of guilt for a large segment of his 'Self', only a few qualms for the same proportion, a great deal of guilt for one specific aspect, but only a little guilt for the rest of his self; or a little guilt for just one aspect of his self." (Albert: 4). Thus the extensiveness and intensity of feelings of guilt can be regarded as important constituent variants of self-attitude.

The maintenance of a positive self-attitude depends on the perception of a certain compatibility between the ideal self and the 'real' self. An individual who behaves in a way commensurate with his ideals and values experiences a level of self-esteem that accords with his behaviour. Normally, then, the 'conscience' functions in a positive manner - maintaining, through the control of behaviour and attainment of ideals, a high degree of self-esteem. However, when an individual does fail to live up to his central values or approximate these at an acceptable level, his feelings of guilt and qualms of conscience will be proportionate and appropriate to his violation. However, when he has made what restitution is possible and remedied the situation in whatever ways he can - he will not normally continue to feel guilt, but will be able to achieve equilibrium on the basis of his own capacity for self-love and restoration of self-esteem. Some behaviour, murder for example, is sufficiently gross as to defy 'internal redress' - apart from external social and institutional responses and help mediated by a priest or a therapist and in ^{the} event these may be precluded. Nevertheless, apart from such extremes, it is only the pathologically guilty person who maintains a continuous self-negating attitude and who is incapable of a variety of flexible self-attitudes varying from healthy self-esteem to self-punishing guilt and back again. However, the pathologically guilty person may express a sort of 'pseudo' self-esteem - but this is just an artifice.

Once an individual has developed the capacity to accept himself and to accept forgiveness, and 'feel' forgiveness for guilt producing behaviour, he has

achieved a level of autonomy that ensures he is capable of restoring self-esteem and making reparation for guilt. Nevertheless, some people are more prone than others to feelings of guilt and 'self-criticality'. In spite of the capacity to expiate guilt, the susceptibility to experience feelings of guilt is a factor that functions to reduce the individual's self-esteem. This does not mean that the anticipation of feelings of guilt predisposes the individual to be self-critical and self-recriminating, nor does it necessarily imply that past misdeeds lead to persistent feelings of remorse and self-recrimination. What this does seem to suggest is that, depending on the extent, intensity, and probability of occurrence of feelings of guilt, 'self-esteem' is proportionately lessened. Thus 'guilt-proneness', or in other words the susceptibility to feelings of guilt, tends to predispose the individual to make unfavourable and generally 'negative' self-evaluations.

The foregoing discussion distinguishes the 'probability of occurrence' of feelings of guilt from the 'anticipation' of feelings of guilt. When comparing guilt feelings and self-evaluation it is important that 'guilt potential' and 'guilt proneness' measures are differentiated. The term 'guilt potential' is used to describe the extensiveness of 'conscience surveillance' over behaviour. Thus a person whose moral values cover an extensive selection of behaviour and impulses may thereby have a high guilt potential - but this does not signify that this person is proportionately more susceptible to guilt feelings and thus to negative self-evaluation.

It may well be that the extensiveness of the moral codes of conduct merely predispose the individual to a rather more strict control of his behaviour so as to avoid more 'wrongdoing'. Consequently the complete reverse of a negative self-evaluation may result. The extensiveness of moralism may reflect the individual's high moral ideals, good conduct and self control, therefore the 'guilt potential' is then commensurate with 'self esteem'. Also the fact that a person anticipates a very intense feeling of self recrimination for the violation of some moral precept does not thereby signify a greater susceptibility to intense feelings of guilt. Rather it signifies just a greater 'potential' and that is all. Hence a 'potentially' punitive and stringent conscience in no way necessarily predisposes feelings of negative self-evaluation. The awareness of a potentially punitive and extensive moralism enables the 'conscience' to act as a 'watchdog' rather than as a self-destructive or self-condemning agent.

The distinction between the terms 'potential' and 'proneness' is emphasised by their respective dictionary definitions. 'Potential' implies that the guilt feelings are latent, existing in possibility but not in actuality. On the other hand, 'proneness' refers to the tendency or propensity, or liability to 'feel guilt'. Thus guilt proneness indicates the ease with which self-punishing feelings are elicited. Thus susceptibility to guilt feelings will depend more on the persistence of self-mediated punishment for past misdeeds - or on self-condemning feelings because of specific or nonspecific violations of the 'ideals' or 'codes of conduct' of the individual.

A person who has violated a specific moral precept will thereby be

exposed to feelings of remorse and self-hatred. The intensity of the negative self-feeling will depend on the immutability of the precept contravened - relative to the moral values of the particular individual. A person may be negatively self-evaluating, however, because of quite non-specific feelings of guilt and sinfulness. These feelings may stem from the conviction that 'behaviour' is incompatible with 'Ideals'. Thus 'ontological guilt' and the 'ontological anxiety of guilt' as Tillich would call it (203) facilitates self-criticism and self-denigration. This negative self-evaluation may not be related to one specific comparison between a 'behaviour' and an 'ideal' - but may emanate from an awareness of a variety of discrepancies. The feeling of 'shortcoming' thus becomes less related to particular acts and develops into a general, nonspecific feeling of self-criticality and dissatisfaction. Hence the interaction of the 'self' and the 'ideals of self' promotes or reduces self-esteem. The extent of this 'ontological guilt', or the feelings of anxiety associated with this ontological guilt, depends on the relative proximity of the two variants 'self' and 'ideal self' and on the ability of the individual to 'self-objectify'. Block and Thomas write: (38)

"The satisfaction or concern of an individual with his 'phenomenal self' is a datum of great importance. Much behaviour becomes coherent when understood in terms of the 'ideal self' toward which an individual aspires, and his very personal evaluation of how close he sees himself to this ideal."


Empirical studies relating the variables of self-evaluation and feelings of guilt

1. Linear relationships

Argyle (17) deduces from previous studies of socialisation that two predictions can be made: that 'withdrawal of love' techniques will result in guilt feelings; and that physical punishment will result in self-aggression. Thus, in one sense anyway, 'guilt' is said to consist of the withdrawal of love or approval from the 'self'. Argyle claims that this occurs because of the 'introjection' of the love-withdrawing parent, or alternatively, the introjection of the 'punishing parent'. However, it may be that 'withdrawal of self love', cannot in actuality be differentiated from 'self-aggression'. Certainly both 'types of guilt' are associated with a negative and intrapunitive self-attitude. If this reasoning is correct then there should be a strong relationship between the affirmation of feelings of guilt and self-criticality or self-rejection. The more extensive or intensive the guilt feelings - correspondingly the greater the self-aggression.

Robinson and Argyle (181) used a measure of 'self-superego' conflict based on Osgood's semantic differential in a comparison of self-evaluation with feelings of guilt. The concept of 'self' was described as "the kind of person I actually am", and the concept of 'superego' was described as "the kind of person I ought to be". The concern of Robinson and Argyle was to measure the discrepancy between the 'self-rating' and the 'superego' or ideal-self rating and to compare this discrepancy with a measure of guilt

feelings. They hypothesised that there would be a positive correlation between the extent of self/superego conflict and the guilt feelings of individuals. The measure of guilt feeling used involved a number of specific violations of standards of behaviour admitted by students - and they had to indicate how guilty they felt about them. Robinson and Argyle thus postulate a positive linear relationship between self-superego conflict (self-ideal discrepancy) and guilt. This is schematically represented below:



They found from their results that there is indeed a positive linear relationship. Also they discovered a rather higher correlation between guilt and self/superego discrepancy on the evaluation factors alone of the semantic differential.

Bethlehem (31) has also found a significant linear relationship between discrepancy scores and guilt scores. But Nicholas (167) did not find a significant positive relationship between 'self-ideal' discrepancy and guilt. His hypothesis was that significant differences in mean self-ideal

discrepancy would be found among three levels of guilt: "High guilt", "middle guilt" and "low guilt", and he specified the following rank order in mean self-ideal discrepancy:

High guilt > Middle guilt > Low guilt

Although this hypothesis was not sustained by his results - he did find a significant negative relationship between guilt scores and 'self-acceptance' scores. This suggests that self-dissatisfaction is related to feelings of guilt and he thus confirmed the following hypothesised rank order in mean self-acceptance.


Low guilt > Middle guilt > High guilt

Nicholas, by assuming that self-ideal discrepancy relates to personality adjustment, comes to the conclusion that there is no significant relationship between guilt and personality adjustment. However, guilt appears to be definitely related to self-acceptance.

2. Curvilinear relationships

One of the reasons for Nicholas' inability to find a linear relationship between guilt feelings and self-ideal discrepancy might have been because of a contaminating curvilinear component in the relationship. Block and Thomas (38) have identified such a component in a comparison of self-dissatisfaction with measures of maladjustment. They found, firstly, the expected result that a large discrepancy between a respondent's perceived self and ideal self goes along with maladjustment as defined in the MMPI

scales (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory). Thus individuals expressing self-dissatisfaction score significantly higher on the Hypochondriasis, Depression, Psychopathic personality, Psychasthenia and Schizophrenia scales. However, the MMPI allows too many 'false negatives', that is, it fails to discern individuals whose pathology leaves them socially appropriate and who are clever or defensive enough to 'fake good'. Block and Thomas present evidence to show that these maladjusted people would score very low on self-dissatisfaction or 'self-ideal' discrepancy by manifesting a response profile close to that of their ideal. Hence Block and Thomas point to a curvilinear relationship between measures of maladjustment and self-dissatisfaction:




Those individuals with very low self-ideal discrepancies are thus using repressive and denying defenses.

3. A repressor-sensitiser hypothesis

Altrocchi et al (16) attempted further specification of the variables related to self-ideal discrepancies by investigating whether people with different defenses or 'modes of adaption' differ in self-ideal discrepancy ratings. Altrocchi et al suggest that there are basically two modes of adaptation to a potential threat or conflict such as those mediating guilt or anxiety. The modes of adaptation are either 'repression' or 'sensitisation'. These are terms derived from the 'perceptual defense' theories of Lazarus, Erikson and Fonda (140) and Gordon (107). Repressors are those who tend to use avoidance, denial and repression of potential threat and conflict as a primary mode of adaptation. Thus repressors are more unaware of negative attitudes, more ready to focus on the positive qualities of themselves and others. They will thus appear to have a small discrepancy between self and ideal self (cf. Leary 141). 'Sensitisers,' on the other hand, are those who are alerted to and perhaps overinterpret potential threat and conflict and whose use: "intellectual and obsessive defences" as a primary mode of adaptation. They tend to ruminate about threat, conflict and the negative qualities of themselves and others (cf. Gordon 107) and thus they can be expected to manifest a high self-ideal discrepancy. Sensitisers will have more negative, for example more hostile and submissive self-concepts, than repressors and therefore a greater discrepancy between 'self' and 'ideal self'. If one accepts the repressor-sensitiser hypothesis - then going by the self-report of the respondents, the expected relationship between guilt feelings and self-ideal discrepancy,


or any measure of self-dissatisfaction or self-criticality, would be as represented below:




Bethlehem (31) however, takes up the cudgels for the curvilinear component hypothesis by suggesting that both repressors and sensitizers will be, really, more prone to feelings of guilt. He says that people with a high discrepancy could be expected to feel guilty for failure to match their concept of the ideal. This much seems a reasonably logical and defensible prediction. However, one might enquire as to the 'status' of those who are scoring low on "self-ideal discrepancy". They either do so because they are repressing self-criticism - and thus one would expect them to have low

guilt feelings as well; or they are genuinely living close to their ideal. If the latter statement is right, then, following the 'intuition' of Bethlehem and the hypotheses of Freud, they are more prone to feelings of guilt because the maintenance of their 'ideal' of good conduct "requires the exercise of considerable effort a likely good to which is guilt". Bethlehem goes on to suggest that individuals in the middle area of discrepancy scores are likely to be 'complacent', or 'well-adjusted'.

Thus we now have two alternative hypotheses proposed. The first, a linear hypothesis, is supported by the work of Robinson and Argyle and also the work of Altrocchi et al - though each proposes a linear relationship for different reasons. However, if one accepts Bethlehem's hypothesis and the evidence given by Block and Thomas that both high and low self-ideal discrepancies relate to maladjustment and personality disorder, then from the responses of the subjects it should be possible to detect a curvilinear component:



Additional theoretical confirmation for this curvilinear relationship is given by Freud's view that good conduct may reflect a strong superego and thus more guilt. Empirical validation of this curvilinear hypothesis is claimed by Bethlehem who found a significant curvilinear component in his results. However, the curvilinearity observed by Bethlehem in a scattergram reveals a rather abbreviated parabolic scatter which can be represented as follows:



Thus, in spite of the statistically significant nonlinearity there is not thereby actually much support for the Freudian theory, or for Bethlehem's intuitions that those close to their ideal will be 'goaded' by feelings of guilt. The abbreviated form of the parabola representing the scattergram can only tentatively hint at a low self-ideal discrepancy/high guilt association. What appears to be more significant in Bethlehem's results is the linear component. The coefficient of correlation was found

by Bethlehem to be: $r = +0.80$ (Product Moment), and the coefficient of nonlinear regression was: $\eta = +0.897$. The "F" ratio for the significance of the nonlinear coefficient was very large. ($F = 32.9$, $df = 16, 127$; $p < 0.001$). The strong evidence for linearity ($r = 0.8$) is rather confounded by the very significant component of nonlinearity. This result is uncommon in that it is usually a low correlation coefficient that obscures a curvilinear component in the relationship. One normally looks for some curvilinear component, or other nonlinear component, when the correlation coefficient is near zero, or at least statistically insignificant. (cf. Guildford, 112, pp.308-317).

In spite of the impressive statistical significance attributed to Bethlehem's coefficient of nonlinearity; the description of his scattergram and the correlation coefficient obtained suggest that the linear component in the comparison was the dominant component. This kind of linearity was predicted by Robinson and Argyle (181) and by Altrocchi et al (16). The failure by Nicholas (167) to find linearity is an interesting deviation from the other results. This Thesis will, in part, attempt to test for the type of relationship that exists between measures of guilt feelings (Guilt proneness and guilt potential) and measures of self-attitude (self-ideal discrepancy and self-criticality).

CHAPTER 3

"The Christian Conscience"

- (i) Christian religious belief and moral and ethical standards.
- (ii) Christian religious belief, guilt feelings and sinfulness.
- (iii) Conclusions, and some questions.

Chapter 3
"The Christian Conscience"

(i) Christian religious belief and moral and ethical standards

This first section will be subdivided under the following list of headings:

- a. Introduction
- b. Religion and morality: a common source?
- c. The Christian Ethic: a statement
- d. Some Biblical referents of the Christian Ethic and moral standards
- e. The Christian Ethic: "Ought"
- f. The Christian religious sanction
- g. The Christian Conscience
- h. Social and ascetic morality.

(a) Introduction

Prior to the consideration of relationships between Christian religious belief and guilt feelings, it is first necessary to consider the association of religious belief and morality. The existence of moral values in society is sustained by the threat of self-mediated punishment as well as by the threat of sanctions from institutions within society.

If Christian religious belief has the effect of extending and intensifying moral codes of conduct, then, compared with a less moralist group, adherents to the Christian Faith will have a correspondingly greater

'potential' for guilt feelings. Therefore it is predicted that over a wider range of behaviour, the censoriousness of the Christian conscience is a factor that differentiates it from that of 'non-believers'. The distinction here is between the 'devout' Christian and the 'uncommitted' person. In spite of the factor of 'censoriousness' one can say that a Christian's conscience is not necessarily a 'reservoir' of taboos, and that Christians in general are ^{not} preoccupied with fears of violating immutable codes of conduct. Such a conclusion would give the impression that the Christian conscience was wholly 'immature' - that is based on 'fear' rather than 'love'. Whilst this may be true of many Christians and non-Christians alike it would be wrong to impute 'immaturity' of moral judgement to either group.

However, it may be that there are some aspects of the 'Christian conscience' that serve to differentiate it. Certain ideals of life, and altruistic ideas are consistent with the essence of the Christian Ethic, which is 'love'. This rather more positive concept will be considered later. To begin with, however, it is worthwhile noting some of the ideas on the common origin of religion, morality and conscience.

b. Religion and Morality: a common source?

As R.B. Cattell (60, p.84) remarks, the majority of anthropologists agree that morality and religion are to be found: "budding from a common stem in all eras and among all peoples of the earth. The manifold taboos which regulate the lives of savages are as closely connected with their colourful background of animism as the ten commandments of Moses are bound up with the one true God." Of course, this does not mean, as Cattell

hastens to add, that morality is therefore always related to religious emotions. He gives the example of Confucianism as a system of morals practically devoid of religious emotion. There are also the so-called 'rationally' derived moralities. J.S. Mill insisted that the real object of all morals is the 'common good'. He rejected the religious sanction in morals. E.L. Thorndike takes up the question of analysing the psychological needs of a good life - he implicitly takes the 'goal of morality' to be something akin to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Nevertheless, some have found it impossible to accept any rational or scientific explanation of morality. Kant resorted to the almost mystical conception of the 'categorical imperative' as an absolute and innate moral sense in man; and Newton never questioned the divine origin of the ten commandments. Even Bertrand Russell, attacking religion, is nevertheless sure that science has nothing to say about values and cannot prove such propositions as: "it is better to love than to hate". However, R.B. Cattell's own views are summarised in this extract from his book (p.87):

"Morality is included in science by two steps: 1. The goal of human endeavour is not invented from the philosopher's inner consciousness, but is deduced from the observation of man's strivings in the general biological setting. 2. The specific laws of behaviour which will best enable men to approach this goal are calculated according to the facts and principles supplied by sociology, biology, economics and psychology."

However, whether or not morality can be included in science, there is little doubt that religion and morality have common roots. Freud (93) states that the common origins of religious practices and belief with conscience can be found in 'totemism'. Freud doesn't claim that totemism is the only origin of religious belief - or the only explanation of it - but he claims it as one explanation. Totemism is a system which takes the place of a religion among certain primitive peoples of Australia, America and Africa and provides the basis of their social organisation. The totemic religion includes certain important inviolable rules and conditions - known as taboos. Freud postulated that religion, like totemism, is an illusion. He maintained that it arose and is sustained by feelings of guilt. Freud's 'myth-like' tale of the origin of totemism and taboos goes something like this: When men were more or less ape-like creatures, the dominant father-male of the horde kept all the females for himself. His sons, after tolerating this for a while, finally grew impatient, rebelled, and killed and ate the father thus gaining access to the females. But this murder caused the sons to feel remorseful so they instituted taboos on eating their totem, identified with the father. Incest taboos also derived from this primordial act. However, the totem was devoured ceremonially from time to time thus commemorating and renewing the guilt. Freud's theory of religion is contained in his allegorical story - for the devoured father is also 'God'. Thus in totemism Freud sees a primal morality and primal religion springing from the common source. Both religion and morality,

it is implied, are sustained by the emotions of fear and guilt - ritualistic religious practices being evidence of an attempt to expiate guilt and appease 'God'. It is true that primitive religions do carry with them strict prohibitions which are closely associated with social interaction, for example, in Judaism, where the ten commandments include prohibitions on stealing, killing, adultery, and so on. Clearly, morality and conscience as the medium of guilt feelings based on the violation of moral codes, has been in harness with religion from its earliest conceptions.

Taboos lead to the threat of an individual 'becoming taboo' if a taboo item is touched or interfered with. This evolves into the need for 'purification' and 'sacrifice' if one has 'offended' the totem. With animism "spirit appeasement" rites and rituals are proliferated. With Theistic religions 'God' represents the Totem and He must be appeased. Freud (93, p.146) comments on what he considers to be the close connection between the concepts of 'totems' and 'gods'. Gods are often represented in animal form in primitive religion, or each God has an animal sacred to him. In mythology the god is often depicted as able to transform himself into an animal, and frequently into the animal that is sacred to him. The animal sacrifices were used as an offering of repentance to the deity - thus allaying guilt. (cf. O'Doherty - 170).

In Christian religious belief, Christ is considered the ultimate and absolute sacrifice: "The lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the World" (John 1. v.29). In Freud's terms the death of Christ is just a

conceptual form of appeasement of a 'just' and angry God. None can claim exemptions from the judgment of the angry God because "all have sinned" (Romans 3, v.23) - that is, consciously or unconsciously violated divinely appointed laws and ordinances. Thus the Christian belief is that all mankind needs to 'appease' the deity, and failure to do this is considered by many Christians to result in the ultimate destruction of the unrepentant by the deity.

c. The Christian Ethic

Personal morality, as the previous section discusses, is considered by 'believers' to be affected by 'cosmic' as well as 'social' influences and standards. Belgum (26) discusses these dimensions of morality in terms of a 'triad of morality' involving the three categories of 'theology', 'law' and 'medicine' these he relates in this following schematisation:

The Categories of Morality

Discipline	Theology	Law	Medicine
1. Dimension	Cosmic	Social	Personal
2. Subject	Creator	The Church	Imago Dei
3. Ethical Obligation	Love God	Love Neighbour	Love Self

Thus Belgum links the cosmic, social and personal aspects of morality with the triad of Ethical obligations which is the kernel of the Christian

Ethic. Christ's summary of the law, which is recorded nine times in the New Testament, was:

"Love God and your neighbour as yourself"

(Mark 12, vv.29-33)

This involves the three ethical obligations constituting the essence of Christian morality. Belgum develops his own concept of actualisation by inferring that 'personal morality' is to some extent dependent on self-acceptance, or self love, as this he considers to be the obverse of personal maladjustment. His argument is that if one is created: 'Imago Dei' then this should be a factor to promote the optimum integration of personality. Thus, the Christian Ethic embraces three dimensions of morality-a constituent, and positive, part of which is 'self-love'.

d. Some Biblical referents of the Christian Ethic and Moral Standards

Christ's teaching on morality provides the germinal source of the content of the Christian Ethic. His teaching on 'morality' is principally found in what is known as the "Sermon on the Mount" (Matthew, Chapter 5). In this chapter Christ is reported to speak against anger and murder (v.21-23); against adultery and impure thoughts (v.27-30) - actually equating these offences. Thus he is reported as saying that the 'impulse' to perform an act is, in God's sight, the same as the committal of that act. Christ confirms the 'sacredness of marriage' (v.31-32) and exhorts the listeners to simple truthfulness of speech (v.33-37) and to love their enemies (v.43-47). Finally he says:

"You are to be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect"

In this way the Christian standard is set. The moral behaviour associated with this standard is expounded by St. Paul in his letters. He speaks against lying, swearing and aggression (Ephesians 4, v.25-32), and against 'evil habits' (Colossians 3, v.8f), and exhorts Christians to 'moral purity' (I. Thess. 4, v.3-8).

This brief introduction to some of the Biblical references identifies some of the specific and general aspects of the Christian Ethic and moral standards. What develops from this is that there appears to be two sides to Christian teaching or morality. Firstly the Christians are exhorted to 'love' and secondly the Christians are exhorted to 'purity', 'holiness' and 'perfection.' The first exhortation is principally cosmic and social, the second is rather more personal and is often associated with 'ascetic denial' as it is called. The fulfilment of the 'general' aspect of the Christian Ethic, that is: 'love', depends on the observation of specific standards and ordinances some of which have already been mentioned.

e. The Christian Ethic: "Ought"

The moral sense particularly of the Christian conscience depends on the awareness of what 'ought to be'. The 'categorical imperative', a term used by the philosopher Kant for a moral law which must be accepted unconditionally, develops from the unaware compulsion "I must" to the self-aware: "I ought". With this self-awareness comes the realisation of personal responsibility in moral judgements. Failure to follow the "ought

to" direction leads to feelings of self-mediated punishment - determined and produced by the 'conscience'. At this point the 'conscience' could be conceptually defined as a system of values and principles and attitudes that are accepted as normative and binding upon moral and ethical behaviour. Guilt feelings thus constitute an affective response conditional upon a cognitive awareness of the violation of the "ought to" rule. "Ought to" implies a moral obligation to do something. The moral obligations of the Christian are both generally and specifically defined in the New Testament, and thus Christian religious belief and moralism, or moral idealism are closely associated.

f. The Christian Religious Sanction

St. Paul said "The good that I would I do not the evil that I would not that I do". St. Paul's words (Romans 7, v.19) reflect a common difficulty found by most human beings ; that is the great difficulty of doing what "one ought to do". This failure leads to feelings of guilt and remorse particularly where 'religion' is used as a consequent and dominant sanction.

Swainson (197) says that in the 'second stage' of childhood, between the years 5-10, religion becomes a dominant sanction. Children at play are heard to say as a form of admonishment: "Jesus will punish you", and "You wicked girl - you'll go to hell". Kay (133, p.129) says that religious sanctions in one investigation were cited by 27% of primary school children and by 17% of the secondary school children. This is confirmed by Cox (65) who discovered that with different moral issues between 1.2% and 19.8% of the boys and between 1.6% and 30.3% of the girls in 6th forms cited

religious sanctions for their moral affirmations. However, for central (social) moral issues figures were considerably lower. For example, 3.6% of the boys and 5% of the girls gave religious sanctions to disapprove of lying, and 8% of the boys and 13.3% of the girls considered stealing to be wrong on religious grounds. Also, 5.8% of the boys and 17.6% of the girls considered that premarital sexual intercourse was wrong for religious reasons. Kay (133, p.124) states that studies with children have shown that the majority believe explicitly that God upholds the moral law. However, as children matured this view declined somewhat - but never finally disappeared. Hilliard's (119) work with students in an establishment of higher education found that almost all the students believed that the Christian Gospel was a satisfactory moral guide, and an overwhelming majority considered that belief in God was intimately related to moral uprightness. However, personal explanations of moral belief did not contain many references to religious sanctions as such. Swainson, agrees with Bovet (40) that the religious sanction is probably understood by children, by the "parentalising of the Deity" which conceptually is linked with the "deification of the parents". Thus the 'religious sanction' is conceptualised as the threat of a severe and punishing parent - and hence, if this is so, tends to influence children more than adults.

g. The Christian Conscience

Allport (12) argues that in spite of the 'negative' aspect of religious sanctions and the "prohibitive" aspects of moral codes of conduct the principal product of the Christian Faith is to provide the positive

dimension of 'love' and affiliation. Allport says that the needs for 'love', security and affiliation, - the need for acceptance, are of paramount importance and Christianity helps satisfy these needs (p.93). Allport warns against reifying or fragmenting conscience. In this latter case he says that when one speaks of a social conscience, a professional conscience, or a religious conscience - this does not mean that each person has an indefinite number of separate 'sensitisers'. Allport says that there is as much unity of conscience as there is unity of personality. With reference to the dimension of 'love' and 'affiliation' Allport distinguishes between the mature functioning of conscience, and the immature functioning - based on childish issues. A similar distinction is discussed by Fromm (98).

"The mark of an immature conscience is its authoritarian nature. It is ridden by a sense of obedience, self-sacrifice, duty and resignation. The victim fears to lose the approval of the father-figure (The Fuhrer, the priest, the deity) who dominates an essentially childish superego."

In this case the "I must" compulsion predominates. Fromm contrasts this with the mature conscience which he says is "... animated by the adult sentiment of self-chosen goals and ideals, by a continuously productive relation between the individual and his surrounding world". The difference between Fromm's distinction and Allport's lies in Fromm's insinuation that the Christian conscience is immature. Allport's comment on this suggests that Fromm has mistakenly assumed that a religious conscience, almost of necessity, is an authoritarian, immature conscience. However, as Allport

says:

"The individual in his course of maturing may rediscover for himself the essential truths of his religion, and thus incorporate them into a wholly productive and rational conscience."

The fact that Christian doctrine may be accepted in a 'supine' manner by some people does not invalidate the doctrine nor prevent its wholehearted acceptance by an individual who in the course of his quest discovers its relevance to the totality of his own life experience. It does not follow, therefore, as Fromm concludes, "that the only mature ethics must be humanistic ethics".

However, one cannot ignore the fact, as Lee (143) observes, that there is a type of Christianity that concentrates in its moral teaching on developing a "sense of sin" (143, p.146). As an acknowledgement of the guilt for falling short of the 'ideal' all sorts of penances may be encouraged such as rigid discipline of life, fasting, and actions of duty. This type of Christianity could perhaps be termed: 'religio-moralistic masochisms'. Lee calls this the 'superego' type of religion. This type of religious belief emphasises the wrath of God and man's guilt, and it strives to deepen the sense of having sinned so that to escape the seemingly inevitable destruction man turns to God to seek the mercies he has provided in his remedies. Belief in Christ as the supreme remedy provides a way of escape from the condemnation of the superego or conscience. Lee comments (p.155) that belief in the Christian religion should not merely be to relieve the individual from his sense of guilt and thus to clear his

conscience. He differentiates this 'superego' religion from an 'ego' religion which he says is more akin to that of Christ. This appears to be very similar in description to Allport's 'mature' Christian conscience. Here the conscience is seen as a guide rather than as a dictator, and morality is considered to be a benevolent institution rather than as malevolent and prohibitive. In 'ego-religion' one identifies with Christ out of 'love and trust' rather than out of 'fear and guilt'. Thus God is not only to be considered as the 'sanction' of morality but also, conceptually, as a source of meaningfulness and love.

The Christian doctrines of 'atonement', in as much as these refer to reconciliation with God through Jesus Christ, have or can have a dual effect. Christian doctrine could relate to an 'immature', 'superego' religion, where the emphasis was on the expurgation of guilt; or to a mature, 'ego' religion where the emphasis was on a relationship of 'love'. The first, 'superego', characteristic involves 'obedience and involves the appeasement of the hostile 'God' - the judge, the condemner of sins. The other characteristic involves the 'attainment' which infers the fulfilment of the ego-ideal in God and Christianity and the discovery of the meaning of existence, and the meaning of love. In this latter case the Christian conscience and ethic is essentially dominated by 'love-morality'; whereas in the former case the Christian conscience and ethic is essentially dominated by conceptions of justice, retribution, punishment, guilt and sinfulness. Where the essence of the Christian Ethic is love - then moral

obligation ceases to be the primary and predominant aspect and becomes subordinate to the virtues of faith, hope, and love, of which the latter is the greatest.

h. Social and Ascetic Morality

There appears to be a strong relationship between the Christian religion and morality - but are religious people therefore more moral? One might hazard a guess that in many cases secularists may be morally better than Christians. Kinsey (cited in Middleton and Putney, 158) found, for instance, that the religious less often violated traditional sexual mores, but religious students were not more or less likely to cheat. Rather more recently (August 1970, 219) Hans Mol confirmed that Christian young people were much more likely to be virgins when they married than non-Christians. However, investigators, such as Cox and Hilliard did not find any difference between Christians' and non-Christians - where central aspects of morality such as 'lying' and 'stealing' were concerned. Middleton and Putney (158), commenting on the confusion surrounding the relationship between religion and morality, say that this confusion derives from a failure to differentiate two different kinds of ethical standards. These two bases of morality are described as 'ascetic' and 'social' ethical standards.

Social standards are defined as those which proscribe actions which, in general, are harmful to the social group: shared by religious and non-religious alike. The fact, then, that religious ideology may also proscribe these actions is incidental. An example of a violation of a social standard

would be 'cheating', or 'stealing' or "striking another person in anger". Ascetic standards, on the other hand are defined as: "abstinence from sensual indulgences" - gambling, sex, and so on - which derive primarily from an ascetic religious tradition. But since such violations are usually not directly or obviously harmful to the social group - at least in moderation - ascetic standards have less persuasiveness to the secularly orientated individual.

Middleton and Putney found that 'believers' are more likely than 'sceptics' to regard 'anti-ascetic' actions as wrong, and they are less likely than sceptics to engage in them. This was the only significant difference between the two groups that ^{they} were able to find. The groups did not differ in how often they believed that 'anti-social' actions are wrong, or in how likely they are to engage in them. So Middleton and Putney concluded that religious variables are not correlated with antisocial behaviour at all.

Subsequently, however, further investigation has shown that Christians do differ from non-Christians on some measures of social morality. Wright and Cox (216) in general found support for the findings of Middleton and Putney - the more ascetic the moral issue, the greater the difference between the responses of religious and non-religious subjects. However, the results differed from those of Middleton and Putney in that even for the most 'social' or 'central' item, religious subjects tend to be more severe than other subjects.

This latter result seems more reasonable bearing in mind the consideration that the Christian respondents would give to their moral

judgements, because for the devoted Christian all his behaviour 'concerns' God. Thus even 'stealing' for the Christian may be considered a more heinous offence, compared with a non-Christian's evaluation of the offence. Thus the 'religious sanction' should increase the extent of moral condemnation and thus intensify the severity of the offence - should any moral principle be violated. From an analysis of the comments made by subjects in Wright and Cox's investigation a clear difference was detected between the 'devout' and the non-religious. The non-religious tend to argue that, if a form of behaviour has no undesirable consequences for other people then it is not a legitimate matter for the moral evaluation of others. On the other hand, the devout claim that the individual's life is not his own, that all his behaviours concern God, and that hence there is no part of it which may not be the subject of moral-evaluation on occasion. However, just as Allport and Fromm could distinguish between mature and immature morality, so Wright and Cox noticed that moral belief may serve more than one function for Christians. Some of the Christians expressed considerable disgust for anti-ascetic behaviour. They condemn it because it could involve loss of self-control and self-respect, and the giving way to 'animal' instincts of fear and lust. As Wright and Cox note, such reasons when coupled with appeals to absolute authority in support of an unqualified condemnation of the anti-ascetic act suggest that the moral beliefs are serving a defensive function. This implies that the 'conscience' is primarily an immature, authoritarian instrument for controlling behaviour.

On the other hand, some Christian subjects were found to be more concerned with future personal development, and see the ascetic moral rules as the necessary condition of growth with self-respect and responsibility. Such subjects, say Wright and Cox, though they condemn anti-ascetic behaviour, are likely to qualify their judgements with the recognition that under certain circumstances such behaviour is not detrimental to personal integrity. These subjects do draw attention to the fact that religious belief, in addition to all its other functions, can serve to support a programme of personal development.

Hence, moral beliefs, can be said to be both an integrating and destructive factor in personality development. Just as Christian religious belief can be a 'restricting' or 'freeing' agent. Christianity and moral belief can combine to produce both positive and negative effects on 'adjustment' and self-esteem - depending on whether moral censoriousness is seen as an end in itself, or whether moralism is accepted only as a means to an end, the goal being self-actualisation and a fully integrated personality. In this latter case the moral beliefs are modified in order to maximise self-esteem, self-respect and self-adjustment relative to ideals of conduct and life.

(ii) Christian Religious Belief, Guilt Feelings and Sinfulness

This second section develops the relationship between religious belief and feelings of guilt and sinfulness. The section basically consists of two parts as follows:

- (a) The concepts of 'sin' and 'guilt', some relationships.
- (b) Religious belief, practices and the association of feelings of sinfulness and guilt.

a. Sin and Guilt

Overstreet (172) asserts that no problem has blocked understanding between religion and psychology as much as the problem of 'guilt' or 'sin'. The Psychiatrist wants to relieve people of unreal and unmanageable faults and failures, whereas a religious concern is to have humility enough to confess one's failures and to make a new start, with faith and courage. As Overstreet remarks:

"There is truth in both positions, for guilt can be creative or uncreative."

To the religious mind feelings of sinfulness mean the same as feelings of guilt to the non-religious mind. The difference is that the Christian believes he is responsible for his action not only to fellow men - but also to God. English and English's (81) operational definition of "Sin" is:

"Conduct that violates what the offender believes to be a supernaturally ordained moral code."

The feelings associated will thus be a 'sense of sinfulness', or in other words: a sense of guilt. This sense of guilt consists of the

realisation that ethical, moral or religious principles have been violated which results in a regretful feeling of lessened personal worth on that account. Feelings of guilt and sinfulness both imply a self-awareness of personal responsibility for an offence and the resultant loss of self-respect. Thus guilt feelings can be considered as 'creative' if they make an individual 'aware of' a discrepancy and thus facilitate the reconciliation with others or 'with God'. However, the 'uncreative' aspects refer to 'loss of self-respect' and intrapunitiveness beyond the socialising or 'reconciling' aspects of feelings of guilt and sinfulness.

Naturally the term 'sinfulness' is really only a meaningful concept for the Christian person, though it may be 'understood' by non-Christians. This implies that religious people should be potentially more 'guilt-laden' because another dimension 'the cosmic' is added to their 'conscience'. Also religious people should be potentially more guilt-laden because of stricter standards of morality and ethics - especially those codes of conduct evolving from a puritanical upbringing. These two proposals of an interaction between religious belief and guilt feelings need careful scrutiny however. As Stern (194, p.173) points out, the fact that the individual believes in God, and talks in terms of 'sinfulness' rather than 'guilt' does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he, or indeed all religious people, more often feel guilty or more often suffer the 'anxiety of guilt' - though some may. Nor can one say that religious beliefs aggravate guilt feelings and anxiety - this too would be an overgeneralisation of the picture. However, it may well be that some Christian people by the very

nature of their religious beliefs are thereby more prone to feelings of guilt and sinfulness.

Little empirical research has been done on the topic of guilt - a fact noted in 1966 by Block and London (37). But, mainly from clinical evidence, it seems that guilt of one kind or another is apparently a prerequisite experience to the development of neuroses and psychoses (cf. Mowrer, 164). Generally, it is supposed to be 'irrational' or 'unreal' guilt that contributes to the development of a neurosis, but Mowrer has taken rather a divergent line on this point. Mowrer has more recently proposed the contrary theory that psychological disorders are more likely to result from 'real' guilt - that is guilt about misdeeds that one has committed, rather than merely 'felt' like doing. If Mowrer's theory is defensible then it has a very interesting bearing on the discussion of the relationship between Christian belief, guilt and psychological disorders. If the 'puritan' does something wrong, and consequently his rigid moral values are violated, then one might predict intense feelings of guilt and loss of self-respect. It would be such a moral perfectionist who would be most prone to neurosis and psychosis. Of course one might also predict that the 'puritan' is least likely to do 'something wrong' and so is able to effectively avoid both the anxiety of guilt and neurosis - more so than his secular counterpart. Nevertheless the risk remains that those who adhere to extremely strict moral codes and hedge themselves around with inviolable rules and duties, may also be those who would suffer most psychologically were they to offend in even: "the smallest point of the law".

However, one can see that the moral orders inherent in the existence and doctrine of the particular religious institutions may act either to prevent the occurrence of 'real guilt' by the advocacy of self-discipline, thus reducing the likelihood of offending moral values, or may serve to aggravate the feelings of guilt if inviolable codes are violated. Black and London (37) found that the 'potential' for feelings of guilt was greater for those whose conduct was influenced by religious attitudes and practices.

As for the 'experience' of or 'susceptibility to' feelings of guilt and sinfulness, empirical research suggests that religious subjects do not record more feelings of guilt or more anxiety and lack of self-esteem than non-religious subjects. Nicholas (167) predicted significant differences in mean guilt among three academic samples and specified the following rank order in mean guilt:

Theological seminary	>	Education	>	Business
(students)		(students)		(students)

However, this hypothesis was not confirmed. In contrast with this finding, there are those who suggest that religious belief can enhance guilt feelings. Malcolm France has recently (91) condemned the Church for its Pastoral failure in actually tending to increase guilt by moralising appeals and by exhorting people to try harder and be more disciplined and so on. France says (p.21)

"The Church has adopted confused and dangerous doctrines of guilt and self-rejection. Too often Christians have been

taught to believe that self-rejection is a virtue, and that the experience of guilt is wholesome and leads to repentance."

Certainly in support of France one could mention the fact that some preaching could be described as: "persuasive appeals based on fear". (For a psychological assessment of sermon content cf. Hilton). Elsewhere France attacks 'cheap moralism' as encouraging self-hatred and guilt. Whereas, in contrast, France prefers a mature self-accepting morality. France says that Jung (131) was nearer to a 'truer Christian' insight when he wrote:

"If the doctor wishes to help a human being he must be able to accept him as he is. And he can do this in reality only when he has already seen and accepted himself as he is."

Again one is confronted with the paradox of the Christian religion which at once seems to possess constructive, creative properties - associated with the 'truer Christian insight' and yet also seems to possess the potency to destroy, and aggravate guilt and self-hatred. The picture is further complicated when some (e.g. Mowrer) argue that the way to self-actualisation may lie through awareness of guilt and personal failure rather than defences against these. Guilt or sin may be thus considered, in these terms, to be a means to a more glorious 'end'. This kind of paradox is exemplified in the Christian doctrines of Sin.

b. Religious Belief, Practices and the Association of Feelings of Sinfulness and Guilt

James (126, p.293f) refers to the significance of asceticism in Christianity - self-denial, moral inhibitions and constraints. James notes

that ascetic activities have been systematised - especially by the Roman Catholics - who attempt to purge 'sin' by denying self through self-mortification (p.299). The first step to Christian Perfection, notes James, is the avoidance of sin:

"Sin proceeds from concupiscence, and concupiscence from our carnal passions and temptations - chief of which are pride, sensuality and loves of wordly excitement and possession. All these sources of sin must be resisted, and discipline and austerities are a most efficacious mode of meeting them"

Barbour (21, p.64f) suggests that man's ultimate ideal is the achievement of absolute perfection. He says that Christ is the only person, who as a human, has been perfect and whose personality was completely integrated with consummate love at its centre as the dominating sentiment. Thus to the Christian - Christ is the perfect personal and moral standard. Deviation from this standard is accordingly considered to be 'sin'. Barbour concludes that 'sin' is not merely violation of the moral law - but just failing to be 'good enough'. The line of the hymn that echoes this sentiment sums up the importance of Christ to many Christians: "There was no other good enough to pay the price of sin."

The Westminster short catechism says that sin is the transgression of, or lack of conformity to, the Law of God. Barbour expounds this by interpreting the phrase "the Law of God" as meaning the law of life as revealed in Christ. If one allows this reinterpretation and many Christians would,

then 'sin' can be considered as any deviation from the standards of Christ. In this case whether the 'deviation' is the result of ignorance, or done in the light of knowledge - it is none the less 'sin'. The fact that 'sin' can be extended by definition to include 'imperfection of any kind' incorporating sensuousness and selfishness as well as violation of immutable moral regulations, suggests that Christians who accept these points must be considerably more prone to feelings of sinfulness and guilt.

For the Christian, then, the implication of the word 'sin' and 'sinfulness' go rather deeper than a sense of moral guilt. The Christian believes that God is offended by the failure of mankind to live up to the perfect standard in Christ. If this, and the preceding discussion, was the whole story then one might defensibly hypothesise that orthodox Christians are considerably and consistently more prone to feelings of self-condemnation, remorse and a generally unfavourable self-evaluation. However, it is suggested that this is perhaps only half the story. If "unforgiven sin" brings a sense of guilt then a belief in "forgiven sin" brings peace of mind. The crucial term in this hypothesis is "Forgiveness".

Confession

The Christian religion 'because of' the central nature of the doctrine of 'Sin', is abundantly provided with the doctrines of God's mercy and forgiveness. However, the receipt of forgiveness is a doctrine which varies from denomination to denomination. However, a common factor, and a necessary prerequisite for the 'forgiveness of sin', is the confession of the

penitent sinner. Barbour says that to receive forgiveness, and thereby peace of mind, one must first acknowledge one's sins to the person against whom the sin was committed. To the Christian this means acknowledging the sin to God - as well as making reparation.

The practice of 'confessing sins' or 'confessing guilt' is something of a controversial doctrine within the Christian churches. There are both liturgical forms of confession and provision for personal and private confession of sins to God. The actual nature of the act of confession varies within Christendom and may, it is hypothesised, thereby have a differential effect on the proness to feelings of guilt. The official view of the Eastern Orthodox Church, for instance, says that every sin that is committed against man is also committed against God, and adds that it is not sufficient to confess and make retribution to the person injured - but that one should also confess to a priest who has spiritually inherited the power to forgive sin. The statement continues with this sentence:

"The Church urges frequent confession, especially before Holy Communion and during illness, so that the soul may ever be ready to stand before the judgement seat."

(This is quoted in Barbour from "The Spirit of the Eastern Orthodox Church"; advent papers series: Cincinnati. Forward movement publications pp.15,16 author: HRH Princess Ileana of Romania).

Also, in the order of confession for the Eastern Orthodox Churches:

"..... Ask God to give you grace to make a thorough examination of your conscience, courage to make a sincere and complete confession."

(quoted in Barbour, from "A pocket prayer book for Orthodox Christians Brooklyn, N.Y. 1956, pp.37-46, Syrian Orthodox Archdiocese).

Thus the practice of confession is encouraged ostensibly to "prepare the soul". The psychological effect one might suppose to be beneficial in that in spite of the increase in self-criticism produced by regular self-examination - the individual is reassured of the 'forgiveness of his sins by God' - mediated by the Priest.

In the Roman Catholic Church the 'sacrament of penance' is of equally vital importance:

"The sacrament of penance sometimes, in persons who are pious and who receive this sacrament with devotion, is wont to be followed by peace and serenity of conscience with exceeding consolation of spirit."

(According to the Council of Trent, Series 14, Chapter 3: "On the parts, and the fruit of the sacraments").

Also the instructions for a good confession consist of five necessary steps. Firstly the individual is required to examine his conscience and be 'sincerely sorry' for his sins. He must then fully confess his sins and resolve to amend his life. After his confession he is required to do the penance that the priest ascribes.

The Anglican and Lutheran view also emphasises the importance of confession but not necessarily through a priest or other intermediary. The requirement for confession is the honest acknowledgement of shortcomings to God with the resolve to live a better life.

The therapeutic value of confession has already been suggested in the extract quoted on the 'sacrament of penance'. Peace and serenity of conscience is offered to those who 'receive the sacrament with devotion'. John Wesley (quoted in Barbour) also talks of the 'disburthening of the conscience' that results from the confession of sin and shortcoming. James (126) acknowledges the psychological value of confession in these words:

"For him who confesses, shams are over and realities have begun: he has exteriorised his rottenness. If he has not actually got rid of it, he at least no longer smears it over with a hypocritical show of virtue."

Allport (12, p.104) adds that, inasmuch as confession involves 'self-objectification', so it is an aid to 'integration', as a prerequisite for integration is 'insight', a knowledge of one's values, and a clearer picture of one's assets and liabilities. Sundry Biblical references also refer to the confession of sins and the resulting beneficial consequences of this. In the book of 'Proverbs' (Chapter 28, v.13) the text is:

"He that covereth his sins shall not prosper: but whosoever confesseth and forsaketh them shall find mercy."

J.C. Ryle, sometime Bishop of Liverpool (185) adds that without confession there is "no inward peace". He says that conscience will never be at rest so long as it feels the burden of unacknowledged transgression. Self-knowledge from self-examination, says Ryle, leads to awareness of the

'sinful' nature of man and this in turn leads to confession and a dis-burthening of conscience.

From all this one might deduce that it is a property and function of Christian religious belief to institute self-examination and thus to elicit the sense of guilt and sinfulness. However, the object of this exercise is apparently not to load the 'conscience' with guilt - but rather to expurgate the 'conscience' of feelings of guilt. Introspection, self-examination and confession do not 'function' as doctrines in the same way in each denominational point of view, however. The practice of, and teaching about confession, private or auricular, does vary from denomination to denomination. It seems probable that the 'sacramentalist' denominations, that is the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Anglican churches, more persistently encourage frequent and regular confession of both a private and liturgical nature. This might suggest that 'committed Christians' in these denominations would be more prone to be self-critical and to sensitise feelings of self-condemnation - than Christians in denominations where the confession of sins, in practice, is not such a prominent part of worship and devotion. For this latter group, the practice of regular self-examination is less likely because of the absence of liturgical and auricular forms of confession. As well as this last factor, nonconformist Theology tends to emphasise God's free gift of Grace to those who believe in Christ, whereas the sacramentalists emphasise the receipt of Grace through participation in the sacraments of which 'penance' and thus confession may be regarded as a constituent factor. In this latter case, there is

consequently rather less assurance of ultimate acceptability to 'God' if one's acceptability depends, to some extent, on one's faithful religious behaviour and duties.

Bullough states (55, p.66) in what is something of a standard reference on Roman Catholicism now, that to the Roman Catholic, "Mass" is the life-giving principle of the Church, and sacraments work: 'ex opere operato' - that is in virtue of the action itself. Overt religious behaviour is thus emphasised rather more by the sacramentalist churches than by the non-sacramentalists. The question is, whether or not overt confession of sins following introspection reduces feelings of guilt. Or whether the overt confession increases the likelihood of the 'sense of guilt and sinfulness' or merely enhances the 'sensitisation' rather than the 'repression' of guilt feelings. These questions may be partly answered by creating a hypothesis that the sacramentalist Christian belief is more likely to increase the self-awareness of guilt and shortcoming regardless of whether the primary or secondary object of this is to 'restore' peace of mind through confession and the consequent assurance of forgiveness. The individual who believes he is forgiven and accepted again, is then able to restore his own self-respect and self-esteem. However, the danger is, according to France (81) that the Church by encouraging the awareness of sinfulness may thereby precipitate persistent feelings of guilt that may resist the cathartic effect of confession. Indeed, guilt feelings, so aroused may not be confessed because of the individual's difficulty in confessing some offence for which he fears the condemnation of the Church.

Luther believed wholeheartedly in regular self-examination and in the doctrine of Penance, but this self-awareness led him to say in his Easter sermon (1533):

"Daily I am deep in sin moreover my conscience terrifies and absorbs me so that I am always without peace."

Luther said this in spite of his belief in the 'Grace of God'. His self-condemnation or self-rejection resulted to some extent from his examination of himself in the light of the perfection of Christ's life and standards. The obsession with 'self' and shortcomings is likely to cause considerable anxiety. Reinhold Niebuhr asserts that:

"Without freedom from anxiety man is so enmeshed in the vicious circle of egocentricity, so concerned about himself - that he cannot release himself for the adventure of love."

(quoted in Pfister, p.189).

A religion that makes an individual 'concerned about himself' by advocating frequent and persistent self-examination in as much as this constitutes a 'search for sin', is a religion of fear and anxiety. This type of religion devalues humanity by exhorting the believer to self-rejection and 'self-denigration'.

In Christianity, generally, and in the sacramentalist Churches in particular, the concepts of 'sinfulness' and 'confession' appear to have something of an ambiguous quality. Those who recommend the sensitisation

and confession of guilt and sinfulness maintain that this results in both 'cosmic' and psychological benefits. One cannot comment on the 'spiritual benefits' that may result from confession - this is rather beyond the scope of this thesis; however, one can criticise the reference to 'psychological benefits'. Paradoxically, it would appear that self-objectification and the exteriorisation of guilt-feelings, whilst perhaps resulting in some 'psychological' relief through the disburthening of conscience, nevertheless may in some cases predispose the individual to persistent consideration of himself as a guilty person - with all that this may mean in terms of recurrent feelings of self-criticism and guilt. Thus, individuals in this position, are at the very least more prone to sensitise and accordingly manifest more guilt feelings, and at the worst are more prone to be morbidly preoccupied with self, sin and guilt.

Healthy and Unhealthy Religion

Marcus Gregory (110) contrasts a 'healthy' form of Christianity with the 'unhealthy' counterpart that involves a preoccupation with sinfulness. Gregory attempts to separate the 'neurotic' aspects of religious belief from its other aspects (110, p.405). He makes this differentiation in the following words:

"The humanity it (Religious Belief) advocates is not based on guilt or a sense of object, permanent unworthiness; the service towards men it enjoins is not patronage, its 'propaganda' was neither subversive nor coercive, its Faith was not arrogant nor contemptuous of paganism."

Gregory adds that the characteristic of 'neurotic religion' involves a guilt-ridden mind which considers the enjoyment of life impossible. Pleasure may even increase the pathological sense of unworthiness and thus the need for punishment. The world appears 'evil': "a snare to the good and a source of pleasure to the bad" - as Gregory puts it. The result of this is that the whole attitude of life becomes ascetic and even misanthropic. Gregory urges psychologists to recognise a difference between religiosity and neurotic patterns of behaviour: and "a faith calmly held with a 'hope' and a desire to tell others of it".

So long as Christian religious belief fulfils the function of encouraging 'healthy' self-examination in order to enhance self-awareness and 'personal integration', then the Christian Faith may be said to be an important, even vital, integrative element in personality and self-attitude. This argument is underwritten by Allport and by Jung. Allport (12) advocates that Psychology and Religion combine their resources so as to help advance mental health using their different 'therapeutic' techniques. Jung believed that the roots of psychoneurosis ultimately lie in the fact that the 'patient' can find no meaning in life. He says that religion gives a meaning to life and this brings peace (130).

(iii) Conclusions

The contrasts drawn in this chapter suggest that there may well be some differentials involving the religious variable; if so, these must be looked for in the results of this present research. It may be that all

Christians have an enhanced sense of guilt and unworthiness, but that mechanisms of catharsis and repression of 'defense' remove or moderate any possible reduction in self-esteem. It may be that some Christians are more prone to 'sensitise' their feelings of guilt than others - and thus 'exteriorise' their 'rotteness' rather than 'repress' it. Which ever the case may be an important qualification of the foregoing discussions must be made. It must be emphasised that one cannot, or should not attempt to stereotype denominations, Churches, or individual Christian believers. There will always be considerable overlap and merging of results from various specific groupings. However, one can point to 'tendencies' or 'predispositions' inherent in particular doctrinal positions - and this has been partly the object of this chapter. The Christian conscience, inasmuch as this involves consideration of religious practices and sanctions, is a very variable factor, varying much, as one might expect from individual to individual - but also varying in its conceptualisation from group to group within the Christian Church.

The introductory chapters of this thesis comprise an attempt to identify the principal variables and relationships between variables that are relevant to the tripartite relationship suggested by the title of the thesis. A study of the nature of Christian religious belief shows characteristics which suggest both 'healthy' and 'unhealthy' factors in this variable. A study of the nature of feelings of guilt has attempted to identify the 'relatively' healthy factor of 'socialisation' as contrasted with the unhealthy potency of proness to feelings of guilt and self-recrimination.

Some questions raised by these introductory discussions are now itemised below:

1. What is the nature of the interaction between the principal variables ^{the} of thesis?
2. Is the distinction between 'guilt potential' and 'guilt proness' a valid one?
3. What effects can Christian religious belief have on these two types of 'guilt'?
4. What effect does 'guilt' and feelings of guilt have on self-evaluation?
5. On the subject of denominational or group differentials - do groups of Christians differ in the extent of their moral values and feelings of guilt?
6. Are sacramentalist Christians more prone to feelings of guilt and self-criticism than nonsacramentalist Christians?
7. Are Christians from 'dogmatic' denominations more moralist by virtue of their unconditional acceptance of the tenets of the Christian religion?
8. Are 'dogmatic' Christians more or less prone to feelings of guilt than other Christians and non-believers?
9. Are there differences between Christians and non-believers in self-esteem?

10. Do some denominations appear generally to 'possess' a greater proportion of self-accepting believers, than others?

These are some of the principal ideas and questions that have evolved from the preceding discussions. These have generated a more formal list of hypotheses which are listed in Chapter 6, after the explanation of the grouping of the respondents.

CHAPTER 4

The Preliminary Study

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The Preliminary Study

Aims

The aims of this study were primarily to ascertain the best methods for assessing the degree of identification with Christian religious belief, and the degree of association between Christian belief and moral values and judgements. It was also postulated that the individual's subjective estimation of the moralism, or moral censoriousness, of his religion was a vital factor in the quality and extent of his moral judgements.

The first objectives were, accordingly, to devise a measure of Christian religious belief and also a measure of 'moralism' that would involve judgements based on moral and ethical considerations. Both these measures had to be suitable for this particular generation and population of students. On completion of this stage it was then necessary to compare the results obtained from the measure of 'orthodox Christian commitment', the religious belief measure, with results from the questionnaire containing statements that would have a high probability of moralistic evaluation from the viewpoint of some religious establishments - statements requiring a moral judgement by the respondent.

Contents of the Chapter

1. The measurement of religious belief, attitudes and practices.
2. The moral judgements questionnaire.
3. The sub-structure of the moral judgements questionnaire.

4. The sample, method and results.

5. Conclusions and discussion.

1. The measurement of Religious Belief, Attitudes and Practices

In this preliminary study the measurement of Christian beliefs and practices was made using three types of questionnaire using the same sample of respondents. These questionnaires were distributed over a period of one month in conjunction with the other measures used in this study.

The first type of questionnaire consisted of seventy statements relating to Christian belief, or attitudes, half of which were positively orientated towards Christianity and half of which had a 'negative' or unfavourable orientation. In selecting the statements for this questionnaire - hereinafter referred to as "RBMA" (Religious Beliefs Measure 'A'), seven concepts within the Christian Faith were used as categories to which ten statements each were assigned. So in all there were seventy statements distributed evenly among the following concept categories: namely, "God", "Jesus Christ", "Prayer", "Church", "Life after Death", "The Bible", "The Christian Religion". Statements assigned to these categories referred to the respective concept either positively evaluative or negatively evaluative. The statements themselves were drawn from a large number of sources. Originally some 400 statements were compiled by the present investigator - in the main from other Religious Belief measures - none of which satisfied the researcher as to their suitability in this present study. Many of the questionnaire

statements were vague, ambiguous or prone to denominational biases. So twenty post-graduate students in the University of Durham were asked to eliminate from the list those statements that they considered ambiguous or irrelevant. Eventually the ten most meaningful and relevant statements for each of the seven concepts ~~were~~ included in the measure. These are listed in the Appendix (B). The problem of response categories was then considered. It was decided that differential weighting of items was unnecessary - as this is most effective only in short tests and usually pays little dividends when there are more than 10 to 20 items (cf. Guilford (112) page 447; Ferguson (87); Likert (147)). It was decided to use the simple Likert method of five response categories ranging from: "Strongly agree with the statement" to "strongly disagree with the statement".

Most of the statements in this questionnaire were derived from questionnaires printed in these two sources: Shaw and Wright's, "Attitudes and Attitude Measurement" (188), and from Moreton King's article in the "Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion" (136). The main authors of questionnaires consulted were namely: King, M., (136); Allport, G.W. (11); Ferguson, L.W., (89); Thurstone and Chave, (202); Middleton and Putney, (158); Thouless, (201); Telford, (199); Kirkpatrick, (138); Ausubel and Schpoont, (20); Broen, (46,47); Funk, (99); Pilkington and Poppleton, (179); and Brown, (49).

The second type of Religious Belief questionnaire used in this study utilised the 'semantic differential' technique. The same seven concepts were used as in the RBMA. Twelve bipolar scales were appended to each of

the seven concepts. Each scale consisting of seven response categories between two semantically opposite evaluative adjectives. These bipolar scales were selected as being, in varying degrees, applicable as evaluative measures to the concepts included in this study. As the instructions said at the beginning of the semantic differential measure:

"The purpose of the study is to measure the meanings of certain - religious concepts to various people - by having them judge them against a series of descriptive scales."

The descriptive scales referred to were selected from - in the main "Osgood and Tannebaum's book and consist of scales related to Osgood's "First" or evaluative Factor. The use of such scales to measure attitudes to Christian Religious concepts is based on the theory that attitudes can be characterised as learned implicit processes which are essentially Bipolar, which vary in intensity and which mediate evaluative behaviour. Osgood (p.195) considers the evaluative factor of the semantic differential as an index of attitude. It does seem to provide an index for the location of the attitude object along a general evaluative continuum.

The twelve scales used in this study were: Good - Bad; Mature - Immature; Wise - Foolish; Important - Unimportant; Interesting - Uninteresting; Beneficial - Harmful; Meaningful - Meaningless; Right - Wrong; Positive - Negative; Valuable - Worthless; Complete - Incomplete; and Pleasant - Unpleasant. The seven possible response categories were arranged in the usual way, for example as shown below:

e.g.

SCALE: GOOD Very : Quite : Slightly : Neutral : Slightly : Quite : Very BAD
 Good : Good : Good : Bad : Bad : Bad

The third method of assessment was made using a "Personal Data Inventory" which was used to elicit information about the respondents Religious activities ('D' appendix) for example such practices as Church attendance, prayer and membership of student Religious groups.

2. The Moral Judgements Questionnaire

The basic structure and content of this questionnaire is derived from those of Black et al (37) and London et al (148). Black and London note that few attempts have been made to relate the adult experience of guilt to the specific moral codes that adults invariably use to explain and rationalise these very feelings. They point out that for many people such moral codes are best exemplified in their religious institutions. In 1964 and 1966 the aforementioned investigators used groups of Protestants, Jews and Roman Catholics to make comparisons between them on the grounds that: "different religions make conflicting evaluations of the same behaviours", and that "it is reasonable to suppose that the sources of guilt and the standards of conduct to which people respond will vary according to Religious affiliation". Their results indicate little difference between Protestants and Roman Catholics on "sources of guilt" and "standards of conduct", and a small, but significant difference between Roman Catholics and Protestants

and Jews in their evaluation of their Religion's stringency in moralistic evaluation: RC > Protestant > Jews.

In this present, preliminary study, only Protestant (if at all religious) respondents were consulted - as it was postulated that intensity of acceptance of the Christian Faith was the critical Factor in determining moral guilt or moral standards - not so much denominational preference. It might also be said that Christianity has its origins in Judaeism and they both share a common ethical teaching - Jesus Christ adding only the commandments of love for neighbour and God.

The questionnaire used in the present study to determine moral judgments and guilt feelings consists of 32 items. After an item analysis (see Appendix E) the questionnaire was revised for the main study but for the preliminary investigation it was similar to the 1964 (33 items) and 1966 (41 items) questionnaire of Black and London (see Appendix A). According to the Black and London Method, respondents were required to answer the questionnaire in three different ways, explained below.

(1) The respondents, in this first case were told that: "Guilt is a special kind of human emotion". "It is the bad feeling people have when they think they have done something wrong. The opposite of guilt is the good feeling people have when they think they have done the right thing. The following 32 situations produce different feelings in different people. These feelings range from extreme guilt to considerable satisfaction with oneself. Please indicate how you would feel in such situations."

Then followed the 32 items of the questionnaire - each depicting a

behaviour, or situation which might provide a moral judgment.

(2) In the second case the same 32 items were presented but with these differing instructions: "Consider these statements from the viewpoint of your own personal standards. In other words we want you to say how you think 'people in general' should behave with respect to these situations."

(3) In the third case the instructions given were: "In your opinion how does your Religion view the following situations?" (Answer on the basis of how your Religion evaluates these situations, and not how you personally feel about them).

So the three forms of presentation produce three measures: anticipated guilt feeling; Moral standards; and the degree of 'estimated moralism' of the respondents' Religion. In each of these three cases five response categories per item were used - of the Likert, bipolar type. In the first, anticipated guilt, case - the responses could range from "feeling very guilty" to "feeling very pleased with oneself". In the second, moral standards, case, the responses would range from "People should always avoid" to "People should always do". And in the third case, moral censoriousness of Religion - "My Religion would strongly disapprove" to "My Religion would strongly approve".

It is assumed that people could have a positive or negative evaluation of these situations.

Using this structure Black and London found that susceptibility to guilt is apparently equal for all religious groups - also that ethical

aspirations were very similar. London and Black suggest that cultural homogeneity might account for this. The present investigator would like to comment that whilst groups were found to be similar in this way - there was bound to be, within each of the Religious groups studied - a range in degree of acceptance of the Respondent's own Religion and therefore in the intensity of identification with the Religion. This the present investigator considers the most important fact in determining how much the respondent shares the predicted moral censoriousness of his Religion. The main study will bear this out.

3. The Sub-structure of the Moral Judgments Questionnaire

The individual items in the questionnaire can be organised into groups according to certain theoretical criteria. This categorisation of the behaviours stated in the questionnaire, into relatively homogeneous groups, has been suggested by Middleton and Putney (158) who believe that much of the confusion surrounding the relation between Religion and morality derives from failure to distinguish two different kinds of ethical standards - the "ascetic ethical standard" and the "social ethical standard". The former refers to what can be termed a 'secondary morality' - or one relating to our internal beliefs; and the latter can be related to the idea of 'primary morality' - that means-related to our environs. Social standards, or primary morality, are said to proscribe actions which in general are harmful to the social group - these are shared by religious and non-Religious alike. Ascetic standards, perhaps one could call them

"abstinence from sensual indulgences" such as gambling, sex, and so on, derive primarily from an ascetic religious tradition.

Both anti-ascetic and anti-social behaviour is included among the items of the present moral judgments questionnaire. Anti-ascetic behaviour would include: gambling, smoking, non-marital sex, looking at pornographic pictures, drinking alcoholic beverages - and so on. Anti-social behaviour would include, stealing, overt aggression, lying, cheating, and deliberately placing unjust blame on another.

Middleton and Putney found that 'believers' are more likely than sceptics to regard anti-ascetic actions as wrong, and they are less likely than sceptics to engage in them. There was no significant difference between these two groups as to attitudes to 'anti-social' actions. Religious variables were found not to be correlated with anti-social behaviour.

A contradictory result was obtained by Wright and Cox (216) however. They did find that the more ascetic the moral issue the stronger the association with Religious belief and practice. But they differed from Middleton and Putney in as much as Wright and Cox did find that even for the most social item, religious subjects tend to be more severe than other subjects. In this present study it is thus predicted that there will be a positive relationship between all categories of moral judgment items and Christian Religious Belief - but that the strongest relationship will be between items associated with ascetic morality and Religious Belief.

In addition to this question of social and ascetic morality, Mosher (161,162) has differentiated in his measures of guilt between sex guilt,

hostile guilt, and others which he terms "Morality conscience guilt". Sex guilt is clearly a subsection of the ascetic morality category. Hostile guilt appears to be at first sight a subsection of the social morality category in as much as it refers to overt aggression. However, it was decided to consider the questionnaire as consisting of four sub-sections, named below, with their respective behaviours:

<u>Sex Behaviour (S)</u>	<u>Other Anti-ascetic Behaviour (ag)</u>
1. Looking at sexy magazines and films	1. Social drinking (going to a Pub)
2. Falling in love with a married person	2. Smoking
3. Petting	3. Taking part occasionally in a sweepstake
4. Flirting	4. Getting drunk
5. Premarital Intercourse	5. Gambling at cards or dice
6. Using contraceptives	6. Blaspheming (using bad language)
7. Masturbation	7. Gambling on sport
8. Thinking sexy thoughts, having sex fantasies or daydreams.	8. Going to a party where there is plenty of alcoholic drink.

Hostile Behaviour

1. Striking another person in anger
2. Striving to do better than other people at one's work
3. Showing anger in an argument
4. Aggressively (but honestly) striving for personal success

5. Competing with others for personal gain
6. Feeling hostility towards a friend
7. Attacking an evil person
8. Disobeying one's parents.

Social Behaviour

1. Cheating in exams
2. Discriminating against a coloured person
3. Breaking a promise to a friend
4. Stealing
5. Lying
6. Giving charity in order to gain the approval of others.
7. Cheating in a game
8. Letting someone else take the blame for something that was really one's own fault.

4. The Sample, Method and Results

(i) Sample

The Sample consisted of 126 students at the University of Durham of whom half were resident in two Anglican Theological Colleges in Durham, and half were resident in the other, secular, University Colleges. It was found that of the total number of respondents 85 were self-styled as 'Christians' and 41 as 'non-Christians'. The sample consisted of a randomly selected group of students who were asked if they would help in the investigation. Nobody refused.

(ii) Method

The questionnaires were administered personally by the author over the stated period of one month. The respondents were assured of the anonymity of their responses and the confidential treatment of their completed questionnaires. The questionnaires were spaced out over the month so that each had to be completed within about five or six days. Respondents were requested to avoid discussing the questions with other people. They were advised to spend not longer than half an hour answering each questionnaire.

(iii) Results

The principal analysis produced a correlation matrix of 34 x 34 variables extracted from the five questionnaires used, i.e. the concepts comprising the measures of religious belief and the sub-categories of the three separate presentations of the 32 items of the moral judgments questionnaire. The three versions of this latter questionnaire are described

as: "anticipated guilt", "Ethical Standards" and "perceived religion's censoriousness".

The Results are discussed under the following headings:

- (a) A 't' test comparison between the means of the Christian and non-Christian groups over sub-categories of the 'anticipated guilt' questionnaire.
- (b) Religious belief and 'anticipated guilt'.
- (c) Religious belief and ethical standards.
- (d) Religious belief and the censoriousness of the religion.
- (e) The anticipated guilt version of the moral judgments questionnaire compared with the other two versions.
- (f) The extensiveness of guilt feelings.
- (g) Correlations between sub-categories of questionnaire items within one of the versions i.e. "anticipated guilt".
- (h) A comment on the response categories of the moral judgments questionnaire.
- (i) A comment on the items.
- (j) Item analysis of the anticipated guilt questionnaire.
- (k) A comparison of the Religious belief measures.

The Results

- (a) A 't' test comparison between the means of the Christian and non-Christian groups over sub-categories of the 'anticipated guilt' questionnaire

The sample was found to consist of 85 self-confessed 'Christians' and 41 self-confessed 'non-Christians'. A comparison between these two groups was made using the mean scores obtained from the 'anticipated guilt' version of the 'moral judgments' questionnaire. The scoring on this questionnaire was as follows:

<u>Response Category</u>	<u>Points Scored</u>
"I would feel very guilty"	5
"I would feel a little guilty"	4
"I would feel neither guilty nor pleased with myself"	3
"I would feel a little pleased with myself"	2
"I would feel very pleased with myself"	1

As there were 32 items in all, the maximum total was thus 160 points and the minimum score 32. The 'neutral' or midway score would be 96 points. For each of the four sub-categories, namely: 'sex guilt', 'hostile guilt', 'ascetic guilt' and 'social guilt', there were eight related items. So the maximum score for each of the sub-categories was 40 points, the minimum was 8, and the 'neutral' score was 24 points.

The following table shows the mean scores and standard deviations for the Christian and non-Christian groups respectively. Also a statistical comparison is included, utilising the 't-test' technique.

Table I

A comparison of the 'Christian' and 'Non-Christian' groups over some sub-categories of anticipated guilt (AGQ)

Category	Christian		Non-Christian		t Statistic	Significance (P)
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
1. Total AGQ	117.0	11.1	101.4	10.1	7.6	< 0.001
2. 'Sex' guilt	27.8	4.4	22.0	4.1	6.9	< 0.001
3. 'Hostile' guilt	27.9	3.2	24.0	3.0	6.4	< 0.001
4. 'Ascetic' guilt	25.9	4.9	21.5	2.7	5.4	< 0.001
5. 'Social' guilt	35.5	2.7	33.6	3.3	3.5	< 0.001

(df = 126)

The results confirm the predicted finding that a Christian group manifests a greater anticipation of guilt feelings than a 'non-Christian group'. This appears to hold true for all the subsections of the moral judgments questionnaire, but especially so for the sub-categories of 'anticipated guilt' associated with sexual and hostile impulses and behaviour. This seems to confirm that 'impulse restraint' is an important factor affecting the moral attitudes of Christians - associated as this is with the denial of self-indulgent behaviour.

(b) Abstracts of Results from the Correlation Matrix: Religious Belief and Anticipated Guilt Variables Compared

Table II, shown below, indicates the observed relationship between the variable of religious belief (in this case the combined scores from the RBM and Semantic differential measures) and the variable of 'anticipated guilt feelings'. The figures shown are coefficients of correlations (using the Pearson 'product-moment' method).

Table II

	Total guilt score	'Sex' guilt	Other ascetic guilt	Total ascetic guilt	'Hostile' guilt	Social guilt
Religious Belief	0.500	0.429	0.311	0.454	0.353	0.181
Statistical significance of coefficients: (df = 126)				0.05 level > 0.174 ^x 0.01 level > 0.228 ^{xx} 0.001 level > 0.300 ^{xxx}		

The results in Table II when compared with Table I confirm the results of Middleton and Putney (158); Wright and Cox, (216); Black et al (37); and London et al (148). One must also emphasise that there is also a difference between the religious and the non-religious groups on the 'social' guilt dimension - a result noted by Wright and Cox.

(c) Ethical Standards

The more 'religious' and uncompromising a person reveals himself to be on the questionnaire concerned with the measurement of Christian religious belief, so the more prohibitive and stringent his moral standards are for society as a whole. An abstract of these results is shown in Table III.

Table III

	Total moral standards	'sex' standards	'ascetic' standards	Total ascetic standards	'Hostile' standards	'social' standards
Religious Belief	0.489 ^{xxx}	0.512 ^{xxx}	0.340 ^{xxx}	0.477 ^{xxx}	0.249 ^{xx}	0.110
df = 126; statistical significance: according to levels shown in Table II						

The higher the religious belief score of the respondent, the more is the consideration of stringent moral standards for society in general. In Table III this is shown to be most obviously the case for ascetic standards. Other standards, one must conclude, originate as much from cultural memes as anything else and cannot be attributed to the particular effects of religious belief. The Christian conscience is distinguishable by the greater concern with standards of 'ascetism' and self-control. Most of the respondents - Christian and non-Christian alike, have high standards associated with 'social morality'.

Table IV shows a comparison between the Christian and non-Christian groups over sub-categories of the 'Ethical standards' version of the

questionnaire. The scores here, represent an indication of how much the respondent recommends that people should avoid the various situations.

Table IV

	Christian		Non-Christian		't' Statistic	Significance (P)
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
1. Total, moral standards	122.2	11.1	106.1	10.3	7.8	<0.001
2. 'Sex' standards	29.4	3.9	23.4	4.0	7.9	<0.001
3. 'Hostile' standards	28.3	3.9	24.8	3.3	4.9	<0.001
4. Smoking, drinking, gambling (standards)	27.6	4.5	22.8	3.4	5.9	<0.001
5. Social standards	37.1	2.8	35.5	2.8	2.9	<0.01

From this table it is evident that the more dogmatic one's Christian beliefs are the more stringent one's moral standards tend to be. This appears to be especially true in relation to 'ascetic' morality.

(d) The Censoriousness of the Christian Religion as Seen by the Respondent

Table V shows the coefficients of correlation between the 'estimated censoriousness of the Christian religion' version of the moral judgments questionnaire and the measure of Christian religious belief (RBMA).

These results suggest that the more 'dogmatic' and 'conservative' is the respondent's own religious belief - so the more strongly he is aware of the moral censoriousness and prohibitions of his own religion.

Table VThe reported censoriousness of the religion

	Total items	'sex' items	'Hostile' items	'Ascetic' items	'Social' items
Correlation (r) with Religious Belief scores	0.647	0.574	0.564	0.437	0.487
All coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level of confidence ($p \leq 0.001$, for $r > 0.300$) (df = 126)					

Conclusions so far

It should be noted that the foregoing results substantiate those from previous studies relating to 'moral judgments', anticipated guilt feelings and the stringent moral codes of the Christian religion. The more uncompromising and extreme the belief of the Christian, so the more prohibitive and morally stringent the 'Christian conscience' appears to be over a wide range of situations requiring moral judgment. Thus the 'extremeness' of identification with Christian religious belief is an important factor associated with moral behaviour and especially 'ascetic morality'. 'Guilt potential' is much greater in the case of the orthodox, dogmatic Christian - as shown by the responses of this group of subjects. The perceived moral censoriousness of the Christian Religion is also proportionate (among Christians principally) to the strength of identification with (dogmatic) religious belief.

(e) The 'Anticipated Guilt' version of the Moral Judgments Questionnaire
Compared with the other Versions

Table VI

Anticipated Guilt Version

	Total	Sex	Hostile	Ascetic (smoking, etc)	Social
'Moral Standards' version	0.625	0.602	0.498	0.572	0.329
'Religion's censoriousness' version	0.699	0.634	0.631	0.532	0.600
All coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level of confidence (p = <0.001) (df = 126)					

It is interesting to note from the above table that, in this sample, the moral stringency attributed to their religion by the respondents bears a closer relationship to their anticipation of guilt feelings than to the respondents' assessment of standards for people in general. Religious belief is a private, personal matter which seems to be more closely related to the 'conscience' and moral behaviour, than to social expectations and social moral control. The 'dogmatic' Christian's conscience appears to be affected by a quite rigid inculcation of the "perceived" values and standards of behaviour advocated by Christian religious teaching and tenets.

(f) The Extensiveness of Anticipated Guilt Feelings

This was estimated by combining the results from the two response categories that indicated some degree of guilt. This produced the total number of items which each respondent regarded as guilt-producing to a greater or lesser extent. The coefficient of correlation between this measure and the religious belief measure was found to be $r = 0.84$ ($p = <$

0.001). Conversely the correlation between religious belief and the total number of items answered by each respondent as 'pleasurable' was $r = -0.698$. Also, the higher the score on the religious beliefs measure, so the less likely the respondent was to use the 'neutral' response category. In this case $r = -0.43$. So both in the measure of extremeness and extent of 'anticipated guilt feelings' there is a strong positive correlation with Christian religious belief.

(g) Correlations between subcategories of Questionnaire items on the 'Anticipated Guilt' Version of the Moral Judgments Questionnaire

Scores on the 'sex guilt' items corresponded significantly with those for the 'Hostile guilt' items, $r = 0.24$ (significant at the 1% level). The 'Hostile guilt' category also correlated even more strongly with the 'ascetic guilt' (smoking, drinking, gambling) category, $r = 0.33$ (significant 0.1%). The sex guilt category correlated highly with the other ascetic guilt category, as one might expect, $r = 0.39$ (significant/0.1%). The control of impulses, including aggressive behaviour, appears to be a strongly delineated factor in the analysis.

Within the moral judgments questionnaire there is evidence for the predictable homogeneity among items associated with the sub-categories of 'sex' and 'hostile' behaviour, for instance. With a few exceptions the correlations of items with sub-category totals are all significant at $p = 0.001$. (See Appendix E). There is, however, a clear dichotomy between the social guilt and ascetic guilt categories. The coefficient of correlation between the average 'sex' guilt score and the average 'social' guilt score (that is the average over the items within these categories) was $r = 0.10$ (not significant at the 5% level of confidence). Also, the correlation between the 'ascetic guilt' category and the 'social' guilt category was $r = 0.11$, again not significant. Asceticism appears to be far more clearly related to Christian religious belief.

(h) A Comment on the Response Categories

A great disadvantage of having a scale of responses from 'very guilty' to 'very pleased with myself', is that it does not allow for the possibility that some act may cause immediate 'pleasure' and satisfaction, but later some feelings of guilt - or perhaps vice versa. It is considered 'not proven' that one can think in terms of a continuum from "guilty" to "self-satisfied" this appears to be an artifact of the 'design' of the experiment and was commented on by a number of respondents. In retrospect it was decided that the absence of guilt feeling was not necessarily associated with any more positive feeling. So, on balance, it seemed best to omit any reference to 'self-satisfaction' in the response

categories of future questionnaires of this type. This was taken into account in the revision of the 'anticipated guilt' questionnaire for the main study.

(i) A Comment on the Items

Some of the items were found to be either too 'extreme' in that they concerned behaviours which all the respondents objected to, or were too amorphous and needed more specific delimitation. This was taken into account when compiling the revised anticipated guilt questionnaire. For example, a broad category item such as 'stealing' was sub-divided into several more specific situations such as 'shoplifting', taking 'souvenirs' from a hotel, and keeping an object that someone has lost in a street.

A number of the statements were 'toned down' - items that tended to have an immediate emotional effect such as 'stealing' and 'masturbation'. The object of this was to attempt to produce a greater differentiation between respondents and groups of respondents on the aggregate scores from the response categories.

(j) The Item Analysis of the Anticipated Guilt Questionnaire

Each statement of the anticipated guilt questionnaire was correlated with the 'total' questionnaire score, and with the relevant sub-category score. This produced certain insignificant correlations between items and subtotals. The following four items had particularly low correlations with the overall scale score and are thus considered as inappropriate:

	<u>(r with total scale score)</u>	<u>(df = 126)</u>
1. Smoking	0.12	(not significant at
2. Use of contraceptives	0.13	the 5% level of
3. Disobeying one's parents	0.01	confidence)
4. Striving to do better than other people at one's work	0.05	"

Smoking was considered, by those who indulged in it, a habit unrelated to morality. The use of contraceptives was accepted by nearly all students as, if necessary, a good rather than a bad thing. 'Disobedience to Parents' appears more appropriate for a younger, less emancipated, age group. The fourth item mentioned above could well be taken as 'healthy competitive spirit' rather than some unethical practice.

A fifth item 'stealing' was considered too 'general' an item and was subdivided as outlined previously. A complete list of items, listed in order of their 'guilt producability', can be found in the Appendix (E). The items are listed under the four sub-category headings.

(k) The Religious Belief Measures: A Comparison

The RBMA and the OSD (Semantic differential: religious concepts) correlated quite highly together across each of the seven concepts as shown in Table VII.

Table VII

	Total Scale Scores	Concepts						
		God	Jesus Christ	Prayer	Church	Life After Death	Bible	Christian Religion
Means: RBMA	252.9	37.1	39.1	39.0	34.7	33.5	33.3	36.1
OSD	464.9	70.9	71.6	65.4	59.9	62.7	65.9	68.3
Coefficients (r)	0.77	0.62	0.68	0.68	0.54	0.54	0.69	0.64
all coefficients are significant, $p = < 0.001$, with 126 df								

The RBMA was constructed with 'Likert-type' response categories. These ranged from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Marking was so arranged that high scores were given for a 'pro-Christian' response. The range of possible scores was 1 to 5.

Each of the twelve scales for each of the Seven concepts comprising the OSD have the usual seven response positions thus the maximum 'pro-Christian' score was 'seven' and the least favourable score would be 'one'.

The OSD had certain advantages as a measure of identification with religious belief. It was non-specific and thus not reliant on the clarity and succinctness of individual statements. Also it could not be affected by 'built in' denominational biases associated with various doctrines and dogmas. But, in retrospect, its disadvantages probably outweigh its

advantages. The suitability of the scales can be questioned and the relative vagueness of the bipolar scales in relation to the religious concept meant that there was a lack of definition in the measure of Christian belief. The RBMA, on the other hand, provided a comprehensive, and relatively unbiased, measure of acceptance of, and identification with, traditional, orthodox Christian belief. It was more intimately related to the specific aspects of religious belief and religious practices and was thus a suitable tool with which to differentiate the 'dogmatic' and 'committed' Christian, from the less devout more 'consensual' Christian respondent.

The Religious belief measure (RBMA) also was found to correlate rather more closely with measures from the sub-categories of the anticipated guilt version of the moral judgments questionnaire, these results are shown in Table VIII.

Table VIII

	Total guilt anticipated	'sex' guilt	'ascetic' guilt	'Hostile' guilt	'Social' guilt
RBMA	0.509 ^{xxx}	0.427 ^{xxx}	0.330 ^{xxx}	0.340 ^{xxx}	0.191 ^x
OSD	0.446 ^{xxx}	0.388 ^{xxx}	0.268 ^{xx}	0.326 ^{xxx}	0.156

(df = 126)

In retrospect it was considered that the RBMA was needlessly lengthy in that some items tended to very nearly duplicate others. 'Feedback' from the respondents confirmed this. Accordingly the questionnaire was pruned from 70 to 54 items (Appendix J).

5. Conclusions and Discussion

The preliminary study showed that there was a strong positive relationship of anticipated guilt feeling, moral standards, and the perceived moralism of the Christian religion, with the degree of identification with, and acceptance of, traditional orthodox Christian religious belief. All aspects of morality, whether ascetic or social, were more stringently observed and recommended by those who were most closely aligned with Christian belief. The strongest of such relationships were those between the 'control of impulses' (Hostile or social) factor and religious belief. There seems here to be a logical connection with the 'model' Christian of the New Testament who is "slow to anger", "willing to turn the other cheek", and who ~~re~~strains "lustful" thoughts and impulses. Impulse restraint is certainly an important factor in the formation and maintenance of moral codes - and particularly so for the Christian.

An associated factor is "asceticism" or denial of 'self' and self-indulgence. This is closely connected with particular religious beliefs. Concepts such as 'temperance' and 'self-denial' are evident among some Protestant groups and some Roman Catholics. Those sections of the Christian Church most prone to denounce such offences as 'smoking, drinking,

and gambling' as bad habits from a religious point of view, are generally also those who are most extreme in the rigid promulgation and rigid interpretation of Biblical doctrines. Respondents with this religious background would be most uncompromising in their acceptance of the tenets of the Christian faith. However, it remains to be seen whether there are any clear-cut denominational differences in social and ascetic moral standards. Also it would be interesting to confirm the finding that those individuals who recorded the 'most extremely' pro-Christian scores were also those who show, from their responses, the most stringent moral judgments and codes of behaviour. Both these ideas are followed up in the main study and reported in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER 5

The Instruments Used in the Main Study.

Chapter 5
The Instruments Used in the Main Study

Preface

The object of this 'main study' was to widen the scope of the research by extending the sample and restructuring the form and content of the investigation. The extension of the sample facilitated comparisons between Christian Denominations as well as between Christian and 'non-Christian' groups. This is discussed in the next chapter. The restructured form of the enquiry is outlined in this chapter. The 'main study' attempted a more comprehensive research into relationships between Christian religious belief, moralism, feelings of guilt, and self-evaluation. To this end some questionnaires were revised and others added to form a 'battery' of nine forms and questionnaires. These are listed below, and subsequently discussed in detail.

1. The revised moral judgments questionnaire (Anticipated Guilt)
2. The 'Manifest Guilt' questionnaire
3. The religious belief measure (revised)
4. The religious practices questionnaire
5. A 'semantic-differential' self-evaluation form
6. An 'adjective check list' (self-evaluation)
7. Taylor's Manifest anxiety scale
8. Eysenck's Neuroticism scale (Form B)
9. The Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale.

(a) The Instruments used in the Main Study: An Introduction

The questionnaires will first be discussed by way of a brief introduction; then, in a following section, they will be considered in greater detail.

1. The 'Moral Judgments' Questionnaire used in the preliminary study was revised and administered in the 'anticipated guilt' version. It will be referred to as a questionnaire concerning 'potential' guilt feelings and comprises 33 'behaviours' which could be expected to precipitate feelings of guilt. These are listed in the Appendix (F). This questionnaire is also an indicator of the extent of 'moralism' in as much as this is related to the stringency of conscience in coding and controlling behaviour through the mediation of the intrapunitive feelings associated with guilt. Mosher (160) in his application of Rotter's 'social learning theory' (184) points to 'anticipated feelings of guilt' as indicating the expectancy of self-mediated punishment which may be considered as a measure of the likely strength of avoidance of the guilt-producing behaviours. The hypothesis is that the greater the expectancy of guilt-feelings so the more likely the avoidance of the behaviour that elicits the feelings of guilt. High scores on such an 'anticipated guilt' questionnaire are thus both indicative of 'guilt-potential' and of high moralism.

2. The Manifest Guilt Questionnaire consists of 41 items appertaining to various 'activities of conscience'. The outworkings of conscience would include: proneness to feelings of guilt; self-hate because of violations of

moral standards; and feelings of regret, for example, (see Appendix L). The items on this questionnaire are in the form of statements to which respondents are required to give their affirmation or denial. A 'yes' or 'no' response thus indicates whether or not the respondent accepts the statement as 'self-descriptive'. The questionnaire contains both specific and general statements and was devised so as to differentiate both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of feelings of guilt. The 'qualitative' aspects refer to the type of guilt feelings the respondent admits to, whereas the 'quantitative' aspect is the extent and extremeness of the feeling.

Other kinds of questionnaire were considered for use in this study but were rejected either because of their general inappropriateness for the sample being studied or because of administrative difficulties. The author considered that the Mosher 'forced choice', or 'incomplete sentences' tests (160,162) had no overriding advantages compared with the relatively 'simple structure', "yes/no" type of questionnaire. A conclusion reached by Mosher, himself (162).

3. The Religious Belief Questionnaire used in the preliminary study was somewhat abbreviated (see Appendix J). Some of the original items were eliminated so as to avoid any ambiguity or denominational bias.

4. A 'Religious Practices' Questionnaire was also used - being based on Allport's (11) questionnaire. This was used as a measure of the extent of commitment to 'active' religious behaviour (Appendix K). The analysis

of the results has shown that there is a very high correlation between scores on this questionnaire and scores on the 'religious beliefs measure': $r = 0.92$.

5. Two measures of self evaluation were used. The Semantic-differential Construct (Appendix H) was one. The respondent is required to indicate the extent of his 'positive' or 'negative' self-evaluation over 23 descriptive scales. In addition to this he is also required to evaluate his 'ideal' self over the same 23 scales.

6. The other measure of self-evaluation was an 'adjective check list' derived principally from 'Grough's adjective check list' (108) and consists of 100 favourable and 100 unfavourable adjectives (Appendix I). Respondents were asked to underline all those words which they considered to be an appropriate self-assessment.

7. and 8. Two measures of maladjustment were used: Taylor's manifest anxiety scale (198) and Eysenck's neuroticism scale (Form B). Both claim to correlate well with reported clinical observations of anxiety and neurotic syndromes.

9. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Appendix G) purports to be a measure of the extent to which a person 'needs' to gain social approval by presenting a favourable series of responses. There is some argument as to whether this scale measures the 'need' for social approval or not. However, there is less doubt that it does measure the extent to which a person is giving a favourable impression of himself.

The questionnaires were administered in four pairs over a period of five weeks, the neuroticism scale being incorporated, together with the 'Eysenck lie scale' (Form B) in the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire. The distribution of the forms was so arranged that the 'self-evaluation' forms were not paired, neither were the religious questionnaires and nor were the two 'guilt' questionnaires.

Some of the instruments introduced in the foregoing introduction need a rather more thorough description and this is given in the following section. This section will consider the structure, content, and theoretical basis of the instruments.

(b) The Content and Infra-structure of the Instruments

1. The anticipated guilt questionnaire

The greater the importance of some moral value or code of conduct, the greater is the likelihood that any behaviour contrary to the value or code will be inhibited. Thus anticipations of guilt feeling tend to be proportionate to 'moralism', and moralism is proportionate to the extent of the inhibition of behavioural impulses associated with immoral or unethical behaviour. Moralism is just another way of referring to the censoriousness of the conscience. The term 'moralism' is used to describe the application of moral precepts - rather than to describe anyone, specific moral precept.

In order to measure as accurately as possible a respondent's moral control and inhibition over a variety of specific behaviours - it is

necessary to tabulate behaviours that would be within the possible experience of the sample of respondents. Also the behaviours included must be likely to arouse guilt feelings in some proportion of the group responding.

The original moral judgments questionnaire contained at least two basic weaknesses: in content firstly and also in the response categories. The original questionnaire contained four sub-sections each with eight items associated with 'sex', 'anti-ascetic' behaviour, 'hostility', and 'anti-social' behaviour. In as much as sexual indulgence was 'anti-ascetic' it could be said that 'asceticism' was indicated by responses to 16 of the items. In view of the fact that some of the social guilt items were very amorphous, items such as: "stealing", for example, it was decided to increase the content and specificity of the 'social guilt' aspects of the questionnaire and reduce the number of 'anti-ascetic' items - some of which had been thought pleasurable by Christians and non-Christians alike. This reorganization was helped by results obtained by the item analysis of the original questionnaire. The following items were omitted:

1. Smoking.
2. Use of contraceptives.
3. Disobeying one's parents.
4. Trying to do better than other people at one's work.
5. Going to a party, where there is plenty of alcoholic drink.
6. Blaspheming (using bad language).

The categories of 'stealing', 'lying', 'cheating', and 'racialism' were subdivided thus making more specific and appropriate items - bearing

in mind that the sample to be tested was from a student population.

The resulting questionnaire consisted of 33 items which were distributed among the original sub-categories as follows:

1. SOCIAL GUILT (14 items)

a. Stealing

- (1) You take something from a shop with no intention of paying for it.
- (2) You have been staying at an Hotel, when you are leaving you take some small "souvenir" from the Hotel such as an ash-tray or hand towel.
- (3) You find a bank-note in the street, you pick it up and later spend it on yourself.

b. Lying

- (1) You do not keep to the truth whilst supposedly relating a factual experience.
- (2) You tell a lie to cover up for a friend who is in trouble.
- (3) You tell a deliberate lie to try and get yourself out of trouble.

c. Cheating

- (1) You cheat in a game whilst playing with friends.
- (2) You cheat in an important exam or test by looking to see what the person next to you is writing.

d. Racialism

- (1) You laugh and joke about coloured people and Jews.

- (2) You deliberately avoid sharing a table with a coloured person in a restaurant.
- (3) You make unkind remarks about coloured people behind their backs.

e. Other Social Situations

- (1) You let someone else take the blame for something that was really your own fault.
- (2) You avoid helping a blind or infirm person across the road - you let someone else do it.
- (3) You remain seated on a bus when an old lady is having to stand.

2. HOSTILE GUILT (7 items)

- (1) You become involved in a heated argument in which you lose your temper.
- (2) You lose your self-control and hit a person who has provoked and angered you.
- (3) You consider hurting someone who has annoyed you very much.
- (4) You say uncomplimentary things about people behind their backs - you are unkindly critical of them.
- (5) You compete aggressively against other people for personal gain.
- (6) You resort to using violence against someone you consider to be an evil person.
- (7) You show anger and impatience towards someone who means a lot to you - someone you are fond of.

3. SEX GUILT (7 items)

- (1) You think sexy thoughts and have sex fantasies and day-dreams.
- (2) At a party, you openly flirt with a good looking member of the opposite sex.
- (3) You indulge in mutual petting with a member of the opposite sex before marriage.
- (4) You have sexual intercourse before marriage.
- (5) You fall in love with a married person.
- (6) You sexually stimulate your own body i.e. masturbation.
- (7) You read a sexy magazine or pornographic book.

4. OTHER ASCETIC GUILT (drinking and gambling) (5 items)

- (1) You drink too much at a party or in a pub and become tipsy.
- (2) You gamble frequently on horse-racing, football, or bingo.
- (3) You spend an evening drinking in a pub.
- (4) You are persuaded to wager a small sum of money in a sweepstake or on a private bet.
- (5) You gamble heavily at cards and dice and thus risk losing what for you is a large sum of money.

The items were arranged on the questionnaire in a random order. There were four possible response categories: "I would feel very guilty", "I would feel quite guilty", "I would feel a little guilty", "I would not feel at all guilty". The actual questionnaire as presented is printed in the Appendix. (F).

THE MANIFEST GUILT QUESTIONNAIRE

The theoretical basis of this questionnaire was similar to that of Mosher's. He defines guilt as "the generalised expectancy for self-mediated punishment for violating, anticipating the violating of, or thinking of the violating of, or failure to attain - internalised standards of proper (moral, non-indulgent, thoughtful, ethical, correct) behaviour." (160). The referents for guilt which he used are also broadly speaking those which the present investigator has used in compiling the present 'yes-no' questionnaire.

These referents for 'guilt feeling' include:

- (i) Painful feelings of self-criticism, self-blame, and self-hate.
- (ii) Remorse and regret or sorrow caused by the violation of internalised standards of proper conduct.
- (iii) A lessening of self-esteem for failure to attain certain "ought-to" goals.
- (iv) Guilt will involve attempts at restitution or reparation.
- (v) Inhibition of hostile and sexual impulses will indicate guilt proneness.
- (vi) Self-punishment and asceticism, statements that the respondents feel that they deserve punishment, or that they are suffering now because of the wrongs they have done in the past.
- (vii) Confessions of sinfulness.

(viii) Depression.

(ix) Over-concentration, or emphasis on what is moral and what is immoral.

A number of statements were compiled associated with feelings of guilt. These were given to fifteen 'judges' who were asked to select those statements which were clearly indicative of guilt feelings and of a stringent and punitive conscience. As a result 41 items were extracted which were considered by all the judges to be clearly associated with feelings of guilt and 'moral intrapunitiveness'. The items do, however, vary in extremeness and quality from statements of considerable intrapunitive feeling such as "I am troubled by morbid and depressing thoughts of my own failure, wrongdoing and sinfulness", to relatively mild statements such as: "Arguments leave me feeling ill-at-ease and ready to renew a friendship".

Some of the items were derived from the Mosher 'yes-no' questionnaire (162) or from the Cattell 16PF measure (the guilt-proneness factor). The bulk of the items, however, were arranged by the author in the form of "confessions of guilt" according to the 'referents' outlined above. This questionnaire is termed a 'manifest guilt questionnaire' on the grounds that it requires the admission by the respondents of their current feelings of guilt or 'susceptibility' to guilt feelings. Of the 41 items finally selected, three related to manifestation of sex-guilt, six were concerned with hostile guilt, eight were associated with aspects of self-hate and 'moral self-criticism' and eleven were related to the idea of

falling short of standards by wrongdoing. Two rather larger classifications of the items were also considered. The first, consisting of twenty items, was termed 'destructive' guilt; the second consisting of sixteen items was termed 'constructive' guilt. The terms 'destructive' and 'constructive' imply a mutual exclusiveness in their content. On the one hand some feelings of guilt are self-punishing, self-recriminating even 'morbid', these are to be distinguished from the more 'constructive' negatively reinforcing property of the emotion of guilt. Guilt feelings which function as an aid to moral control can thus be described as necessary and indeed 'constructive' and purposeful, but guilt feelings that are 'self-destructive' and self-abasing can only be negative and 'destructive' in their effect.

The original categorisation of the guilt items was partly supported by the factor analysis. However, the factor analysis bore a quite close resemblance to the original list of referents. The items of the manifest guilt questionnaire are printed in the Appendix (L).

The questionnaire was used in a small pilot study with a group of 20 'non-believing' students and 20 ministerial (Anglican) students. It was found to differentiate between the Christian and the non-Christian groups over the 'constructive guilt' category and the 'sex' and 'hostile' guilt categories, but it did not distinguish between the groups on measures of remorse and 'destructive guilt'. As a result of this pilot study, a few grammatical alterations only were made to the questionnaire to reduce ambiguity and some clumsiness of expression.

The items comprising this questionnaire do not refer to hypothetical occurrences in the future - but to activities that have been or are taking place. Thus, by his response, the individual is indicating his present awareness of feelings of guilt associated with his behaviour and his impulses. In some instances the respondent is asked to affirm or negate that he is 'likely' to have feelings of guilt in a particular situation for example:

Item 15. "I feel guilty when my mind is preoccupied with
sexy thoughts and daydreams."

Elsewhere the item may be rather more general, such as:

Item 22. "At the present moment I am aware of feelings
of guilt about some things"

Some items express preoccupation with past misdeeds such as:

Item 29. "I sometimes think that I am suffering now
because of the wrong things I have done in
the past."

In spite of the variety in content and a certain built-in heterogeneity, the manifest guilt questionnaire taken as a whole provides an indication of the activity and censoriousness of the conscience over a variety of situations. From one theoretical point of view it could be said to represent a rough indication of the strength of the 'negative' or 'intra-punitive propensity' invested in the 'Superego'.

The Religious Beliefs Measures

(1) It should be emphasised that the Religious Belief questionnaire, consisting of 54 statements either affirming or contradicting tenets of the

Christian Faith, was concerned with 'orthodox' Christian beliefs as opposed to non-orthodox, sectarian doctrines and dogmas. This intrinsic orthodoxy means that the content of the questionnaire facilitates the measurement of the extent of respondent acceptance of rather conservative, and traditional doctrines of the Christian religion. Low scores on this questionnaire among a Christian group would thus indicate a certain degree of scepticism or radicalism - certainly an unwillingness to accept the straightforward creedal definitions of Christianity. The questionnaire does contain essential elements of Christian belief derived from the New Testament. It is also an attempt to avoid denominational biases and controversial dogmas and doctrines. In fact 'feedback' from the respondents tends to confirm that the questionnaire was indeed appropriate for various different groups and Churches within the Christian Religion. The questionnaire retains the seven 'concept sub-categories' referred to in the previous chapter, and is printed in the Appendix (J).

The religious beliefs questionnaire was used as a measure of how strongly a person accepts the Christian Faith and its outworkings through the Church. Thus the more definitely singleminded and uncompromising a person appears to be in his beliefs - so the more 'dogmatic' that person can be said to be. Thus the questionnaire, providing scope as it does for a measure of extremeness or closeness of identification, is occasionally referred to as a measure of dogmatic religious belief.

(2) The Religious Practices Questionnaire was a measure of how strongly

a person associates with the practices inherent in Christian Faith and Worship. This questionnaire included topics such as Church attendance, Church activity, prayer, confession, and so on. It is derived primarily from Allport, Gillespie and Young's Questionnaire of Religious Attitudes and Practices (11). It is printed in the Appendix (K).

THE SELF EVALUATION INSTRUMENTS

(1) The Semantic Differential

This technique was used to obtain a rough profile of a person's self-attitude - the degree of its favourable or unfavourable nature, and a rough profile of a person's "ideal self". The profiles were then compared to measure the revealed self-ideal discrepancy of the respondents. The 23 descriptive scales selected were in the main evaluative though some were included from the 'Potency' Factor (Osgood et al., 171). Those people high in self-esteem would be expected to reveal a comparatively narrower discrepancy between the self and ideal self profiles - and to score comparatively more highly on the measures of self-attitude and ideal self. The instructions for the respondents were: 1. for the self-evaluation:

"Respond in a way that indicates how you consider yourself to be in relation to the following 23 scales."

2. - and the instructions for the respondents for the ideal self evaluation were:

"Indicate by your responses how you would like to be."

The wording of this instruction implies a 'state of being' not yet attained by the respondent, but which is none the less a state to be desired - as far

as that respondent is concerned. Difficult and clumsy instructions such as: "Respond as you would like your model person to respond - if he was inside you," (as one investigator wrote) are deliberately avoided!

The use of such measures as the 'semantic differential' presupposes the capacity of individuals to be 'self-aware' and to be able to 'self-objectify'. It is also assumed that they are capable of assessing themselves in relation to certain descriptive scales. The 'self', as a construct, is discussed in the introductory chapters. It was concluded that the 'self' can be considered both as an 'object' and as an ongoing and developing system or process. The instruments used to measure 'self-evaluation' are used to extract responses indicating either a positively or negatively orientated self-attitude.

Self-acceptance is construed in different ways by various theorists: cf. Block and Thomas (38), Butler and Haigh (57), and Sarbin (186). In this study 'self-acceptance' is measured by the ratio of favourable to unfavourable self-evaluations. The response choice on the self-assessment forms is quite wide so the scores extracted from the instruments indicate the direction and extremeness of the self-attitude - rather than any precise measure of self-acceptance in specific aspects of personality. Thus the semantic-differential scales chosen, allow for a fairly broad self-assessment - which is extended even further with the utilisation of the adjective check list.

The coefficient of correlation between the semantic-differential self-evaluation rating and the adjective check list index of self-acceptance was:

$r = 0.728$. Both measures indicate the extent of 'self-esteem', and as the coefficient shows, there is an acceptable congruence between results derived from them. This coefficient is especially satisfying in view of the very low correlations between the various self-acceptance scales and tests reported by Crowne and Stephens (67). The use of two measures of self-evaluation was considered necessary so as to ensure a 'double check' on the 'self-assessment', and also so as to avoid the possible criticism that one measure chosen was inappropriate because of its content, format, or response elicitation.

(2) The adjective check list

The adjective check list, in format, consists of 200 adjectives of which half are regarded as being descriptive of favourable traits and aspects of 'self', and the other half is regarded as being negatively and unfavourably evaluative. Most of the adjectives in this present list (see Appendix I) are derived from Gough's adjective check list (108). Obviously with such a list of traits or items it is necessary to assume either that they truly represent all self-percepts, or at least that they represent the most important ones. Perhaps what is required is that the subject generates his own list of self-descriptions - and the values he attaches to the separate elements and to the composite. Kelly's (134) Role-construct repertory test appears to fit this model. But in the interests of brevity and practicability the use of already structured instruments - employing the most comprehensive and fundamental response possibilities is necessitated.

Neither of the two self-evaluation measures in this study required personal supervision by the investigator.

Warr and Knapper (211) have objected to the adjective check list on the grounds that not all adjectives are being responded to if one merely asks respondents to underline the appropriate ones for them. This is rather a dubious conclusion as the respondent has to consider each adjective in order to decide whether to underline it or not. The status of the unchecked adjectives is then that they are considered as being inappropriate in the self-assessment. Respondents varied as to the total number of positive and negative adjectives underlined, so the principal measures derived were ratios of the number of positive to negative adjectives underlined - thus producing a 'self-acceptance' ratio and a 'self-criticality' ratio.

Warr and Knapper (211) also criticised the adjective check list on the grounds that there was a 'primary effect', that is more items are responded to in the first half of the text than on the second; or, alternatively, more items are responded to in the first third than in the last third. Results from this main study, however, show only a 2.2% reduction in the number of adjectives underlined in the second half of the check list. The adjectives were arranged so that there was an even distribution of positive and negative adjectives throughout the check list.

The 23 scales of the Semantic differential, and the adjective check list are printed in the Appendix (H and I respectively).

Meisels et al (157) have noted the relationship between social desirability response set and evaluative judgments made using the semantic

differential. Statistically significant correlations were found between self-evaluation and social desirability. In this present study the 'Marlowe-Crowne' scale was used (66) in order to test for such a relationship.

(3) The social desirability scale

This particular social desirability scale was compiled by its authors because it was alleged that a major shortcoming with some other social desirability scales was that they contained psychopathological items. This 'criticism' can be applied to the 'Edwards social desirability scale' (76) which draws items from the "Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory". For an item to be included in the Marlowe-Crowne scale it had to meet the criterion of cultural approval and was required to have minimal pathological and abnormal implications - if responded to in either the socially desirable or undesirable directions. It correlates with the Edward's scale with a coefficient of $r = 0.35$, ($p < 0.01$) and has an internal consistency coefficient (Kuder-Richardson) of 0.88, and a test/retest correlation of 0.89.

Meisels (157) suggests that high self-esteem scores merely reflect the need to give a favourable impression. However, there is the possible alternative explanation that those people who are highest in self-esteem may consider themselves to be the most socially desirable anyway.

(4) The Measures of Maladjustment

The Taylor manifest anxiety scale was used to indicate the level of proneness to anxiety. Taylor writes (198):

"The construction of the test was not aimed at developing a clinically useful test which would diagnose anxiety, but rather was designed solely to select subjects differing in: 'general drive level'."

The items on the scale were selected by clinicians as referring to manifest anxiety. In actual fact, correlations with test scores and clinical diagnosis are significantly high. The items were originally selected by the clinicians from 200 items from the 'MMPI'. Fifty items were eventually collated to form the manifest anxiety scale.

The Eysenck neuroticism scale (Form B) was also used in this study. The Eysenck Personality Inventory is a standard test and needs no further elaboration here.

Each of the respondents assisting with this research was required to complete all of the nine questionnaires outlined above. The organisation of the research and the sample chosen is introduced and discussed in the ensuing chapter.

CHAPTER 6

Prologue to the Results.

Chapter 6

The Prologue to the Results

Aim

The principal aim of this chapter is threefold. Firstly the sample is introduced, secondly the method of conducting the research is explained and finally the respondent groupings are discussed together with a formal list of hypotheses involving differentials predicted among the various respondent groupings.

Contents

1. The Sample.
2. Conduct of the Research.
3. The Grouping of the Respondents.
4. The List of Hypotheses.
5. The Ordering of the Analysis of the Results.

1. The Sample

The 'Religious' part of the sample consisted of 154 students from theological colleges. All of the respondents were 'ministerial' students - that is they were in training to serve as priests or ministers in their respective denominations. Eleven theological colleges participated in the research, ten in London - which was a convenient base for the major part of the main study, and one in Durham. Of these eleven colleges, two were Roman Catholic seminaries, four were Anglican Theological Colleges, one was the Salvation Army College, one Methodist College, one Baptist College, one Congregational College, and one Interdenominational 'Evangelistic' College. As the number of respondents from some of the colleges was small - all the colleges were grouped together into larger groups according to definite criteria that will be explained in the analysis of results. The colleges in fact fell into quite natural and relatively homogeneous groupings.

The 'Non-Religious' part of the sample consisted of 48 students from four colleges in the University of Durham. Of these 21 were found to have varying degrees of 'pro-Christian' sympathy and 27, varying degrees of 'anti-Christian' attitude. Some of these students were degree students and some were studying for Certificates of Education at a College of Education affiliated to Durham University. These latter respondents were included in the 'control' sample because not all of the 'Ministerial' students were degree students or graduates. The students from the theological colleges

were slightly older on balance, their mean age was 22.9 as opposed to 20.5 - the mean age of the 'control group'.

2. Conduct of the Research

Altogether eight separate forms were administered in this study. These were organised into pairs and distributed two a week for four weeks. Each college was treated in exactly the same way. The students were not aware of the nature or implications of the research when asked to take part - but considered it a sort of survey of attitudes. The same instructions were given to each subject in each college. And all the respondents were seen in their college groups beforehand and assured of the confidential nature of the project and of their complete anonymity as regards their part in the research. Of the 154 Christian respondents who began in the research none dropped out, no one complained of boredom, all remained keen and interested, and it would seem the attitude of the respondents was frank and sincere throughout. Each college was visited separately - once a week for four weeks and the respondents were given a week to complete each pair of questionnaires in private. They were asked not to discuss them with anyone else.

3. The Grouping of the Respondents

This section continues with a discussion of the grouping of the respondents according to denominational differences and doctrinal differentials mentioned in the introductory chapters. The subdivision of the various respondent groups is justified on the grounds of the existence of basic and

inherent group divisions and these are not intended to be arbitrary categorisations by the author. Accordingly the subdivision was accomplished according to certain definite objective criteria.

The primary criterion for the formation of subgroups within the Christian sample ($n = 154$) was a major differentiation in the structure of the Christian religion, producing two relatively distinct 'blocks' namely: 'sacramentalism' and 'non-sacramentalism' - or nonconformism. The sacramentalist group includes Roman Catholics and Anglicans. In spite of various obvious doctrinal differences, especially between the Anglican and Roman Catholic groups, the liturgy, worship, and private devotional life within these two groups differs only a little. Indeed there are some definite similarities between the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches in terms of worship in the form of liturgical expressions of sinfulness and the 'confession of sin', and in some cases Anglicans use the 'confessional'; and the style of worship is almost identical with that of the Roman Catholic Church. To this section of the Church the term "High Church" is commonly applied. Until comparatively recent times the sacramentalist and non-conformist groups of the Church have run in parallel without any significant attempt at reconciliation. There still remain some deep gulfs of doctrinal disagreement especially concerning the nature of the 'sacraments'.

It is such doctrines of the 'sacraments' of confession and Penance that to some extent also serve to divide the sacramentalist group itself. The Roman Catholic and 'High' Church of England groups could be described perhaps as 'hyper-sacramentalist' in order to distinguish them from rather

less liturgically conscious Anglican churches who emphasise the 'Ministry of the Word' to the same extent that the 'Tractarians' emphasise the 'Ministry of the Sacraments'.

Thus for the 'Christian Sample' can be differentiated so as to produce a Sacramentalist group of 90 respondents and a non-sacramentalist group of 64 respondents. Of the former group, the Roman Catholic Church is represented by 40 respondents.

A further differentiation can be made according to the intensity of acceptance of the Christian Faith. This factor is reflected in the extent of private and public devotions and in the unreserved acceptance of the orthodox tenets of the Christian Faith. The phrase 'dogmatic Christianity' describes adequately a form of Christianity that advocates the wholehearted acceptance of the traditional and 'Bible-based' doctrines of the Christian Religion. The word 'dogmatic' is here used not as a term of abuse - but to describe definite, intense, acceptance of the Christian Faith. The 'dogmatic' Christians would be those who were relatively non-critical in their acceptance of the basic teachings and belief structure of the Christian Faith. They would be uncompromising in their acceptance of traditional Biblical Christianity and could equally be termed as "conservative" or as "fundamentalists". On the other hand the "non-dogmatic" Christians would be relatively more critical, less conservative, in acceptance of the tenets of the Christian Faith and could equally be described as 'liberal' or 'radical'.

It is not by chance that theological colleges, from which the Christian sample is taken, show a high degree of homogeneity among their students on

scores of Dogmatism, or dogmatic Christian Belief. Certain colleges clearly attract 'types' of Christians - by their avowed teaching and doctrinal emphases. Even 'committed' students who go to these colleges are obviously affected to a greater or lesser degree - by these doctrinal emphases. This has facilitated the division of the Christian group into sub-groups, by separating sacramentalist from non-sacramentalist colleges, and "dogmatic" from "non-dogmatic" colleges.

The 'dogmatic' colleges showed a much smaller standard deviation of Religious Belief scores than the non-dogmatic colleges, however. This seems to indicate that the non-dogmatic colleges were far less rigid in their interpretation and teaching^{of} the Christian Faith. On the other hand, the 'dogmatic' colleges showed much more conformity - a probable indication of their more doctrinaire, less critical, approach to Christian religious belief. There was thus a narrow range of religious belief scores within the dogmatic sub-groups. It was in fact possible to subdivide the group of nine Protestant colleges into six 'dogmatic' and three 'comparatively' 'non-dogmatic'. This was accomplished by using two criteria: Firstly that of Christian dogmatism implicit in the religious beliefs measure, and secondly that of the known doctrinal attitudes and alignment of the colleges involved. Subsequently both the non-conformist and the Anglican groups were subdivided on this basis.

Tabulated below are the resultant sub-groups, together with the relevant denominations involved, the average Christian religious belief scores and the associated standard deviations.

Subgroups	Number in subgroups	(Denomination)	Mean RBM Score	(SD)
1. Dogmatic Nonconformist	(41)	Baptist Salvation Army Evangelical- Interdenominational	257.50	9.94
2. Non-dogmatic Nonconformist	(23)	Methodist Congregational	232.00	26.22
3. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	Three Anglican Colleges	247.97	13.14
4. Non-Dogmatic Anglican	(17)	One Anglican College	219.65	23.10
5. Roman Catholic	(40)	Two Roman Catholic Seminaries	245.80	17.53

The larger sacramentalist/nonsacramentalist dichotomy resulted in the following division:

A. Sacramentalist (n = 90)	Six Anglican and Roman Catholic Colleges	241.7 (RBM)
B. Nonconformist (n = 64)	5 Nonconformist Colleges	248.3 (RBM)

The differences between these two groups on the Christian Religious Belief measure was not statistically significant.

The differences on the 'Beliefs' measure were significant between the 'dogmatic' and the 'nondogmatic' respondent groups referred to in the table. The 'dogmatic' Anglican subgroup differed significantly from the 'non-dogmatic' Anglican group: $t = 5.41$, with 48 df, $p < 0.01$. Also the 'dogmatic' nonconformist subgroup differed significantly from the 'non-dogmatic'

nonconformist group: $t = 5.47$, with 62 df, $p < 0.01$.

Most of the major statistical comparisons were made using the groups represented in the table as the 'experimental' groups. It should be noted that comparisons made using some of the individual colleges would not always be valid or meaningful because of the small number of respondents that might be involved.

The 'control group' consisted of 48 respondents of which 27 recorded a 'negative' attitude towards Christian religious belief. Occasionally, in the analysis and discussion of the results, this 'anti-Christian' group is used as the comparison group - rather than the control group as a whole. On average the control group could be said to be 'neutral' to the Christian Faith - neither for, nor against. It consisted of students of similar age-range and ability to the sample from the Theological Colleges.

4. The List of Hypotheses

This section continues with a list of the basic hypotheses as they were originally formulated on the basis of the theoretical discussions outlined in the introductory chapters. In retrospect it is obvious that they do not encompass all the parameters of the study, but they are concerned with the central aspects of the Thesis. They are not listed in any significant order:

1. That Christian religious belief is positively correlated with aspects of morally-determined inhibitions implicit in measures extracted from the 'anticipated guilt' version of the moral judgments questionnaire

and from the 'manifest guilt' questionnaire.

2. That Christian religious belief is not significantly correlated with manifestations of feelings of guilt that are by nature self-recriminatory or morbid.

3. (a) That there is a positive correlation between Christian religious belief and self-esteem.

(b) That, conversely, there is a negative relationship between Christian religious belief, and measures of self-criticality and intrapunitiveness.

(c) That there is an inverse relationship between Christian religious belief and 'self-ideal' discrepancy.

4. That there is an inverse relationship between Christian religious belief and measures of maladjustment: viz. 'Manifest anxiety' and 'neuroticism'.

5. That there are some significant differences, within the Christian sample, between sub-groups in their manifestations of expectancy of feelings of guilt, and in their report of experiences of guilt feelings.

(a) That the 'dogmatic' Christians will score high on measures of moralism and on those measures, therefore, associated with the inhibition of 'impulsive' behaviour.

(b) That the sacramentalist group will tend to score higher on measures indicating self-recrimination than the other Christian groups. This would include such measures as 'remorse', 'intrapunitiveness' and manifestation of excessive and morbid feelings of guilt.

(c) That the sacramentalist group will be less self-accepting than the other Christian groups.

(d) That the 'dogmatic' Christian subgroups will score low on measures of maladjustment and self-criticality.

6. That there are significant differences between the Christian sample and the control groups:

(a) That the control group will score lower on all aspects of 'anticipated guilt' feelings.

(b) That the control group will score significantly lower on measures of the: inhibition of anti-ascetic impulses such as the sexual, aggressive, and other self-indulgent impulses.

The next three hypotheses are based on the assumption that the control group will be rather less concerned to give a favourable self-assessment than the representative Christian groups. The introductory chapters also contain some arguments supporting the contention that, on balance, the Christian religion has an 'integrating', 'measuring' effect which enhances 'self-acceptance'. Thus:

(c) That the control group will score higher on measures of self-criticality than the Christian group.

(d) That the control group will score lower on the measure of social desirability.

(e) That the control group will have a greater average 'self-ideal' discrepancy.

These are the principal hypotheses concerning the interactions of the factor of Christian religious belief with other factors and variables.

5. The Ordering of the Analyses of the Results

In the first place the results were analysed in three separate ways, these are outlined in brief below:

Firstly, thirty-nine variables were extracted from the nine questionnaires used. This produced a correlation matrix of 39 x 39 variables. In this way the significant relationships and coefficients of correlation between variables could be assessed. A Factor Analysis was utilised to test for "second order" factors in this matrix.

Secondly, a Factor Analysis was run on the items of the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire and a comparison was made between the different Christian groups and between these and the control groups over the 13 Factors produced by the analysis.

Thirdly, detailed comparisons were made between the Christian (n = 154) and the control group (48) - across the 39 variables and across the individual item scores on the 'Anticipated Guilt Questionnaire' and 'Manifest Guilt Questionnaire'. Detailed comparisons were also made, in this way, between the different sub-groups contained in the Christian sample.

The results of the study are presented, analysed, and discussed in the four following chapters; the first chapter deals with results concerning Anticipated Guilt and moralism, the second chapter deals with results from the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire and its Factor Analysis; and the third

chapter is concerned with self-evaluation and discusses the results obtained. The fourth chapter deals with the social desirability variable, and its significance as a factor in the results.

CHAPTER 7

Results: Moralism and Potential Guilt Feelings.

Chapter 7

Moralism and Guilt Potential

INTRODUCTION

The term 'moralism' refers to the stringency and extent of conscience activity as is indicated, for example by 'anticipated guilt' scores. As Mosher (161) has postulated, expected guilt feelings, or the expectancy of self-mediated punishment, is a strong motive for the avoidance of the specific guilt-producing situation. Avoidance of guilt-producing situations is thus mediated by the anticipation of negative reinforcement - which for the socialised individual refers to feelings of 'self' punishment. Hence the greater the anticipations of guilt feeling the more likely the avoidance of that guilt feeling.

The self-confessed 'moral' person must be living in obedience to his conscience. By 'conscience' is meant the awareness of codes of behaviour, standards, and ideals accumulated through the inculcation of parental, social and religious values. When the term 'conscience' is used - there is no intention to 'reify' this concept and thus infer that it is a separately delineated mental structure of some kind.

The term 'moral idealism' perhaps rather more benevolently characterises the practice and aim of Christians. Moralism, or moral idealism is thus related to self-control through the inhibition of impulsive thoughts and actions. If it is assumed that the strength of this inhibition is proportionate to the anticipation of self-mediated punishment - then the

'anticipated guilt questionnaire' (referred to as the guilt potential measure) will be an indication of personal moralism. Thus a paradigm of this could be:

$$(eB \longrightarrow eR_G^-) \longrightarrow I_B$$

Where the anticipation of a behaviour (eB) produces the expectancy of negative reinforcement (eR_G^-), in other words, 'feelings of guilt', which act to inhibit the behaviour (I_B). The strength of the inhibition of the behaviour is one definition of 'moralism'. Thus 'moralism' and 'guilt potential' are closely related expressions because the avoidance of guilt producing situations (i.e. 'moralism') involves the ability to anticipate the emotional consequences of those situations. (This idea and the relating paradigms are developed more fully in the Appendix 'M').

CONTENTS

1. Correlations of Christian belief and practices with guilt potential.
2. Comparisons between sub-groups on the guilt potential.
3. Christian Belief and questionnaire items.
4. Guilt potential and guilt proneness: a differentiation.

1. Correlations of Christian Belief and Practices with Guilt Potential

The first table shows the correlation coefficients between scores on the measure of dogmatic Christian belief and scores on the 'guilt potential' measure.

TABLE I

Categories	Total (AGQ)	drinking gambling	hostile	sex	racialism	stealing	cheating	lying
Religious Belief	0.58	0.43	0.47	0.54	0.182	0.49	0.31	0.42
All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level of confidence (where $r = 0.181$) with 200 degrees of freedom ($n - 2$).								

These results compare favourably with those obtained in the preliminary study. In the preliminary study the coefficient between the total score from the anticipated guilt questionnaire and the religious belief score was $r = 0.50$. In this study, $r = 0.58$. All the correlations are significantly positive - whether or not the situation involved contraventions of 'social' or 'ascetic' morality.

The main conclusion from these results is that the stronger the Christian belief of the respondents - the greater is their expectancy of guilt feelings over a variety of situations. It is particularly interesting that anticipated guilt feelings associated with behaviours, considered as violations of social morality (such as: stealing, cheating and lying), are correlated with Christian belief almost as closely as are the feelings of guilt associated with violations of 'ascetic' morality such as: indulgence in : drinking, gambling, and sex. The greater the anticipated guilt feeling the stronger the motivation to avoid the guilt producing behaviour - thus it is

evident that the activity of conscience is greater for the respondent who identifies himself with Christian beliefs.

Correlations with the religious practices questionnaire are very similar to those obtained using the religious beliefs measure. Religiosity, as shown by the extent of religious practices, is another indication of the strength of identification with Christianity. The correlations from the comparison between anticipated guilt and scores on the religious practices questionnaire is shown in the following table (Table II).

TABLE II

Category	Total (AGQ)	drinking gambling	hostile	sex	racialism	stealing	cheating	lying
Religious Practices	0.59	0.47	0.45	0.53	0.19	0.50	0.32	0.42
All coefficients are significant at the 1% level of confidence (df = 200)								

The similarity between these correlations and the previous set is explained by the high correlation between the Christian Beliefs measure and the Religious Practices Questionnaire: $r = 0.925$.

Part of the first hypothesis is thus confirmed - that dogmatic Christian belief is positively correlated with the guilt potential categories of self-indulgence viz. sex, 'drinking', and gambling. In addition it is found that there is a positive correlation with guilt potential that relates to various aspects of social morality contraventions such as:

racialism, stealing, cheating, and lying. 'Good conduct' and 'self-control' are two expressions that characterise the principles of the Christian conscience.

2. Comparison of Sub-groups on the Guilt Potential Measure.

(a) A comparison of the Christian and control groups:

As was predicted there is a statistically significant difference between the Christian ($n = 154$) and the non-Christian groups ($n = 48$). The average total guilt potential score for the Christian group (61.62) differed very significantly from that for the control group (45.25). For this comparison: $t = 6.238$ which is significant at the 1% level of confidence.

Except for the anticipated guilt category of 'racialism' all the categories on the guilt potential measure, differentiated significantly between the Christian and control groups: as is shown in Table III.

These results are anticipated by the results from the correlation matrix. 'Ascetic' guilt, with the associated categories of 'sex' and 'drinking and gambling' accounts for the largest of the differences. But some aspects of 'social guilt' differentiate almost as distinctly between the Christian and non-Christian groups. The guilt feeling anticipated following violation of social moral codes is higher for the Christian groups than for the non-Christian control group - especially on aspects of stealing and lying. The situations described in the anticipated guilt questionnaire on the whole do not relate in any way to 'criminal activity,' except for the shop-lifting item, and so the items of the questionnaire are

TABLE III

Guilt Potential Category	Christian (n = 154)	Non-Christian (n = 48)	"t" Statistic	p (significance)
1. Drinking, gambling	1.59	1.03	4.29	< 0.01
2. Sex	1.47	0.76	5.88	< 0.01
3. Hostility	2.09	1.54	5.42	< 0.01
4. Racialism	1.95	1.81	1.14	NS
5. Stealing	2.26	1.66	5.27	< 0.01
6. Lying	1.71	1.21	4.91	< 0.01
7. Cheating	2.25	1.99	2.14	< 0.05, > 0.01
8. Social guilt (total)	2.06	1.72	4.24	< 0.01
9. Ascetic guilt (total)	1.52	0.85	6.17	< 0.01

Average scores: minimum = 0

maximum = 3

more likely to discriminate between a group with comprehensive and rigid moral categories and a group with more flexibility in its moral judgments. Needless to say, the Christian group manifests much more moralism. The control of impulses, particularly sexual and aggressive impulses, for the Christian is part of a general, rigid moral system - it is this ascetism that most differentiates between Christians and non-Christians.

2. (b) The total score (the overall 'guilt potential' scale score)

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>Average Guilt Score</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	71.71
2. Dogmatic Anglican	60.09
3. Roman Catholic	59.50
4. Non-dogmatic Nonconformist	57.57
5. Non-dogmatic Anglican	50.76
6. All control	45.25
7. 'Anti-Christian' control	39.22

The dogmatic nonconformist group is significantly different in its response from both the non-dogmatic groups. For the comparison with the non-dogmatic nonconformist group: $t = 3.72$ (with 62 degrees of freedom) which is significant at the 1% level of confidence. For the comparison with the non-dogmatic Anglican group: $t = 5.48$ (with 56 degrees of freedom) which is significant at the 1% level of confidence. The dogmatic nonconformist subgroup, which incidentally has the highest mean 'Christian belief' score

($\bar{X} = 257$), scores statistically significantly in excess of any of the other subgroups (at the 1% level in each case).

There is also a significant difference between the Dogmatic Anglican and the non-dogmatic Anglican subgroups: $t = 2.48$ (with 48 degrees of freedom) which is significant at the 5% level.

(c) The drinking/gambling category

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>Mean Score</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	2.49
2. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	1.53
3. Dogmatic Anglican	1.30
4. Roman Catholic	1.18
5. Non-dogmatic Anglican	1.01
6. All control	1.03
7. Anti-Christian control	0.84

Here the nonconformist groups again score higher. One important factor predisposes the nonconformist subgroup to register a high score on this category—that is 'temperance'. This doctrine requires individuals to totally abstain from drinking or gambling. This particularly reflects the teachings of the Salvation Army whose respondents form about half of the dogmatic nonconformist subgroup. Methodists and Baptists also appear more inclined to 'temperance' than other denominations represented in this study.

The Dogmatic nonconformist group scores significantly higher than all the other subgroups on this category of anticipated guilt.

(d) The Hostile Category

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>Mean Score</u>
1. Dogmatic Anglican	2.27
2. Dogmatic nonconformist	2.16
3. Non-dogmatic Anglican	2.00
4. Roman Catholic	1.99
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	1.93
6. All control	1.54
7. Anti-Christian control	1.33

All the Christian subgroups differ significantly from the control groups on this category of anticipated guilt feeling. There are only small differences within the Christian group. There is a just significant difference between the scores of the dogmatic Anglican and the Roman Catholic and nondogmatic nonconformist scores (at the 5% level).

The desire to avoid 'hostile' behaviour, by restraining aggressive impulses appears to be one of the most characteristic codes of Christian behaviour. No doubt 'meekness' and 'turning the other cheek' are concepts derived directly from the teachings of Christ - as far as Christian respondents are concerned. Aggressive impulses are suppressed, or at least an attempt is made to suppress them, because of the expectation of feelings of guilt - reported particularly by the Christian groups.

(d) Sexual behaviour

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>Mean Score</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	1.80
2. Roman Catholic	1.80
3. Dogmatic Anglican	1.20
4. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	1.16
5. Non-dogmatic Anglican	0.86
6. All control	0.76
7. Anti-Christian control	0.56

There is one fairly obvious division that can be made in the list of sub-groups. The Roman Catholic and dogmatic nonconformist subgroups respond significantly higher on these items than any of the other Christian groups (the differences are all significant at the 1% level of confidence). The result was expected because of the doctrines of the high scoring sub-groups. The Roman Catholic respondents had already taken or were preparing to take vows of celibacy and this would predispose them to attach much stronger feelings to the anticipation of sexual behaviour. The dogmatic nonconformist sub-group score equally strongly on this category. One explanation of this latter result would be that the asceticism of the dogmatic nonconformist group encourages abstinence from self-indulgence, particularly sexual pleasure and sexual experience before marriage. In this comparison the dogmatic nonconformist groups differs significantly from the dogmatic Anglican group $t = 4.27$ (with 62 degrees of freedom) which is significant at the 1% level of significance. The 'dogmatic' section of the respondents is split on this item because of the greater rigidity of the nonconformist group.

(e) Social morality and Anticipated Guilt Feelings

The preceding comparisons show that asceticism and the concept of 'self-control' are important categories within the concept of Christian moralism and they reveal strong differentiation between some Christian subgroups and the control group. The preliminary study also suggested that Christian subgroups also differ from a non-Christian group on measures of guilt potential associated with 'social morality'. 'Social morality' covers types of moral judgments associated with the maintenance of socially acceptable or socially necessary codes of behaviour. Thus such behaviour as stealing, lying, cheating, and racialism would in a student society be considered as contravention of these moral codes of behaviour. Likewise, deliberate avoidance of social responsibility - by ignoring the needs of less fortunate people - would equally be considered unacceptable by student society. One might expect, then, a certain equivalence in the responses of Christians and non-Christian students. However, there is some disparity in the results:

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>Mean Social Guilt Score</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	2.24
2. Dogmatic Anglican	2.11
3. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	2.01
4. Roman Catholic	1.95
5. Non-dogmatic Anglican	1.85
6. All control	1.72
7. Anti-Christian control	1.57

The dogmatic nonconformist group differs significantly from both the Roman Catholic and non-dogmatic Anglican groups: $t = 2.79$ (79 df) and $t = 3.09$ (56df) respectively. Both comparisons are significant at the 1% level of confidence. The dogmatic groups appear to be manifesting a rather more 'stringent' conscience than the other groups - but the differences are not very great. Considering various specific contraventions of social morality separately - some of the differences between the sub-groups become a little more obvious. The next group of comparisons involves the four sub-categories of 'social guilt': stealing, lying, cheating, and racialism:

(f) Stealing, Lying, Cheating, and Racialism

	<u>sub-category</u> (mean scores)			
	<u>Stealing</u>	<u>Lying</u>	<u>Cheating</u>	<u>Racialism</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	2.45	1.91	2.46	2.25
2. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	2.39	1.48	2.07	1.97
3. Dogmatic Anglican	2.32	1.84	2.38	1.86
4. Non-dogmatic Anglican	2.06	1.57	1.79	1.63
5. Roman Catholic	2.03	1.58	2.13	1.83
6. All control	1.66	1.21	1.99	1.81
7. Anti-Christian Control	1.32	1.04	1.85	1.70

In each of the four sub-categories it is the dogmatic nonconformist group that manifests the greatest guilt potential.

On the 'stealing' sub-category all the Christian groups differ significantly from the 'anti'-Christian control group and only the non-

dogmatic Anglican group does not differ from the control group as a whole. In this result and also with the others one cannot conclude that non-Christians condone any of these activities - but they anticipate considerably less intense feelings of guilt than the Christian groups - and especially the dogmatic nonconformist sub-group. On average the control groups are indicating that they would feel: 'a little' or 'quite guilty', whereas the Christian groups on average are indicating that they would feel: 'quite' or 'very guilty'.

On the 'lying' sub-category the dogmatic nonconformist group scores significantly higher than three other Christian sub-groups:

1. Compared with the non-dogmatic nonconformist group

$$t = 2.94 \text{ (62 df) } p = 0.01$$

2. Compared with the Roman Catholic group

$$t = 2.67 \text{ (79 df) } p = 0.01$$

3. Compared with the non-dogmatic Anglican group

$$t = 2.05 \text{ (56 df) } p = 0.05.$$

High Christian dogmatism is thus in part characterised by more guilt potential consequent upon the violation of 'social morality'. The rigidity and stringency of the dogmatic nonconformist conscience is the outstanding feature in these results.

On the 'cheating' sub-category it is again the dogmatic nonconformist sub-group that scores in excess of the responses of other Christian sub-groups. This group significantly scores higher than the same three respondents mentioned in the preceding comparison.

1. Compared with the non-dogmatic, nonconformist group

$$t = 2.24 \text{ (62 df) } p = 0.05$$

2. Compared with the Roman Catholic group

$$t = 2.35 \text{ (79 df) } p = 0.05$$

3. Compared with the non-dogmatic Anglican group

$$t = 3.49 \text{ (56 df) } p = 0.01.$$

It is the 'intensity' of the anticipated self-mediated punishment that most differentiates between these sub-groups - not the actual anticipation of the presence or absence of guilt feelings. The moral stringency of the dogmatic nonconformist respondents is in part dependent on a punitive conscience. Strong negative reinforcement, and indeed the 'expectancy' of strong negative reinforcement, facilitates the perseverance of avoidance of behaviour that would elicit feelings associated with the capacity for self-mediated punishment. Hence the rigidity and moralism of the dogmatic nonconformist group is not only a result of high moral idealism, per se, which is common to other Christian respondent groups, but also dependent on an inflexible system of morality based on the expectancy of guilt and remorse contingent upon contraventions of codes of behaviour associated with that system of morality. This intrapunitiveness, or rather this 'potential' intrapunitiveness is the factor that most differentiates the Christian sub-groups.

The pattern is very similar on the 'Racialism' sub-category. All sub-groups indicate that they would expect feelings of guilt for manifesting racist behaviour, but the dogmatic nonconformist group still scores in

excess of the sacramentalist groups:

1. Compared with the dogmatic Anglican group

$$t = 2.76 \text{ (72 df) } p = 0.01$$

2. Compared with the non-dogmatic Anglican group

$$t = 3.34 \text{ (56 df) } p = 0.01$$

3. Compared with the Roman Catholic group

$$t = 2.42 \text{ (79 df) } p = 0.05.$$

These comparisons reveal that the potential intrapunitiveness of respondents is a factor that differentiates sub-groups from each other. The dogmatic nonconformist group scores in excess of other Christian sub-groups on measures of the capacity for self-mediated punishment relative to specific behavioural situations.

In general, the guilt potential measure, as the correlational analysis implies, differentiates the more dogmatic respondents from the less dogmatic - as the next section shows in detail.

3. Christian Belief and Specific Questionnaire Items

This section compares the 'more dogmatic' with the 'less dogmatic' respondents. The median 'Religious belief measure' score was selected as an arbitrary cut-off point, separating the entire sample into two halves of 101 respondents in each.

The resultant analysis showed that the anticipated guilt questionnaire contains twenty four items that differentiate between the high scoring

group on the measure of Christian dogmatism (above median) and the low scoring group on that measure (below median). In fact the median score was 245 and the maximum score possible is 270. Thus those respondents in the 'above median' group are virtually equivalent to the 'dogmatic' respondents a score of 245, being in fact a high 'pro-Christian score'.

All the 33 items of the guilt potential measure were then used to test for any disparity between the 'above median' and 'below median' group. The scores indicated after the items listed below represent the actual number of respondents that make a moderate or high anticipated guilt response on the respective items. The 24 items that do significantly differentiate the two groups are listed according to the principal guilt potential categories with the relevant chi-square statistic and its significance.

(1) Sex guilt

The results are outlined in Table IV.

The figures in Table IV can be considered as approximate percentages since the number of respondents scoring above and below the median is 101 in each case.

The 'above median' Christian group is significantly differentiable from the 'below median' group in terms of the numbers of respondents anticipating moderate or high feelings of guilt. This results emphasises the 'controlling' and 'inhibiting' effect of dogmatic Christian belief. Indulgence in sexual behaviour before marriage, even the thought of it, is regarded as 'taboo'. Self-indulgence and self-gratification are practices incompatible with the comparative asceticism of dogmatic Christian beliefs. The large disparity

TABLE IV

Items	The number of respondents scoring moderate or high anticipated guilt		Chi square
	Above Median religious Belief (n = 101)	Below Median religious Belief (n = 101)	
How guilty would you feel if			
1. You think sexy thoughts and have sex fantasies and daydreams.	35	17	8.4 (p = <0.01)
2. At a party you openly flirt with a good-looking member of the opposite sex.	30	17	4.7 (p = <0.05).
3. You indulge in mutual petting with a member of the opposite sex before marriage.	41	21	9.3 (p = <0.01)
4. You have sexual intercourse before marriage.	89	47	39.7 (p = <0.001)
5. You fall in love with a married person.	71	49	9.9 (p = <0.01)
6. You sexually stimulate your own body: i.e. masturbation.	63	27	25.9 (p = <0.001)
7. You read a sexy magazine or a pornographic book.	57	28	17.1 (p = <0.001)

between the two groups on items '4', '6' and '7' suggests that self-gratification is considered as highly distasteful by the 'more dogmatic' Christians. These respondents would avoid these situations completely if possible - failure to do this would, the respondents believe, precipitate intense feelings of self-mediated punishment.

(2) Hostile guilt

Table V shows the items, associated with this sub-category of the Anticipated Guilt questionnaire, which distinguish significantly between the two comparison groups. The results shown in Table V do not show such a marked disparity between the dogmatic 'above median' group and the 'below median' group. Nevertheless, 'self-control' is supposed to be an important attribute and characteristic of 'dogmatic Christian' behaviour. Inasmuch as aggressive behaviour is a form of self-indulgence and lack of self-control so this Christian group attempts to suppress hostile impulses. Some factor of unselfishness or 'tendermindedness' is no doubt involved in these results - relating as these do to various Christian teachings about 'meekness' and 'love'.

(3) Drinking and Gambling

Drinking and gambling are both forms of self-indulgence and as such are 'anti-ascetic'. The Christian principle of 'moderation in all things' is clearly violated by the first item listed in Table VI, it also indicates a lack of self-control. This is the most conclusive result in the table. Naturally, for those to whom drinking or gambling in any shape or form is 'taboo', items '3' and '4' also elicit strong feelings of guilt.

TABLE V

Items	The number of respondents scoring moderate or high anticipated guilt		Chi Square
	Above median religious Belief (n = 101)	Below median religious Belief (n = 101)	
How guilty would you feel if.....			
1. You become involved in a heated argument in which you lose your temper.	68	50	6.6 (p = <0.02)
2. You lose your self-control and hit a person who has provoked and angered you.	89	76	5.6 (p = <0.02)
3. You consider hurting someone who has annoyed you very much.	78	65	4.0 (p = <0.05)
4. You compete aggressively against other people for personal gain.	70	54	5.3 (p = <0.05)

TABLE VI

Items	The number of respondents scoring moderate or high anticipated guilt		Chi square
	Above Median religious Belief (n = 101)	Below Median religious Belief (n = 101)	
How guilty would you feel if			
1. You drink too much at a party or in a pub, and become tipsy.	60	32	15.7 (p = <0.001)
2. You gamble frequently on horse-racing, football, or bingo.	75	61	4.4 (p = <0.05)
3. You spend an evening drinking in a Pub.	37	11	18.5 (p = <0.001)
4. You are persuaded to wager a small sum of money in a sweep-stake or on a private bet.	37	13	15.3 (p = <0.001)

(4) Social guilt

Items relating to 'stealing, cheating, lying, and racialism' differentiated between the 'above median' and the 'below median' groups as is shown in Table VII. However, on measures involving social responsibility - such as 'helping other people', there was little or no differentiation between the groups. The items in the list below that are in some ways the most 'mild' are those which differentiate most strongly between the 'above median' dogmatic group and the 'below median' group - such items as '2' and '4'. Guilt feeling is anticipated by dogmatic Christians regardless of the 'moral importance' of the act. The rigid rules of conduct accepted by many dogmatic Christians would infer that stealing was 'wrong' under any circumstances and that 'lying' was wrong under any circumstances. Thus whilst others would judge some misdeeds as insignificant, many Christians would decide that if the behaviour was wrong in principle, then it should be completely avoided. Consequently comparatively 'insignificant' behaviours become 'morally significant' to dogmatic Christians and will elicit feelings of guilt in those individuals to whom it is anathema to violate 'the principle'.

Conclusions

The overall picture of the anticipated guilt questionnaire results shows a fairly distinct difference between Christian and non-Christian respondents. 'Ascetic morality' with the associated potential sex guilt and potential guilt for drinking and gambling - differentiates most strongly between the Christian and non-Christian respondents. The largest difference

TABLE VII

Items	The number of respondents scoring moderate or high anticipated guilt		Chi square
	Above median religious Belief (n = 101)	Below median religious Belief (n = 101)	
How guilty would you feel if			
1. You take something from a shop with no intention of paying for it.	99	89	4.9 (p = <0.05)
2. You have been staying at a Hotel when you are leaving you take some small 'souvenir' from the Hotel such as an ash-tray or hand-towel.	78	56	10.7 (p = <0.01)
3. You do not keep to the truth whilst supposedly relating a factual experience.	62	47	4.4 (p = <0.05)
4. You tell a lie to cover up for a friend who is in trouble.	37	16	11.3 (p = <0.001)
5. You tell a deliberate lie to try to get yourself out of trouble.	87	69	9.1 (p = <0.01)

contd./

Table VII contd.

Items	The number of respondents scoring moderate or high anticipated guilt		Chi square
	Above median religious Belief (n = 101)	Below median religious Belief (n = 101)	
6. You cheat in a game whilst playing with friends.	84	68	6.8 (p = <0.01)
7. You cheat in an important exam. or test by looking to see what the person next to you is writing.	88	71	8.5 (p = <0.01)
8. You deliberately avoid sharing a table with a coloured person in a restaurant.	90	77	5.8 (p = <0.05)

being between the dogmatic nonconformists and the rest. In the case of 'sex guilt' the Roman Catholic respondents understandably score equally high. Potential 'hostile' guilt is higher for the dogmatic sub-group though there is not so much differentiation between the Christian groups on this category.

The stronger anticipations of 'negative reinforcement' of the dogmatic groups implies that they are more equipped to inhibit the behavioural impulse. This implies that there has been a more stringent process of

socialisation with the emphasis on self-control. However, the dogmatic groups also score highest on the social morality aspects of guilt potential. In terms then of both private (ascetic) morality and public (social) morality, the conscience of the dogmatic Christian respondent tends to be more punitive and stringent. It is not that other groups of respondents, including the non-Christians, do not feel guilty about most of the situations incorporated in the questionnaire - but that the intensity of their anticipation of guilt feeling is considerably less. The dogmatic Christians respondents tend to express more potential self-punishment - which implies rather stronger motivation to avoid guilt producing situations - which is reflected in their greater moralism and greater emphasis on 'good conduct' and 'self-control'.

4. The Differentiation between Guilt Potential and Guilt Proneness Variables by the Factor Analysis.

A factor analysis was run on the 39 variables extracted from the questionnaires used in this study. Some of the factors produced by this analysis will be introduced elsewhere, in particular three factors will be considered in this section. In all, eight factors were isolated after rotation of the factor matrix using the standard computer programme "Facto" (IBM system's 360 computer: Northumbrian Universities). Three factors were isolated that were associated with variables from the anticipated guilt questionnaire (guilt potential) and the manifest guilt questionnaire (guilt proneness).

Taking the usual 0.3000 loading as the 'cut-off' point, variables are listed under their factor headings in order of the size of loading for the following three factors.

The first factor: social guilt potential

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Variable</u>
0.94895	(all) social guilt potential
0.86614	total guilt potential score
0.74045	stealing (guilt potential sub-category)
0.72966	racialism (guilt potential sub-category)
0.72039	Cheating (guilt potential sub-category)
0.71756	lying (guilt potential sub-category)
0.70091	Hostile guilt potential
0.62202	drinking/gambling guilt potential
0.45104	sex guilt potential
0.34099	Religious Practices questionnaire
0.33111	Religious Belief measure
0.32747	"Constructive guilt" manifest guilt questionnaire

The variables with high loadings on this factor are principally sub-categories of the anticipated guilt questionnaire especially those associated with the contravention of various aspects of social morality. There is a fairly obvious demarcation at the 'ascetic guilt' level in the above list, and in fact both 'ascetic guilt' and 'religious belief' are more heavily weighted on a different factor.

The factor analysis thus differentiates quite clearly between aspects of 'Public morality', including in this case, 'Hostile guilt' potential, and aspects of 'Private morality' which in fact form the 5th Factor.

The Fifth factor: 'Asceticism'

The denial of self-indulgence is one aspect of asceticism. It does not necessarily affect society or public morality in the same way as for example: stealing or cheating might. The expression 'private morality' implies that the codes of conduct are not 'socially determined' and inculcated in a socialising process, but rather determined by individual, 'private', religious beliefs.

<u>Loadings</u>	<u>Variable</u>
0.75066	Potential sex guilt
0.71868	ascetic guilt potential (sex + drinking/gambling)
0.65527	sex guilt (proneness to guilt feelings) (Manifest guilt questionnaire)
0.51585	Religious Beliefs
0.50860	Religious Practices
0.49943	Potential 'drinking/gambling' guilt
0.42469	Total: guilt potential
0.38688	'Constructive guilt' proneness (manifest guilt questionnaire)

'Ascetic guilt' feelings - anticipated and manifest relate to the inhibition of 'desire', or the suppression of the impulses for self-gratification and self-indulgence. The high loadings of the measures of

religious belief on this factor are thus understandable in the light of Christian teaching on 'self-control', 'moderation', and 'the lusts of the flesh'. The connection between ascetic morality and Christian belief is confirmed, this serves to explain why 'ascetic guilt' differentiates most strongly between a group of Christian respondents and a group of non-Christian respondents.

One of the strongest human impulses is 'sexual' and this is one of the greatest causes of mental conflict for the Christian. The strong impulse for sexual gratification has to be restrained and indeed denied to the 'self' by the Christian person. Thus in 'ascetic moral living' for the Christian, the most prominent cause of conflict is between 'self-denial' and the strong biological impulses such as the 'sex drive'. The Christian is taught that it is a 'virtue' to subdue desire and covetousness. Hence violation of this 'virtuousness' would precipitate both self-mediated punishment and ostracism by the individual's Christian community - as the most extreme censure. Thus one of the causes of differentiation between a non-Christian and a Christian respondent group is likely to be a greater emphasis on the control of sexual impulses by the Christian group - with the concomitant threat of severe guilt feelings for failure to suppress the sexual impulses.

The facilitation of ascetic morality requires not only the suppression of the behaviour, but also the suppression of 'thoughts' about the behaviour. Thus feelings of guilt accompany 'sexy thoughts' and 'day-dreams' encouraging the suppression of these self-stimulating thoughts.

Similarly the reading of pornographic literature is 'taboo' as this again stimulates the sexual drive with accompanying erotic sensations - which also serve to arouse feelings of guilt and anxiety. This type of asceticism common among dogmatic Christians seeks to reduce sexual stimulation by 'self-denial' and 'self-control'. The inhibition of impulses and behaviour is maintained by the threat of self-mediated punishment and the fear of the disapproval of others. The rigid views of dogmatic sections of the Church on premarital chastity and 'post-marital faithfulness' restricts sexual behaviour to the husband-wife relationship, thus emphasising the pro-creative aspects of the sexual impulse. Self-gratification is thus discouraged as it infers the surrender of 'self-control' and the substitution of 'desire' and 'lust'. The non-Christian does not accept the 'religious' arguments for asceticism, hence both his proneness to feelings of guilt and his estimated guilt potential is correspondingly reduced on this factor.

The third factor: guilt proneness.

This factor is almost exclusively concerned with 'manifest' feelings of guilt. The highest loadings on this factor are for sub-categories of the manifest guilt questionnaire - concerned primarily with proneness to self-recrimination - rather than the inhibiting effect of anticipated feelings of guilt.

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Variable</u>
0.94254	Total: manifest guilt feelings
0.92433	'Destructive' guilt

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Variable</u>
0.86594	"Falling short" of standards
0.82703	Remorse
0.79921	Self-hate, because of wrongdoing
0.66236	Manifest 'hostile' guilt feelings
0.66061	'Constructive' guilt
0.52434	Manifest anxiety
0.42347	Neuroticism
0.39266	Manifest sex guilt feelings

Guilt proneness is thus differentiated from guilt potential, the latter variable being closely related to the extent and intensity of moralism. The ensuing chapter will consider the manifest guilt questionnaire results in some detail including a factor analysis of the 41 items of the questionnaire.

The absence of the loading of 'religious' variables on this third factor underlines the dissociation of this variable from the measures of guilt-proneness and self-recrimination. It may thus suggest that the differences between the Christian and non-Christian groups on the guilt-proneness factor are insignificant. The following chapter will examine the alternative possibility that some significant differences exist between various Christian sub-groups in their scores on the measures of guilt-proneness. However, at this stage one might conclude that dogmatic Christian belief affects 'ascetic', and to a lesser extent 'social',

morality; but does not, in itself, encourage and induce feelings of guilt and proneness to self-recrimination.

NOTE: An outline of the theory underlying the affinity of the terms "guilt potential" and "moralism" (as defined in this study) is given in Appendix 'M'. This also relates to the theory underlying the interpretation of results from the "guilt potential measure" (i.e. "the Anticipated Guilt questionnaire").

CHAPTER 8

Results: The Manifestation of Guilt Feelings.

Chapter 8
The Manifestation of Guilt Feelings

Contents

This chapter comprises a number of analyses of the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of 41 statements relating to the 'self-report' of feelings of guilt.

This chapter is sub-divided into three main sections:

Section I:

Results from the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire.

- a. Revealed response patterns to the 41 items of the Questionnaire.
- b. Comparison of 'manifest guilt' scores with other variables.
- c. Differences among respondent groups in response to questionnaire categories.

Section 2:

The Factor Analysis.

Section 3:

Conclusions and Discussion.

Chapter 8: Section 1

Section 1: Results from the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire

a. Revealed Response Patterns to the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire

This part of the analysis of the Manifest guilt questionnaire examines the distribution of frequencies of the 41 questionnaire items among five 'response classes'. These response classes were arbitrarily chosen on the basis of the average percentage affirmative response to each item by each of the various sub-groups. Thus this analysis will indicate the 'pattern' of responses over the 41 items for the sub-groups. Each of the response classes represents a range of 20%.

The five response classes represented are:

- | | | |
|----|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. | Items with 0-20% affirmative response | . |
| 2. | " 21-40% " " | |
| 3. | " 41-60% " " | |
| 4. | " 61-80% " " | |
| 5. | " 81-100% " " | |

The distribution of the 41 items among these five response classes would be expected to produce an approximately 'normal' or inverted 'U' shaped function. This is because one might expect the majority of items to be responded to in equal proportion of affirmation to negation, rather than all affirmation or all negation. Actual results show rather skewed distributions - but a roughly inverted 'U' shape. For instance, the response pattern of the Christian group (n = 154) revealed a distribution of the 41 items in this way: six items were given a mean percentage

affirmation of 80-100%; eleven items had 61-80%; eight items had 41-60%; eleven items: 21-40%; and five items 0-20% affirmation.

However, a definite difference in the pattern of frequency distribution of items was detected between sub-groups. Sub-groups of the respondents produced either a 'bimodal' distribution or a 'unimodal' distribution. Unimodal - but skewed distributions were the pattern of distribution shown from the control groups, non-dogmatic Anglicans, and Roman Catholics' results (see Figure I). These groups produce unimodal distributions - but with different directional skewness. The control groups produce a pronounced skew to the low-affirmation response classes. Whereas the two sacramental sub-groups produce a skew towards the high-affirmation response classes.

The remaining sub-groups produced a definitely bimodal frequency distribution of questionnaire items: namely the 'dogmatic nonconformist' group, the non-dogmatic nonconformist group and the 'dogmatic Anglican' group. As shown in Figure II.

An explanation of why such a bimodal distribution should be found may be that there is a general tendency of part of the 'dogmatic' and non-conformist groups to differentiate between items of guilt feeling associated with violations of specific moral standards; and items of guilt feeling - indicative of remorse, self-recrimination, - and a generally punishing conscience. Thus the 'dogmatic' and non-conformist groups respond affirmatively to the items associated with the 'inhibition of impulses', and appear to do so very consistently - 'as a group'. However, they respond

FIGURE I

Key: 1. Non-dogmatic Anglican (————)

2. Roman Catholic (— — — —)

3. 'Anti-Christian' control (-----)

4. 'Pro-Christian' control (.....)





FIGURE II

Key: Non-Dogmatic non-conformist - - - - -
 Dogmatic non-conformist - - - - -
 Dogmatic Anglican —————




'as a group' negatively for items associated with generalised, 'all pervasive', feelings of guilt and feelings of self-recrimination. This pattern of response reveals a basic difference between numbers of items in the questionnaire - apparent to the sub-groups which manifest the 'bimodal' distribution. The difference is between items that indicate an active and 'moralist' conscience and items that indicate a self-recriminating and 'morbid' conscience.

In opposition to this, the other sub-groups of respondents have no apparent uniform 'group' attitude to differences in the content of the guilt questionnaire, but respond in such a way as to produce a 'unimodal' frequency distribution of items according to mean percentage affirmation. A direct comparison of the 'Bimodal' and 'unimodal' groups (Christian), is shown in Figure III. The table of ordinates shows the average number of items per response class.

Ordinates for Figure III

Groups	Response Classes				
	81-100	61-80	41-60	21-40	0-20
1. Bimodal (n = 97)	6.3	9.7	6.7	10.3	8.0
2. Unimodal (n = 57)	6.0	11.0	13.0	6.5	4.5
(mean frequency of items per response class)					

FIGURE III

The bimodality, from the results of the nonconformist groups in particular, reflects a response pattern that will be commented on elsewhere in this chapter. The bimodality suggests a reluctance to affirm many of the items.(which the 'unimodal' group affirms).

b. Comparisons with Other Variables

(a) The Christian Faith and Manifest Guilt Feeling

Table I shows the coefficients of correlation between some sub-categories of guilt feeling - and measures of Religious Belief and Practices. These sub-categories consist of groups of questionnaire statements that are interrelated according to certain criteria. The "sex" and "hostile" categories are, as in the anticipated guilt questionnaire, related to situations where guilt feeling is manifested. These categories are measures of manifest guilt feeling because they indicate the extent of emotions aroused by aggressive or sexual impulses. There is also a category relating to "self-Hate" or 'intrapunitiveness'. These statements contain expressions of hostility to self - because of violations of moral codes of behaviour. The category represented by the phrase "Falling short of Standards" is self-explanatory. It contains statements involving admission of, and concern about, failure to live up to the respondent's own moral values - moral values 'in general' - rather than specific, - objectifiable, codes of behaviour. The 'Remorse' category represents the statements of feelings of sorrow, regret and self-recrimination because of admitted 'wrong doing'. The 41 statements

are also split up between two further classifications. These have been rather loosely termed "Destructive" and "Constructive" guilt feeling. The "Destructive" category contains 20 statements of guilt feeling and associated emotions that would be 'disabling', mentally, to the person who suffers them. They would include persistent feelings of guilt and self-recrimination in varying degrees of morbidity. This would indicate a punitive and 'neurotic' conscience which as yet was not and could not be 'appeased'. The 'constructive guilt' category is really, in one sense, rather inappropriately named, but it seems to differentiate feelings that are elicited by contravention of moral standards, (which encourage people to avoid such contraventions,) from other types of guilt feelings. These constructive guilt feelings form, in the individual, a pattern of moral control and inhibition which aids socialisation, or living according to strict moral standards. The other sort of guilt-feeling termed: 'destructive' is more akin to the 'anxiety of guilt' caused by a masochistic, self-recriminating, remorseful conscience. The 'constructive guilt' category contained sixteen statements. Five statements are unaccounted for by these two major categorisations. These could not be classified according to the foregoing dichotomy.

It is worth noting that various authors have distinguished between "normal" or "acceptable" or "necessary" guilt feelings and the "anxiety of guilt", or "neurotic guilt". (e.g. Ausubel, 19; and Ovestreet, 172). In the latter case this refers to feelings of overburdening guilt which is a distortion of the 'expected' and 'normal' reactivity. The factor of

guilt in the socialising process - and other types of guilt feelings both constructive and destructive, are discussed in the introductory chapters.

Table I shows clearly that guilt feelings associated with sexual and Hostile impulses are correlated significantly with Religious Belief and Religious Practices. Guilt-proness associated with these 'instinctive' impulses is thus significantly positively correlated with Christian belief - this is part of the first hypothesis.

In addition to this there is also a significant relationship between statements concerned with expressions of "self-hate" and Religious Belief. These statements are actually concerned with negative self-feeling because of wrongdoing which may or may not be specified. It seems that Christian Belief is associated with a strict punitive conscience - in as far as it is concerned with the inhibition of impulsive behaviour. It is important to emphasise that the intrapunitiveness of the conscience of the Christian is, generally speaking, carefully delimited - and is not, again, generally speaking - the unstable - unpredictable - distorted conscience of some disturbed people. Of course - if the Christian person was to violate a specific moral standard - then he might then be prone to the "anxiety of guilt" depending on the seriousness of the perceived violation. However, Christian Belief predisposes people to avoid "wrong" by conditioning in them, through the conscience, avoidance of the guilt-producing situation. This argument becomes clearer - when the coefficients of correlation are considered between "Remorse" and Religious Belief, and between "Falling Short" and Religious Belief. Here there is no relationship at all between

TABLE I

Correlations Between the Religious Belief and Practices Measures
and the Categories of Manifest Guilt

Categories of Manifest Guilt number of statements	Coefficients of correlation (product moment)	
	Religious Beliefs Measure	Religious Practices Measure
1. Sex Guilt (3)	0.3924	0.3911
2. Hostile Guilt (6)	0.3244	0.3416
3. Self Hate (8)	0.2897	0.3023
4. Remorse (7)	-0.0270	-0.0212
5. Falling Short of Standards (11)	0.0714	0.0773
6. Destructive Guilt (20)	0.0730	0.0813
7. Constructive Guilt (16)	0.4677	0.4778
8. Total Guilt (41)	0.2487	0.2575

Coefficient of $>(r = 0.181)$ is significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. (n = 202).

Religious Belief and these categories of guilt feeling. Manifestation of self-recrimination and "falling short of standards" and the associated feelings of wrong and regret are not related to Christian Belief. In fact Christians are more ready to admit that they are in a state of having "fallen short" of 'what they should be' - but in this case it is an expression of moral idealism (see responses to item 32) rather than an admission of anxiety and remorse - as are some of the other statements in this category. (cf. items: 12,17,24,27,29 and 30). (Appendix L).

This category of "Falling short of Standards" is non-specific as to the actual violation of a particular standard - for example as in statement 24 :-

"I worry a lot when I feel I have fallen short of
my moral and ethical standards"

or statement 17 -

"I am troubled by morbid, depressing thoughts of
my own shortcomings and guilt".

However, the Christian conscience, is, it seems, acutely punishing when certain specific standards are contravened. For instance - the 'Self-Hate' category already mentioned in these results - includes such statements as (statement 23):

"I detest myself for thoughts I sometimes have";

and statement 10:

"I hate myself when I give in to some temptation
I ought to have ignored or avoided".

The Christian conscience is more punitive when the "OUGHT" principle is violated. The Christian conscience appears to be moralist or 'morally idealistic', without causing accompanying anxiety or persistent self-recrimination. This is emphasised by the coefficients of correlation between Religious Belief and 'Destructive', and 'Constructive' guilt. There is a strong correlation coefficient of $r = 0.468$ between the Religious Beliefs measure and the 'constructive' guilt category; whereas there is no correlation at all with the 'destructive' guilt category $r = 0.073$.

c. Differences between Groups on Responses to Questionnaire Categories

These results are primarily concerned with certain categories and classifications of feelings of guilt - a complete list of the 41 statements, and the average percentage affirmative response per statement per group, can be found in the Appendix (L).

(a) The responses of the Christian and Control Group compared:

The average manifest guilt (total) score of the Christian group ($n = 154$) is 20.6104; that for the Control group is 17.2708 ($n = 48$). This is the basic superficial differentiation between the two groups. However, some categories of guilt feeling do not differentiate as significantly as others. Table II shows the means and standard deviations for the control and Christian groups and the statistical comparison between them across the various categories. The Christian group stands out most on categories associated with 'impulse'. It is inhibition and control of impulses that most characterises the Christian conscience. This contrasts with the

TABLE II

Sub-categories of guilt	Groups				't' statistic
	Christian (n = 154)		Control (n = 48)		
	%	SD	%	SD	
1. Sex Guilt	41.8	33.7	14.6	20.3	5.28 (p < 0.01)
2. Hostile Guilt	75.4	22.4	62.9	26.0	3.24 (p < 0.01)
3. Self-Hate	53.2	25.7	38.8	26.2	3.37 (p < 0.01)
4. 'Falling Short'	46.7	18.7	43.0	21.5	1.15 (NS)
5. Remorse	32.9	21.8	34.6	25.7	0.45 (NS)
6. Destructive Guilt	38.8	20.2	35.1	21.1	1.09 (NS)
7. Constructive Guilt	68.1	18.9	51.6	21.3	5.09 (p < 0.01)
8. Total Guilt Score (raw scores)	20.6	6.8	17.3	7.7	2.86 (p < 0.01)
	(mean percentage affirmations)				

control group scores on the categories of sex guilt, hostile guilt, and 'constructive' guilt. There is also the expected difference between the Christian and Control groups across the category of "Self-Hate" - the Christians admit to a punitive conscience - where violation of moral standards, including self indulgence, is considered or carried out. As would be expected from the correlation analysis there are no statistically significant differences between the Christian and Control groups on measures relative to the "Falling Short", "Remorse" or "Destructive Guilt" categories.

Comparisons between sub-groups

Eight series of comparisons were made each associated with a category of guilt extracted from the guilt questionnaire.

(i) Category: The Total Manifest Guilt Score

In this case the means given are based on the raw scores, that is the sum of affirmative responses that each respondent makes. The other seven series of comparisons are based on percentage affirmation - because of the unequal number of statements in each category. In this category, and all the other seven, groups of respondents were compared among themselves - producing a statistical comparison of every possible pairing of comparison groups. Significant differences are discussed.

All the Christian sub-groups except the 'non-dogmatic' nonconformist group scored significantly higher on the 'total guilt' score, than did the 'anti-Christian' control group. The sacramentalist groups (mean: 21.56), as a whole, scored higher than the control group (17.27) and the nonconformist groups (19.25). Nevertheless, this total guilt score conceals some

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Total Manifest Guilt</u> <u>SD</u>
1. Roman Catholic	(40)	22.5750	7.4226
2. Non-Dogmatic Anglican	(17)	21.4706	6.0207
3. Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	20.5122	5.2411
4. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	20.3636	5.6826
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	17.0870	8.5563
6. All control group	(48)	17.2708	7.6478
7. 'Anti-Christian' control	(27)	16.2963	7.0753

differences which parts of the questionnaire might reveal. This could be considered a fair argument for not attempting to compile a comprehensive measure of 'guilt-feeling'. In fact, the questionnaire is considered in these discussions as consisting of a number of clusters of statements rather than as a uniform scale of 'guilt'. The total questionnaire score does indicate, however, that the sacramentalist groups, overall, report more intensive and widespread feelings of guilt. It is sufficient to say, from these initial comparisons that the Christian group tends to manifest a greater preoccupation with the 'conscience' than does the control group. The difference between the control group and the Christian group is statistically significant as has already been mentioned: ' t ' = 2.8630, which with 200 degrees of freedom is significant at the 0.01 level of confidence.

(ii) Category: "Sex Guilt"

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean percentage affirmation</u>	<u>S.D.</u>
1. Roman Catholic	(40)	64.1625	30.1866
2. Non-Dogmatic Anglican	(17)	43.1294	37.5176
3. Dogmatic Conformist	(41)	34.9585	32.0588
4. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	31.2970	25.8739
5. Non-Dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	28.9826	29.9905
6. Control group	(48)	14.5750	20.3016
7. 'Anti-Christian' control	(27)	6.1667	12.9353

Statistically all the Christian sub-groups are significantly different from the control groups. But certain marked differences also exist within the Christian group. For instance, the Roman Catholic group scores significantly higher than the other Christian groups. The 't' test for significant difference between the means shows the following 't' statistics and levels of significance, for the comparison of the Roman Catholic and other Christian sub-groups.

Comparisons

Roman Catholic and Dogmatic nonconformist: $t = 4.1664$; $p = < 0.01$

(degrees of freedom 79)

Roman Catholic and Dogmatic Anglican: $t = 4.8670$; $p = < 0.01$

(degrees of freedom 71)

Roman Catholic and Non-dogmatic Anglican: $t = 2.1926$; $p = < 0.05$

(degrees of freedom 55)

Roman Catholic and Non-dogmatic nonconformist: $t = 4.3927$, $p = < 0.01$
(degrees of freedom 61).

This result was easy to anticipate because of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Celibacy of the Priesthood. The Roman Catholics concerned in this research were all training to be Priests - though not all were finally committed to ordination. A consequence of their belief about celibacy - would be anxiety and guilty feelings because of their natural sexual impulses. The concept of the great blessedness and worth of celibacy, - and the reward for sacrificing sexual indulgence, - clearly is not enough to suppress the worry and guilt feelings because of sexual impulses. The guilt questionnaire contains just three items concerned with sexual feelings and impulses - which probably occur very frequently, if not daily, in the experience of "normal" men and women.

(iii) Category: "Hostile Guilt"

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>mean percentage affirmation</u>	<u>SD</u>
1. Roman Catholic	(40)	79.6400	20.2486
2. Dogmatic non-conformist	(41)	78.9488	16.0758
3. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	76.8576	17.4009
4. Non-dogmatic Anglican	(17)	70.6529	23.2717
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	65.2652	31.8302
6. Control group	(48)	62.8833	25.9843
7. Anti-Christian Control group	(27)	55.6000	25.2991

Under this category it is the groups who score highest on the measure of Christian Belief that score highest on their proness to guilt feelings associated with violations of standards of self-control - control of anger and aggression. The control of aggression, thoughtfulness, and tender-mindedness seem to be the most typical characteristics of Christian conscience - irrespective of creed or denomination. All the three 'Dogmatic groups' (including the Roman Catholic sub-group) differentiate from the control groups at the 0.01 level of confidence. The only, barely significant, differences within the Christian group are between: the dogmatic nonconformist and the non-dogmatic nonconformist ($t = 2.2463$, $p \leq 0.05$, degrees of freedom 62), and between the non-dogmatic nonconformist and the Roman Catholic sub-group ($t = 2.1532$, $p \leq 0.05$, degrees of freedom 61).

(iv) Category: "Self-Hate"

This category has already been explained in terms of its relationship to expressions of intrapunitiveness because of loss of self-control and specific violations of moral standards.

The Roman Catholic and dogmatic nonconformist groups differ significantly from both the control sub-groups - this differentiation being statistically significant ($p \leq 0.01$). All the Christian sub-groups except the non-dogmatic nonconformist sub-groups differ significantly from the 'anti'-Christian control group. The Christian group, therefore, tends to manifest intrapunitive feelings because of the contemplation, or accomplishment, of 'immoral' acts. The results on this category do not, however, indicate that

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean percentage affirmation</u>	<u>SD</u>
1. Roman Catholic	(40)	59.6875	26.7347
2. Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	55.1829	24.5346
3. Non-dogmatic Anglican	(17)	52.9412	22.4957
4. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	48.4848	21.0423
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	45.6522	30.3084
6. Control group	(48)	38.8021	26.1754
7. Anti-Christian group	(27)	34.7222	25.7601

Christians are more self-punishing more often, but it does suggest that Christians are 'potentially' more intrapunitive regarding certain violations of values and standards. It is suggested here, and elsewhere in this Thesis, that Christians are more likely to avoid self-punishment, because they are strongly motivated to avoid guilt-producing situations, or any situation which might be considered to involve a possible compromise of their values. The control groups do not presumably have such rigid or carefully delimited codes of conduct. This much can be deduced from the results showing that non-Christians do not report such a punitive or 'demanding' conscience.

(v) Category: Falling short of standards

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>mean percentage affirmation</u>	<u>SD</u>
1. Non-dogmatic Anglican	(17)	55.1353	14.7958
2. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	49.6364	18.3498
3. Roman Catholic	(40)	47.7300	19.6348

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean percentage affirmation</u>	<u>SD</u>
4. Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	44.6122	15.9280
5. Control group	(48)	43.0354	21.4816
6. 'Anti-Christian' group	(27)	43.4778	18.7533
7. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	38.3739	20.5971

In this case the sacramentalist-non-sacramentalist differential is more apparent. In addition - the non-sacramentalist groups score very similarly to the control group. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the mean sacramentalist group affirmation of 50% and the mean non-sacramentalist group affirmation of 42%. On the other hand both the Anglican groups differ significantly from the non-dogmatic, non-conformist group. The non-dogmatic Anglican group is the only one that differs significantly from the control group ($t = 2.1156$, $p = < 0.05$, degrees of freedom: 63).

Guilt feeling generated by awareness of falling short of personal standards - is expressed a little more by the sacramentalist group. Conclusions are difficult to make from the results of this category because the difference between sub-groups is very small.

(vi) Category: "Remorse"

This category includes statements of regret and self-recrimination because of past wrongdoing.

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean percentage affirmation</u>	<u>SD</u>
1. Roman Catholic	(40)	39.3200	25.7183
2. Non-dogmatic Anglican	(17)	36.1706	21.4459
3. 'Anti-Christian' control	(27)	34.9519	25.3132
4. Control group	(48)	34.5542	25.7415
5. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	32.4939	23.1403
6. Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	29.6463	16.5294
7. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	25.4870	16.8363

Again, differences between sub-groups are not very large - but there are certain interesting indications. Firstly - between one quarter and one third, only, of the groups indicate feelings of remorse. Secondly the control group scores 'separates' the "Hyper-sacramentalist groups" from the rest of the Christian sample. Nevertheless the only statistically significant comparisons are between the mean Roman Catholic score and the mean scores of the two non-sacramentalist groups:

a) Comparison with the dogmatic nonconformist sub-group:

$t = 1.9936$, $p = < 0.05$ (degrees of freedom: 79)

b) Comparison with the non-dogmatic nonconformist sub-group:

$t = 2.2735$, $p = < 0.05$ (degrees of freedom: 61).

(vii) Category: "Destructive" guilt

The last two categories of guilt feeling to distinguish two different attributes and effects of guilt. Guilt feeling can act both as

a factor in avoidance conditioning - by monitoring the expectancy of self-mediated punishment; or it can be persistently, morbidly, intrapunitive.

The latter experience is termed "Destructive Guilt".

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>mean percentage affirmative</u>	<u>SD</u>
1. Non-dogmatic Anglican	(17)	44.4118	18.5411
2. Roman Catholic	(40)	44.3750	23.5634
3. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	36.6667	18.4911
4. Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	36.5854	16.6176
5. 'Anti-Christian' group	(27)	35.1852	18.3324
6. Control group	(48)	35.1042	21.0528
7. non-dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	32.1739	20.0448

The percentage differences are rather small - but the sacramentalist group, once more, manifests higher feelings of guilt than the other groups. There is only one statistically significant comparison - namely the comparison between the Roman Catholic and non-dogmatic nonconformist sub-groups where: $t = 2.0534$, $p = < 0.05$, degrees of freedom: 61. This category does contain twenty items and thus can be expected to be rather amorphous - but it does contrast strongly with the 'constructive' guilt category.

(viii) Category: "Constructive" Guilt

On average the dogmatic nonconformist sub-group responded with a 36% increase in affirmative responses over the percentage affirmation to the 'destructive' guilt items. Other Christian sub-groups responded about 25% higher in affirmations. This can be contrasted with the "anti-Christian"

control group which only responded about 10% more affirmatively than for the 'destructive guilt' category.

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>mean percentage affirmation</u>	<u>SD</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	72.4439	13.3252
2. Roman Catholic	(40)	70.6750	18.1585
3. Dogmatic Anglican	(33)	69.2970	14.6993
4. Non-dogmatic Anglican	(17)	64.2118	19.7589
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	(23)	57.2522	27.0595
6. Control group	(48)	51.6208	21.3188
7. 'Anti-Christian' group	(27)	45.2889	20.4686

The dogmatic groups lead in their affirmation of constructive guilt feelings. They expect, and report they have experienced, self-mediated punishment for the violation of moral standards - standards associated with both ascetic and social moral systems.

The dogmatic nonconformist group, for example, scores appreciably higher than the non-dogmatic nonconformist group: $t = 2.9565$, $p = < 0.01$ (degrees of freedom: 62). Also both dogmatic anglican and Roman Catholic sub-groups significantly differentiate from the non-dogmatic nonconformist group on this category ($p = < 0.05$ in both cases). Only the latter group fails to significantly outscore the control group.

Interim Comments

The manifest guilt questionnaire results reveal a fairly basic differential in the activity of the conscience - and feelings derived from

this cognitive activity. The feelings of guilt associated with a natural process of conditioning act to perpetuate the moral structures and ideals of society. The Christian society has carefully delimited moral codes and criteria which are, in varying degrees of rigidity - applied within that Christian society and to some extent imposed on adjacent groups. Intra-punitiveness is proportionate to the importance attached to the various moral standards. Thus the analysis reveals a dogmatic/non-dogmatic differential - characterised by apparent differences in stringency of self-control, directly related to the prohibitive nature of the conscience. The more dogmatic the Christian Belief - the stronger is the inhibition of impulse and the greater the potential punitiveness of the conscience. Acceptance of these stringent moral criteria is termed 'moralism' - a more accurate expression from the Christian point of view would be 'moral idealism' - which will be positively related to the strength of avoidance of situations that arouse the guilt-producing function of the conscience. The analysis also reveals a sacramentalist/non-sacramentalist differential which reflects a basic difference between those whose religious belief is more likely to lead to self-examination and self-criticism, and those whose religious belief boosts self-esteem. Clearly, then, the sacramentalist group is going to be slightly more prone to morbid guilt feelings and self-recrimination than the non-sacramentalist group.

Thus to some extent hypotheses '5a' and '5b' are confirmed - that is those hypothesis associated with the predictions of dogmatic/non-dogmatic and sacramentalist/non-sacramentalist differentials respectively.

The Manifest Guilt Questionnaire contains fifteen statements on which the Christian and Control group scores are differentiated significantly. On only two items does the control group's mean percentage affirmation significantly exceed that of the Christian group (as a whole). These two statements are tabulated first in the following list. Other than these the statements are listed in order of significance of difference between the Christian and Control groups.

mean percentage affirmation		χ^2 (significance) (P) <		Statement
Christian (%)	Control (%)			
1. 28	52	11.29	0.001	(6) Sometimes people make me feel guilty by accusing me of doing something even though I am innocent.
2. 31	46	4.53	0.05	(25) I wish I was able to go back in time so that I could change parts of my past life that I still remember with feelings of guilt and regret.
3. 88	56	22.13	0.001	(19) If I have spoken sharply or bitterly to someone - I feel very upset and annoyed with myself.
4. 40	6	17.87	0.001	(36) I feel I deserve punishment for my wrong deeds, thoughts and desires.
5. 65	33	13.68	0.001	(2) When I have sexual desires I usually try to curb them.

mean percentage affirmation		χ^2 (significance) (P) <		Statement
Christian (%)	Control (%)			
6. 35	6	13.61	0.001	(15) I feel guilty when my mind is preoccupied with sexy thoughts and day-dreams.
7. 80	52	12.27	0.001	(26) When I lose my temper I feel guilty afterwards.
8. 90	69	11.74	0.001	(32) I have to admit that I am far from being the sort of person I really ought to be.
9. 85	63	10.17	0.01	(20) Arguments leave me feeling ill-at-ease and ready to renew a friendship.
10. 80	56	9.48	0.01	(18) If I found anything that was not my own and I kept it - my conscience would keep troubling me.
11. 25	4	8.86	0.01	(5) When I have sexual desires I often feel guilty and anxious.
12. 57	31	8.81	0.01	(8) If I spend a lot of money on amusement and pleasure for myself I feel guilty about it.
13. 44	27	6.75	0.01	(4) I long for forgiveness for the wrongdoing and sin in my life so that I can have peace of mind.
14. 50	29	5.60	0.02	(7) I feel very guilty and ashamed of myself if I tell a lie - even though it is only a harmless one.
15. 64	46	4.10	0.05	(3) I am very self-critical especially concerning my moral and ethical

The majority of the items listed above are constituents of the 'constructive' guilt category. Christians, especially, accept these guilt feelings as necessary concomitants of their moral beliefs. Inhibition of impulsive behaviour is reflected in the statements that differentiate most between Christians and the Control group.

N.B. Appendix L comprises a list of the 41 items of the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire, including, for each item, the mean percentage affirmations of the respondent subgroup referred to in this chapter.

Chapter 8: Section 2

Section 2: The Factor Analysis

Contents

This section concerns the analyses and discussions relating to the 'Factor Analysis' of the manifest guilt questionnaire. This section contains the following sub-sections:

- (a) The Unrotated Factor Analysis
- (b) The Rotated Factor Analysis
 - (a detailed consideration of each of the factors)
- (c) Summary of Factors
- (d) Factor Scores and Respondent Groups.

Section 2: The Factor Analysis

The manifest guilt questionnaire contains 41 statements consisting of admissions of guilt feeling. Up to now, for the purpose of comparison and analysis, these statements have been grouped together to form categories of guilt feeling. To some extent, however, these categories were "ad hoc" and cannot be precisely defined. So whilst they are useful in making comparisons - it was considered that a factor analysis should be run on the 41 items of the manifest guilt questionnaire so that the questionnaire sub-structure could be more meaningfully evaluated. As there were 202 respondents in all - there were 202 (affirmative ~~and~~ negative) responses to each item.

This 'post-hoc' analysis should confirm the 'theoretical' classifications of guilt feeling which assisted in the compilation of the questionnaire. These classifications of guilt feeling, - or 'referents' as Mosher calls them, include such feelings as: painful feelings of self-criticism, self-blame, and self-hate; remorse and regret and sorrow caused by the violations of internalised standards of proper conduct; a lessening of self-esteem - for failure to live in accordance with personal ideals and from failure to obtain certain "ought to" goals; - attempts at restitution or reparation because of guilt feeling; inhibition of hostile and sexual impulses; self punishment and asceticism; and confessions of sinfulness.

The method of Factor analysis employed was the "Principal Components" Method which exists as a standard "Facto " programme in the Library of the

'IBM 360' Northumbrian Universities Computer in Newcastle. This programme produces an unrotated and a rotated factor matrix. The unrotated matrix gives a disproportionate loading to the first factor because of various anomalies in the complicated mathematical calculations. So rotation to "simple structure" is considered to be an important step to eradicate this disproportionate loading. "Simple structure" is the point at which the number of zero loadings on variables is maximised. At this point as many as possible of the factor vectors are at right angles to as many as possible of the original test vectors. Also the battery of tests, or items, is not suitable for defining factors - unless such a rotation is uniquely possible (cf. Thomson:200). Thurstone's "simple structure" is therefore indicated by a large number of zeros in the matrix of loadings - thus meeting the requirement that: "no factor shall extend through many tests".

(a) The Unrotated Factor Analysis

As has been said above, unrotated Factor loadings do not have much meaning - because the first factor usually has all positive loadings and the second factor has 50% positive and 50% negative loadings - this is a mathematical artifact of the method employed. But it is interesting to look at the first two unrotated factors (13 factors were extracted in all by the computer analysis).

The first factor was heavily overloaded. No less than 33 of the 41 items were weighted on this Factor above the chosen criteria of a loading of 0.3000. This factor could be termed "manifest guilt" or perhaps more accurately: "Capacity for, and proness to, self-mediated punishment".

It reflected a crude homogeneity in the questionnaire. This first unrotated factor is considered later as a basis for a revised guilt questionnaire (see Chapter 11).

The second factor had five negative loadings greater than the criteria of 0.3000, and ten positive loadings greater than the criteria. The second unrotated factor accounted for 8.5% of the total variance as compared with the first factor 16.8% and every other factor:- 3 to 4%. These last eleven factors are excluded from this scrutiny of the unrotated Factor matrix.

The bipolar nature of the second unrotated factor split the questionnaire statements into two basic groupings. This difference is very relevant to preceding and ensuing discussions on categories and classifications of guilt feeling.

The five statements with "above criteria" negative loading on the second factor are listed below.

<u>Statement number</u>	<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
(2)	-0.512	I am troubled by morbid, depressing thoughts of my own shortcomings and guilt.
(29)	-0.461	I sometimes think that I am suffering now because of the wrongs I have done in the past.
(2)	-0.457	I punish myself with guilty feelings.
(6)	-0.371	Sometimes people make me feel guilty by accusing me of doing something even though I am innocent.
(34)	-0.328	I am bothered by nagging thoughts of the wrongs I have done in the past.

The Christian sub-groups, particularly, react with low percentage affirmation to these statements. The mean percentage affirmation for the Christian group is 20% as compared with 35% by the control group ($\chi^2 = 2.326$ - just not significant). There is, however, a significant difference between the "anti-Christian subgroup", whose mean percentage affirmation 35%, and the non-sacramentalist sub-group - whose mean percentage affirmation is only 14%. In this latter case $\chi^2 = 4.444$ - which is significant at the 0.05 level of confidence.

The ten statements with above criteria positive loadings are now listed:

<u>Statement Number</u>	<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
(9)	0.519	I would avoid doing anything my conscience told me was wrong.
(26)	0.471	When I lose my temper I feel guilty afterwards.
(19)	0.469	If I have spoken sharply or bitterly to someone I feel very upset and annoyed with myself.
(20)	0.466	Arguments leave me feeling ill at ease and ready to renew a friendship.
(18)	0.429	If I found anything that was not my own and I kept it my conscience would keep troubling me.
(28)	0.394	I feel awful when I break a promise.
(7)	0.365	I feel very guilty and ashamed of myself if I tell a lie even though it is only a harmless one.
(36)	0.338	I feel I deserve punishment for my wrong deeds, thoughts, and desires.
(21)	0.312	When I have sexual desires I usually try to curb them.
(31)	0.309	If I know I have wronged someone I don't have peace of mind until I have apologised or made amends to that person.

On these positively loaded statements the mean percentage affirmation of the Christian group is much in excess of that of the "anti-Christian" control group:- 72.3% as opposed to 40.4%. This second factor could be termed a factor of self-control and moral stringency, high scores on these statements would be characteristic of this, whereas low scores on the other five statements would also be characteristic of this factor. This suggests that, (in terms of intercorrelations of manifest guilt questionnaire statements) - statements containing moralistic expressions of anticipated guilt and inhibition of impulses are incompatible with statements involving self-recrimination and susceptibility to guilt feelings. Moralism is thus not statistically related to 'manifest' guilt feelings such as self-recrimination. This underlines the dichotomous content of the questionnaire and the importance in differentiating between expectations of guilt, i.e. guilt potential; and manifestation of guilt feelings, i.e. guilt proneness.

There is little point in taking the analysis of the unrotated factor matrix further. The following series of analyses are based entirely on the rotated factor matrix - producing, as it does, thirteen factors which satisfy a mathematical criterion for uniqueness (in this case the factor eigenvalue must be > 1.000).

(b) The Rotated Factor Analysis

In this analysis, under each factor,- those statements with the largest loadings are listed. It is argued that these statements are most descriptive of the particular factor under discussion. Thus, with a few exceptions, statements appear only once. In only a relatively few cases do

statements have equal loadings on two factors, so that they are descriptive of those two factors - rather than of one particular factor. An attempt is made to define all the thirteen factors - though some are clearly more meaningful than others. In fact most of the factors are psychologically meaningful and reflect not only the intrinsic structure of the questionnaire but also the differences in awareness of guilt feeling - as manifested by the respondents.

Statements are listed in order of size of loadings on the factors and other significant (> 0.3000) loadings are given on other factors.

1. The First Factor

Principal loadings on First Factor

Questionnaire Statement

+ 0.75189	(3) I am very self-critical especially concerning my moral and ethical behaviour.
+ 0.54499	(24) I worry a lot when I feel I have fallen short of my moral and ethical standards.
+ 0.47896	(12) I feel extremely upset and annoyed with myself when I do something that I know is not strictly right by my own values and standards.

Other	Item 24 is also loaded	-0.50282 on Factor 10
loadings	Item 12 is also loaded	+0.40218 on Factor 2
		-0.33773 on Factor 3

The principal referent for this factor appears to be a highly critical conscience - when there is violation or possible violation of private moral values and standards. The respondents are not rating guilt feeling as a

reaction to specific violations of social or ascetic morality. The Christian group had a mean percentage affirmation on this factor of 57.7% as compared to the control group's 49.3% rating. This difference is not statistically significant. However, a breakdown of the responses of the Christian group gives a more detailed picture:

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation: First Factor</u>
1. Non-dogmatic Anglican	67
2. Roman Catholic	63
3. Dogmatic nonconformist	56.33
4. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	55
5. Anti-Christian control	53
6. Dogmatic Anglican	49.67

None of the differences between these sub-groups was statistically significant. Nevertheless it is worth noting that it was the "hyper-sacramental" group of Roman Catholics (63%) and non-dogmatic Anglicans (67%) (High Church) who responded highest on this factor. The statistical comparison of this latter group with the control group did not produce a significant difference, however ($\chi^2 = 3.073$; $p = .1$).

2. The Second Factor

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Questionnaire Statement</u>
+ 0.69740	(41) If I am caught doing something wrong, however harmless and trivial it may be I feel very ashamed and guilty.

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Questionnaire Statement</u>
+ 0.61393	(7) I feel very guilty and ashamed of myself if I tell a lie even though it is only a harmless one.
+ 0.58039	(28) I feel awful when I break a promise.
+ 0.55838	(26) When I lose my temper I feel quilty afterwards.

Item (26) also has a loading of 0.39930 on Factor 8

This factor refers to aspects of social morality; and to guilt-proneness associated with contravention of those internalised moral standards. The difference between the mean percentage affirmation of the Christian group (71.3%) and of the control group (56.8%) was found to be significant ($\chi^2 = 3.863$, $p = 0.05$).

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>Mean % affirmation: Second Factor</u>
1. Dogmatic Anglican	82.75
2. Dogmatic nonconformist	81
3. Roman Catholic	65.25
4. Non-dogmatic Anglican	64.75
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	53.25
6. "Anti-Christian" control group	52.75

The 'dogmatic' grouping of the sub-groups responded considerably in excess of the other groups; of the latter - especially the control groups and the non-dogmatic nonconformist group. The difference between the dogmatic groups (81.1%) and the control group produces a chi-square of 8.775

which is significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. Chi-square for the difference between the mean percentage affirmation of the dogmatic groups and the non-dogmatic nonconformist sub-group is 7.664 which is also significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. The response on this factor is very similar to that which results from the analysis of the 'anticipated guilt' questionnaire have indicated. Social morality - as an internalised system of stringent standards and values, is to some extent manifestly proportionate to the dogmatism of Christian Belief. The closer the identification with the Christian Faith the more uncompromising is the moral conscience of the individual.

3. The Third Factor

<u>Loadings</u>	<u>Questionnaire Statements</u>
- 0.76501	(33) I still feel much regret and guilt when I recall the times I have been angry with someone I am very fond of.
- 0.58438	(38) When I do something wrong and get into trouble I feel a need to talk to someone about it.
- 0.49031	(40) I long for forgiveness for the wrongdoing and sin in my life so that I can have peace of mind.

Item (38) has a loading of 0.34059 on Factor 7

Low scores on this factor, as indicated by the negative loadings, appear to be related to "Peace of Mind". Certainly from the content of the statements it seems clear that high scores would indicate an unsettled, 'remorse-prone' conscience. Implicit in these three statements is a need,

an unfilled longing, to expiate past wrongdoing and consequently 'ease' the conscience. In this instance "Peace of mind" is considered as the obverse of a "remorseful conscience". "Need for peace of mind" seems to express most accurately the essence of this factor.

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation: Third Factor</u>
1. Dogmatic Anglican	65
2. Roman Catholic	62
3. Non-dogmatic Anglican	51
4. 'Anti-Christian' group	44.33
5. Dogmatic Nonconformist	41.33
6. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	37.66

The Christian group, as a whole, responds with a mean percentage affirmation of 52% as against the control groups response of 51.33%. There would thus appear to be a superficial similarity between the two groups. The sub-groups do, however, differ among themselves quite significantly. The non-sacramentalist groups score in rather the same way as the control groups. There are, though, significant differences between the non-sacramentalist groups and the dogmatic Anglican group ($\chi^2 = 5.907$, $p = 0.02$) and between the Roman Catholic and non-sacramentalist groups ($\chi^2 = 4.713$, $p = 0.05$). Relatively speaking, the sacramentalist groups manifest least "Peace of mind", - whereas the nonconformist groups seem to have a comparatively more settled conscience with rather less widespread feelings of remorse. The difference between the sacramentalist group (61.1%) and the non-sacramentalist group (40.9%) was significant: $\chi^2 = 6.296$, $p = 0.02$ ($df = 1$).

A closer look at the individual statements associated with this third factor shows that there are no significant differences between sub-groups on responses to statements '33' and '38'; but there was a clear differentiation in response to statement '40':

"I long for forgiveness for the wrongdoing and sin in my life so that I can have peace of mind."

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation: Statement '40'</u>
1. Dogmatic Anglican	61
2. Roman Catholic	60
3. Non-dogmatic Anglican	53
4. Dogmatic Nonconformist	24
5. Non-dogmatic Nonconformist	22
6. Anti-Christian Control	7

There is an obvious differentiation between the sacramentalist group and the non-sacramentalist group, they responded with mean percentage affirmations of 58.9% and 23.4% respectively. This difference produced a chi-square of 9.553 which was significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. There appears to be a basic doctrinal difference which is affecting responses to this statement. The sacramentalist groups do not accept to such an assured degree that 'unconditional' forgiveness and "peace of mind" are necessary concomitants of their Christian Faith. On the other hand, three-quarters of the nonconformist group do not manifest longing for forgiveness and peace of mind. The logical deduction from this, bearing in mind their

doctrines of forgiveness of sin, is that the nonconformist Christians feel they have forgiveness - and thus peace of mind, already, so they do not have to "long" for them. Religious practices such as the use of "confession" - as a necessary part of Religion - produce a perpetual self-examination and 'awareness' of sinfulness. The nonconformists, on the whole do not employ such practices in their public or private devotions - but feel assured of forgiveness for all their wrongdoing and inadequacy.

At this point the author would like to emphasise most strongly that the conclusions reached in the foregoing discussion are most general. Clearly there will be individual differences within the Christian groups. Some sacramentalists may not use 'confession' in any deep devotional way, and some non-sacramentalists may treat regular confessions of sinfulness as most important. On balance, however, the results do indicate that whereas nonconformists seem to report an easy conscience, sacramentalists are more prone to feelings of sinfulness. This differentiation will be considered elsewhere in the discussion of results and in the light of the 'repression-sensitisation' hypothesis.

The difference between the sacramentalist and control groups was even more significant, as the results would indicate: chi-square = 10.049, $p = 0.01$. The high scores of the sacramentalist groups meant that there was also a significant difference between the Christian group as a whole and the control group: $\chi^2 = 6.745$, $p = 0.01$.

4. The Fourth FactorLoadingsStatements

0.75852	(15) I feel guilty when my mind is preoccupied with sexy thoughts and daydreams.
0.69323	(5) When I have sexual desires I often feel guilty and anxious.
0.44365	(21) When I have sexual desires I usually try to curb them.
0.42530	(8) If I spend a lot of money on amusement and pleasure for myself - I feel guilty about it.
0.41556	(36) I feel I deserve punishment for my wrong deeds, thoughts and desires.

Item '21' is loaded 0.42428 on Factor 13

Item '8' is loaded 0.43582 on Factor 6; and -0.30954 on Factor 12

Item '36' is loaded -0.39882 on Factor 5.

This factor is most typified by guilt feelings associated with sexual desires and impulses. It does have referents to guilt-feeling because of other forms of self-indulgence. On this factor there is a very significant difference between the Christian group and the non-Christian group. The Christian group manifests guilt feelings because of sexual impulses to the extent of a mean percentage affirmation of 44.4% as compared with the control-group figure of 16%: chi-square is 11.783, $p = 0.001$. The Roman Catholic group is understandably at the top of the table in terms of actual, manifest guilt feelings because of sex impulses.

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation: Fourth Factor</u>
1. Roman Catholic	59.2
2. Dogmatic nonconformist	45
3. Non-dogmatic Anglican	41.2
4. Dogmatic Anglican	35.2
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	34.8
6. Anti-Christian Control	9.0

All the Christian sub-groups listed above respond significantly more affirmatively than the non-Christian control group. This correlates very highly with the 'anticipated guilt' scores, that is of expected guilt for actual sexual indulgence. The Christian group is still differentiated when the guilt feeling relates to sexual desire - rather than overt sexual behaviour of a flirtatious or promiscuous kind.

5. The Fifth Factor

<u>Loadings</u>	<u>Statement</u>
-0.73931	(23) I detest myself for thoughts I sometimes have.
-0.65542	(1) I hate myself for the things I have thought and done in the past.
-0.59591	(10) I hate myself when I give in to some temptation I ought to have ignored or avoided.

Item '10' is loaded -0.34108 on Factor 11

These statements contain intrapunitive expressions, resulting from 'self-perceived' wrongdoing. High scores on this factor will be evidence of

a punitive, moralistic conscience. There was no significant difference between the Christian group (50.7%) and the control group (42%).

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation: Fifth Factor</u>
1. Roman Catholic	59.3
2. Dogmatic nonconformist	54
3. Non-dogmatic Anglican	51
4. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	43.3
5. Anti-Christian control	40.66
6. Dogmatic Anglican	40.33

Very little can be construed from these results except that there is a large difference between some individual colleges on this particular factor. For instance, on all the other twelve factors, the difference between the two Roman Catholic colleges is never greater than 15% - which is non-significant. But on this factor the difference is surprisingly large:- 35%. One Seminary gives a mean percentage affirmation to this factor of 76.6% - the other - a percentage of 41.6% (chi square = 5.013, $p = 0.05$). There is a possible explanation of this in that the Seminary which produces the 41.6% affirmation had a mean "anticipated guilt" score of 53.1 which was appreciably lower than the other Seminary's rating on this measure of 65.9. There is a coefficient of correlation between the self-hate category of the manifest guilt questionnaire and the total 'anticipated guilt' score of 0.39. None of the other Christian sub-groups show any significant

differences in comparison of the scores of their constituent colleges. In this case, then, the punitive conscience is a moralist one. The three statements associated with this 'self-hate' factor are connected directly or by implication with "bad" thoughts, "bad" things and "giving in" to temptation (which by definition results in a "bad" thing).

6. The Sixth Factor

This is a bipolar factor with both positive and negative loadings.

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
+ 0.67055	(30) Even when I am in the company of other people I am sometimes overcome by feelings of worthlessness and sinfulness.
- 0.40297	(14) I would feel very guilty and concerned if I thought I had hurt someone's feelings.
- 0.39309	(16) I feel very embarrassed and uncomfortable when I meet people I have offended in some way.

Item (14) is loaded 0.31808 on Factor 8

Item (16) is loaded 0.35115 on Factor 7

It is difficult to find such a self-evident explanation of this factor - as for some of the others. However, there is a high positive loading on a statement which is an expression of feelings of guilt in terms of worthlessness and sinfulness. This is guilt feeling that is felt - in spite of other people. This type of feeling can be referred to as 'intrceptive' as it is very much contained within the individual without the necessity of elicitation.

by some external stimulus. The other two, negatively loaded, statements refer to exteroceptive feeling since they originate because of contact with other people - other people forming the external stimulus. In the positively loaded statement guilt feeling is "self" orientated. It is the perception of 'self' which produces the feelings. In the negatively loaded statements guilt feeling is elicited because of an interaction of "self" - with "others". To facilitate examination of this factor, it is considered in two parts - the positive loading first, and then the negative loadings.

6a. Intrceptive Guilt Feelings

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean percentage affirmation</u>
1. Dogmatic Anglican	40
2. Non-dogmatic Anglican	29
3. Dogmatic nonconformist	22
4. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	22
5. Roman Catholic	20
6. 'Anti-Christian' Control group	15

There is no statistically significant difference between the Christian (n = 154) and the control (n = 48) groups. The mean Christian affirmation is 26% as compared with the mean control group affirmation of 15%. The only statistically significant difference is between the dogmatic Anglican group and the non-Christian group: chi square = 6.474, p = 0.02.

6b. Exteroceptive Guilt Feelings

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean percentage affirmation</u>
1. Roman Catholic	84
2. Non-dogmatic Anglican	79.5
3. Dogmatic nonconformist	78
4. Dogmatic Anglican	76
5. 'Anti-Christian' control group	76
6. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	67.5

There is no statistically significant difference between the Christian (77.5%) and the control (75%) groups; nor is there between any combinations of the sub-groups. This factor only shows that the Christian group is slightly more prone to intraceptive guilt than the non-Christian group - but there is very little difference on the 'exteroceptive guilt' dimension.

7. The Seventh Factor

<u>Loadings</u>	<u>Statement</u>
+ 0.74305	(6) Sometimes people make me feel guilty by accusing me of doing something even though I am innocent.
- 0.61848	(9) I would avoid doing anything my conscience told me was wrong.

As with the preceding factor, this is bipolar - with a high positive and a high negative loading. This factor does not appear quite so abstruse however. High scores on this factor (statement (6)) appear to be indicative of a relatively weakly delimited conscience - in that

accusation can sometimes elicit feelings of guilt. Low scores on statement '9' would also indicate this as low scores would relate to a comparatively non-stringent, less definite morality. High scores on statement '9' reveal an uncompromising, obedience to a dictatorial conscience - which because of its precise delimitations does not mediate feelings of guilt after false accusation.

Below - the mean percentage affirmations are listed of each sub-group for statements '6' and '9'. It can be seen that sub-groups with high scores on susceptibility to guilt feeling because of false accusation - have low scores on obedience to the dictates of conscience.

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>7b</u>
	susceptibility to guilt feeling Weakly delimited conscience	Obedience to dictatorial conscience
1. 'Anti-Christian' Control	56	48
2. All Control	52	56
3. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	30	57
4. Dogmatic Anglican	30	64
5. Roman Catholic	30	68
6. Non-dogmatic Anglican	24	71
7. Dogmatic nonconformist	24	80

There is a significant negative correlation between item '6' and item '9' of $r = -0.260$. This negative correlation is reflected in the

results above. The higher is the mean percentage affirmation to '7a', the lower is the mean percentage affirmation to '7b'.

The 'anti-Christian' control group, which is most susceptible to guilty feelings when wrongly accused, (56%) is also manifestly less bound to obey the dictates of the conscience than the other sub-groups (48%). By way of comparison the dogmatic nonconformist subgroup whose susceptibility is only 24% is most obedient to the conscience (80%). This factor implies that strict obedience to conscience is a defence against mediated feelings following accusation. It will be argued elsewhere that strict obedience to conscience is also a defence against self-mediated punishment, in any situation. Moralism should be associated with a reduction in the likelihood of wrongdoing and consequently with a reduction in the likelihood of self-mediated punishment.

8. The Eighth Factor

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
+0.78167	(20) Arguments leave me feeling ill-at-ease and ready to renew a friendship.
+0.58460	(31) If I know I have wronged someone I don't have peace of mind until I have apologised or made amends to that person.
+0.47603	(19) If I have spoken sharply or bitterly to someone I feel very upset and annoyed with myself.
+0.47084	(18) If I found anything that was not my own and I kept it, my conscience would keep troubling me.

Item 31 is loaded -0.39669 on Factor 5

Item 19 is loaded 0.36479 on Factor 2

Item 18 is loaded 0.31659 on Factor 2.

This factor is basically concerned with "hostile" guilt. Guilt feelings which are associated with wronging, offending others. As might be expected from the 'anticipated guilt' scores, the Dogmatic Christian groups scores highest on this factor:

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	92
2. Dogmatic Anglican	85
3. Roman Catholic	82.3
4. Non-dogmatic Anglican	75
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	73.8
6. 'Anti-Christian' control	49

There is a significant difference between the Christian group (83.8%) and the control group (60.5%): Chi-square = 10.891, $p = 0.001$. All the sub-groups are significantly higher in their 'hostile guilt potential', than the 'Anti-Christian' control group (49%). There is also a significant difference between the Dogmatic Christians and the non-dogmatic: chi-square = 5.207, $p = 0.05$. Therefore, the closer the alignment to Christian belief, the greater the motivation to inhibit hostile behaviour.

9. The Ninth Factor

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
+0.77712	(37) My mind is seldom free from feelings of guilt and remorse.
+0.55322	(4) I seem to have a keener conscience and suffer more guilt feelings than my friends.

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
4. All control	23.8
5. Dogmatic Anglican	20.5
6. Dogmatic nonconformist	15.8
7. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	12.3

The difference between the 'hypersacramentalist' group (RC + non-dogmatic Anglican) and the nonconformist groups was just significant at the '0.05' level of confidence (means = 29.8% and 14.1% respectively; chi-square = 4.44).

The sacramental and control groups score fairly similarly - both responding more affirmatively than the non-sacramental groups who do not manifest as much self-recrimination.

Considering individual statements on this factor, there were two which differentiated significantly between the sacramental and non-sacramentalist.

(1) Statement 2: "I punish myself with guilty feelings."

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
1. Non-dogmatic Anglican	41
2. Roman Catholic	35
3. Control group	29
4. 'Anti-Christian' control	26
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	22
6. Dogmatic Anglican	18
7. Dogmatic Nonconformist	7

The difference between the Roman Catholic group (35%) and the dogmatic nonconformist group (7%) produces a chi-square of 9.357, $p = 0.01$. The difference between the dogmatic nonconformist group and the control group is also statistically significant, chi-square = 6.832, $p = 0.01$. The sacramentalist group (30%) differ appreciably from the non-sacramentalist group (12.5%) on this statement. This difference has a chi-square of 6.522, $p = 0.02$. The non-sacramentalist group (12.5%) also differs significantly from the control group: chi-square = 4.827, $p = 0.05$. These results reveal that the sacramentalist group's mean percentage affirmation (30%) is almost identical with that of the control group (29%). The big differential in the results is between the dogmatic nonconformist sub-group and the others, or more generally between the nonconformist group as a whole and the other groups. It seems that the nonconformist group - and especially the dogmatic part of this avoids the punishing aspects of guilt feelings.

- (2) Statement '17': "I am troubled by morbid, depressing thoughts of my own shortcomings and guilt".

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
1. Non-dogmatic Anglican	47
2. 'Anti-Christian' control	41
3. Dogmatic Anglican	24
4. Roman Catholic	23
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	13
6. Dogmatic nonconformist	7

Comparing the sacramentalist (27.8%) and the nonconformist (9.4%) groups - it is clear which group manifests more proneness to morbid preoccupation with feelings of guilt and sinfulness. The difference between these two comparison groups produced a chi-square of 7.878, $p = 0.01$. As before, the sacramentalist and control groups score similarly; so, needless to say, the nonconformist group scores significantly lower than the mean percentage affirmation of the control group (31%): chi-square = 8.615, $p = 0.01$.

Very few of the respondents in the nonconformist groups manifest morbid guilt feeling - compared with a rather larger proportion of the control group and sacramentalist group manifesting these feelings. The experience of excessive, self-recriminating, guilt feeling would certainly be incompatible with beliefs about acceptance, and 'forgiveness' for sin by a loving and merciful God. 'In effect', and the author emphasises this; in effect, the nonconformist emphasises the Christian's righteousness - because of Christ's sacrificial death; whereas the sacramentalist in part emphasises this - but emphasises more strongly the Christian's 'sinfulness' hence the differences between these two Christian groups in the doctrinal and liturgical emphasis on "confession", and for many Roman Catholics - 'penance'.

Any emphasis on 'sinfulness' is more likely to increase the proneness to, and experience of, guilt feelings and self-recrimination.

Although the control group scored higher (33%) on this factor than the Christian group (26%) there was no significant difference. But at least it can be said that the control group is marginally more concerned with the past than the Christian group. A comparison between the 'Anti-Christian control' group (40%) and the Christian group (26%) - produces a chi-square of 3.236 which is not quite significant at the 5% level of confidence.

However, a comparison of the Anti-Christian control group with the nonconformist groups shows a significant chi-square of 4.016, $p = 0.05$. Also a comparison of the anti-Christian control group with the dogmatic Christian group shows a chi-square of 5.143, $p = 0.05$. Once more the sacramentalist group scores similarly to the control group. The dogmatic Christian group, particularly, manifests few worries or guilt feelings because of past experiences and behaviour. It can be presumed that their conscience is more clear because to them 'the past is forgiven'. One recalls Bunyan's 'Pilgrim' who carries with him a burden of sin and guilt - which he has collected in his life, but when he reaches the cross - symbolising his salvation - he loses the "burden" of sin that has been weighing on his conscience.

11. The Eleventh Factor

Loading

+0.77788

Statement

(27) When I think of the way I have lived my life up to now and the sort of things I have done that I am ashamed of, I feel that my life has been worthless.

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
+0.46941	(39) When I do something wrong I feel I have not only let myself down - but also those who think a lot of me.
-0.34508	(13) I get worried sometimes because of a personal feeling or habit that I don't want anyone to find out about.

Item 13 is loaded -0.32282 on Factor 10; 0.31049
on Factor 12 and 0.38632
on Factor 13.

This factor appears to differentiate between 'self-reproach' and "other reproach" or fear of the reproach of others. In some ways this factor could also be described as an intrareceptive/exteroceptive dichotomy. The high positive loading on this factor is on a statement that manifests a very negative and self-recriminating self-assessment in the context of "accountability to self". The negative loadings refer implicitly to accountability to others and suggests fear of the reproach of others.

(i) The positive loading: Item 27

An examination of this statement and the responses to it show that the extremeness of the self-condemnation implied has resulted in low mean percentage affirmations for all the sub-groups. However, these scores are listed below:

<u>Sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
1. Non-dogmatic Anglican	12
2. Anti-Christian control	11
3. All control	6

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
4. Roman Catholic	5
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	4
6. Dogmatic Anglican	3
7. Dogmatic Nonconformist	0

It is not possible to make any meaningful comparisons among the sub-groups here - because of the very low scores involved.

(ii) The negative loading: Items 39 and 13

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
1. Non-dogmatic Anglican	85
2. Dogmatic Anglican	71.5
3. Roman Catholic	68
4. Dogmatic nonconformist	63.5
5. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	59
6. Control group	58.5
7. 'Anti-Christian' control	55.5

The nonconformists score similarly to the control group - with the sacramentalists scoring noticeably high - especially the Anglican group. In fact the Anglican group does differ significantly from the control group: $\chi^2 = 4.380$ ($p = 0.05$). The sacramentalists certainly seem to be more fearful of the reproach of others. But on closer examination item '13' which refers to 'guilty secrets' about personal failings or habits -

is probably in 'content' and 'meaning' more related to self-indulgent guilt - whereas item '39' is far more general. Nevertheless both statements do indicate a concern for what others think and a need to preserve a degree of "respectability" and "rightness" in the eyes of others. This is especially important for the Christian person - and particularly so for the Christian minister - because of the clean-living, moral stand they choose to take.

12. The Twelveth Factor

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
-0.73360	(32) I have to admit I am far from being the sort of person I really 'ought' to be.
+0.49240	(11) I feel very anxious and guilty when I am tempted to do something wrong.

Item '11' is loaded 0.30058 on Factor 4, and
-0.30968 on Factor 10.

At first sight it appears strange that these two statements should be linked to this factor in the bipolar manner that they are. In fact these two statements are nearly significantly negatively correlated ($r = -0.135$). There is thus a tendency for people, who do not choose to manifest that they are far from being the sort of person they ought to be, to feel very anxious and guilty when tempted to do wrong. If people feel that they are at least approximating to their "ought to" ideal - then, fairly obviously, temptation to relinquish this moral position will be rather traumatic. Whereas if one admits to being far from this moral ideal then temptation is regularly expected because of the acknowledged "sinful" nature of man.

Temptation to do wrong is thus cognitively evaluated as a necessary concomitant of human nature. This latter position would seem to be more typical of the Christian way of thinking. In addition to this if one admits to being far from "ought to" goals this implies a high degree of moral idealism and, involved in this, a determination to master impulses. Hence - for Christians with a well-developed sense of moral idealism and self-control - "temptation" is a considerably reduced threat. So Christians, particularly, should admit to being far removed from their "ought to" goals - and yet should, perhaps paradoxically, be unafraid or unmoved emotionally by temptation to do wrong.

The two statements are considered together below.

	<u>mean percentage affirmation</u>	
	<u>item 32</u>	<u>item 11</u>
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	100	15
2. Non-dogmatic Anglican	94	29
3. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	87	17
4. Dogmatic Anglican	85	30
5. Roman Catholic	85	40
6. Control group	69	31
7. Anti-Christian control	67	30

On 'item 32' the dogmatic nonconformist group, which is also the group with the strongest identification with dogmatic Christian Beliefs and the highest moral stringency, has 100% affirmation to the statement of

admission of falling short of "ought" to ideals. This implies a high degree of moral idealism and self-control. This group scores with only a 15% affirmation to item '11' which concerns a manifestation of anxiety associated with 'temptation'. This can be compared with the sacramentalist group whose mean percentage affirmation on item '32' is 86.7%, and on item '11' is 34.4%. The relevant percentages for the control group are 69% and 31% respectively.

It might be construed from these results that the moral idealism and moral certitude of the respondents in the dogmatic nonconformist group is sufficient to produce an adequate 'defense' in the face of 'temptation'. The feelings accompanying temptation could be described as the "fear of guilt". Such feelings could be successfully resisted if there was assurance of rigid moral ordinances and strict self-control. That is, the individual was aware that the 'temptation' concerned something that was 'categorically wrong', and was sure of his own moral 'untouchability'.

13. The Thirteenth Factor

<u>Loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
+0.75947	(22) At the present moment I am aware of feelings of guilt about some things.
+0.42428	(21) When I have sexual desires I usually try to curb them.
+0.38632	(13) I get worried sometimes because of a personal failing or habit that I don't want anyone to find out about.

Item '21' is loaded 0.44365 on Factor 4
 Item '13' is loaded -0.32282 on Factor 10; -0.34508 on Factor 11; and 0.31049 on Factor 12.

This factor is concerned primarily with current guilt feelings as the highest loaded statement would suggest. It is significant, however, that control of sexual impulses (statement '21) and guilt feelings because of some secretive habit (statement '13) should also be positively loaded on this factor. This seems to imply that these last two statements are the most closely identified with current guilt feelings. In fact statement '22' is correlated with statement '21': $r = 0.139$ (just significant at the 0.05 level); and statement '22' is correlated with statement '13': $r = 0.277$ (which is significant at the 0.01 level).

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
1. Roman Catholic	69.3
2. Non-dogmatic Anglican	58.7
3. Dogmatic Anglican	56
4. Non-dogmatic Nonconformist	46.3
5. Dogmatic nonconformist	41.7
6. 'Anti-Christian' control	34.7

The difference between the control group ('non-Christian' section $n = 27$) and the Christian group as a whole (54.7%) was just statistically significant: chi-square = 4.138, $p = 0.05$.

In spite of this overall difference - it is clear that the non-sacramentalists (43.75%) are responding more similarly to the control groups than to the main body of the sacramentalists. There is a significantly differentiating chi-square of 5.800 ($p = 0.02$) between the sacramentalist

group (63.3%) and the nonconformist group (43.8%). There is also a significant difference between the sacramentalist group and the control group (42.3%): $\chi^2 = 5.958$, $p = 0.02$. So it is the sacramentalist group which manifests more 'current guilt feelings' - especially those feelings associated with sexual impulses.

The statement (22): "At the present moment I am aware of feelings of guilt about some things".

This is considered separately to remove any possible affect the other two statements might have in the statistical calculations.

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean % affirmation</u>
1. Roman Catholic	55
2. Non-dogmatic Anglican	47
3. Control group	46
4. Dogmatic Anglican	43
5. Anti-Christian Control	41
6. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	39
7. Dogmatic nonconformist	34

Here the percentage differences are smaller - which contrives to remove the statistical significance of the difference between the sacramentalist group (48.9%) and the nonconformist group (34.4%). Though the discrepancy between the two means certainly justifies the conclusion that the sacramentalist group manifests more proness to feelings of guilt than the other Christian groups, especially in the case of the Roman Catholic group

whose mean score of 55% is only just not statistically significant from that of the nonconformist group (34.4%).

(c) Summary of Factors

The thirteen factors are listed below together with the percentage variance accounted for by each factor. The total percentage of variance attributable to the thirteen factors is 61.113%.

Factor 1. (4.40%)

Referents: A highly self-critical conscience and associated feelings of guilt and self-condemnation.

Factor 2. (6.25%)

Referents: Social guilt potential.

Factor 3. (4.79%)

Referents: The need for peace of mind. High scores indicate remorse; low scores indicate: 'peace of mind'.

Factor 4. (5.37%)

Referents: 'Sex' guilt and self-indulgent, 'anti-ascetic' guilt feelings. (That is guilt feelings associated with those categories of behaviour).

Factor 5. (5.37%)

Referents: Acutely intrapunitive feelings, relating to a punitive, moralist conscience.

Factor 6. (3.55%) Bipolar

Referents: 6a Intrceptive Guilt.
6b Exteroeceptive Guilt.

Factor 7. (4.72%) Bipolar

Referents: 7a A weakly delimited conscience and
susceptibility to unnecessary guilt feelings.

7b A stringent conscience.

Factor 8. (5.63%)

Referents: 'Hostile guilt' potential.

Factor 9. (5.57%)

Referents: Self-recrimination and morbid feelings of guilt.

Factor 10. (4.91%)

Referents: High scores relate to dissatisfaction with the past
and preoccupation with thoughts of past wrongdoing.
Low scores relate to the absence of lingering,
persistent concern because of past wrongdoing.

Factor 11. (3.43%) Bipolar

Referents: 11a 'self'-reproachful guilt.
11b Fear of 'other' reproach.

Factor 12. (3.51%) Bipolar

Referents: 12a High moralism, moral idealism.
12b Susceptibility to guilty fears.

Factor 13. (3.60%)

Referents: (i) Current guilt feelings.
(ii) Guilt feelings connected with self-indulgence
in an undesirable habit.

Accumulated percentage variance = 61.11%

Following this factor analysis and the summary of the factors recorded above, the main respondent sub-groups will be assessed in relation to the factors identified. The assessment will involve a consideration of the two major doctrinal dichotomies, namely the dogmatic/non-dogmatic differential and the sacramentalist/non-sacramentalist (nonconformist) differential, in relation to the thirteen factors.

(d) Factor Scores and Respondent Groups

The non-sacramentalist, or 'nonconformist', group

This consisted of both the dogmatic nonconformist and the non-dogmatic nonconformist groups. The nonconformist group - considered as a whole, does not have a larger mean percentage affirmation than any other group on any of the thirteen factors. However, the 'dogmatic' nonconformist sub-group scores the highest on four of the factors. This group manifests the highest social guilt potential (Factor 2) and the most 'stringency of conscience' (Factor 7(b)). It also scores highest on hostile guilt potential (Factor 8) and on 'high moralism' (Factor 12a). This Christian sub-group reveals the most stringent inhibition of impulsive behaviour - that is the most 'self-control', and, directly associated with this, indications of high moral idealism.

The nonconformist group, as a whole, does score lowest on three factors. They appear to have the least need for peace of mind (Factor 3) and the least manifestation of morbid guilt feeling and self-recrimination

(Factor 9). They also have less susceptibility to the fear of guilt than the other groups. The dogmatic nonconformist group - in addition to contributing to these last three factor results also scores lowest on two additional factors: self-reproachful guilt (Factor 11(a)) and current guilt feelings (Factor 6(b) - that is guilt feelings elicited because of contact with other people.

The Sacramentalist Group

This group scores highest of the groups on four of the Factors. Firstly, it scores highest on the factor relating to the 'need for peace of mind' (Factor 3). This group also scores highest on two factors associated with 'fearfulness' in anticipation of the condemnation of others or self-condemnation. These factors are, respectively, that relating to the fear of 'other' reproach (Factor 11b) and that referring to the susceptibility to the 'fear of guilt' (Factor 12b). Lastly the sacramentalist group scores highest on 'current' guilt feelings (Factor 13). In addition to the foregoing list, the Roman Catholic group scores highest of the sub-groups on two other factors - that is on the 'sex guilt' or 'self-indulgent guilt' factor (Factor 4), and on the factor relating to 'acutely intrapunitive guilt' (Factor 5) produced by a moralist or 'authoritarian' conscience. The Anglican sub-group scores higher than the other groups on the factor of 'intraceptive guilt', in other words they are more prone to 'feel sinful' even in the presence of other people (Factor 6a).

Considered as a whole, the sacramentalist group does not have the lowest mean percentage affirmation on any item of guilt. However, the

dogmatic Anglican group does score lowest on three factors. Firstly it seems to be the group least likely to have a highly self-critical conscience (Factor 1), and it has the lowest mean percentage affirmation on the factor associated with acutely intrapunitive guilt feelings (Factor 5). Thirdly, the sub-group scores least on the factor of 'self-reproachful' guilt. (Factor 11a). Certainly this group anyway appears not to be prone to feelings of self-condemnation.

The Dogmatic Group

If there is a dogmatic/non-dogmatic, and a sacramentalist/non-sacramentalist dichotomy, then there is going to be some overlap between the respective groupings in this factorial assessment - this will be apparent in the ensuing list of factors related to the dogmatic/nondogmatic dimension.

The dogmatic group, for the purposes of this analysis, incorporates the dogmatic nonconformist group and the dogmatic Anglican group (total = 74 respondents). As a whole, they scored highest on two factors - those of social guilt potential (Factor 2) and Hostile guilt potential (Factor 8). In addition to these the dogmatic nonconformist group score highest on the factor of 'stringent conscience' (Factor 7b) and highest on moral idealism (Factor 12a).

Again, as a whole, the dogmatic group scores lowest on the factor relating to, 'self-reproachful guilt' (Factor 11a). The dogmatic Anglican group, as has already been mentioned, also scores lowest of the sub-groups on two other factors - those referring to a highly critical conscience

(Factor 1) and acutely intrapunitive feelings of guilt (Factor 5), respectively. The dogmatic nonconformist sub-group scores lowest on no less than four of the thirteen factors. It has the lowest mean percentage affirmation on the 'current' guilt feeling' factor (Factor 13); on the 'need for peace of mind' factor (Factor 3); on the 'morbid guilt feelings' factor (Factor 9); and on the susceptibility to the 'fear of guilt' factor (Factor 12b).

Christian Group, and Control Group Comparisons

The Christian group scores significantly higher than the control group on four factors - all of which are indicative of the disparity between the groups in their attitude to moralism and moral idealism. The Christian group scores significantly higher than the control group on social guilt potential (Factor 2), Hostile guilt potential (Factor 8), sex or self-indulgent guilt (Factor 4), and finally, on moral idealism associated with "ought-to" goals (Factor 12a). As could well be expected, then, the Christian group scores lower than the control group on the factor evidencing a weakly delimited conscience (Factor 7a).

The control group scores highest on two factors, the first mentioned being Factor 7a. Non-Christians appear to be more prone to feelings of guilt, when 'wrongly' accused, than Christians. The control group also scores significantly higher on the factor relating to dissatisfaction with the past in terms of persistent concern and wrong because of past wrongdoing (Factor 10).

The control group scores lower than the Christian sample on no less than eight factors. These are listed below:

1. Social guilt potential (Factor 2)
2. Sex guilt (Factor 4)
3. Intrceptive guilt (Factor 6a)
4. Exterceptive guilt (Factor 6b)
5. Stringent conscience (Factor 7b)
6. Hostile guilt potential (Factor 8)
7. Fear of 'other-reproach' (Factor 11b)
8. High moralism, or moral idealism (Factor 12a).

Chapter 8: Section 3

Section 3: Conclusions and Discussion

The factor analysis confirmed that there were two quite basic dichotomies in the results. These dichotomies separated the sacramentalist and non-sacramentalist groups, and also the moralism and guilt proneness categories. These dichotomies are considered in this third section.

A. The Sacramentalist/Non-Sacramentalist Dichotomy

One significant outcome of the various analyses hitherto explicated is that hypothesis 5b is confirmed. This states that the sacramentalist groups will score higher on measures of self-recrimination. The foregoing results and discussion clearly shows this discrepancy between the sacramentalist group and the non-sacramentalist group. This discrepancy cuts across the dogmatic-non-dogmatic dimension. On nearly all the foregoing comparisons between groups over measures of self-recrimination - the non-dogmatic sacramentalists differ from the non-dogmatic nonconformists, and the dogmatic Roman Catholic group differs from the dogmatic nonconformist group. This is illustrated in the following table (Table I).

Table I supports the contention that there is a definite dichotomy in the results of the sacramentalist and non-sacramentalist groups. Since the control groups' 'mean percentage affirmation' (37%) lies approximately midway between the sacramentalist and non-sacramentalist (or nonconformist) group scores, as represented in Table I, this would suggest that there is

TABLE I

measure of self-recrimination	non-dogmatic		dogmatic	
	sacramentalist	non-sacramentalist	Roman Catholic [sacramentalist]	non-sacramentalist
1. "Destructive" guilt.	44	32	44	36
2. Factor 3: 'Need for peace of mind'.	51	38	62	41
3. Factor 9: Morbid guilt.	32	12	28	16
4. Factor 10: Preoccupation with past.	37	23	36	24
5. Factor 13: Present guilt.	59	46	69	42
\bar{X}	44.6	30.2	47.8	31.8
	mean percentage affirmations			

some factor or series of factors that predisposes the sacramentalist group to express more feelings of self-recrimination and guilt proneness, and that there is some factor that predisposes the non-sacramentalist group to express fewer feelings of self-recrimination and guilt proneness - than a control group.

Hypothesis 5B was formulated because such a difference in results was anticipated. Despite the confirmation of the hypothesis, conclusions based on these results may still seem rather speculative. Certainly it is difficult to talk meaningfully about causation and motivation on the basis of any set of empirical data. Nevertheless, sometimes the strength of relationships inferred from the data can indicate a satisfactory explanation of the results. In this case it is possible to eliminate some explanations and thereby clarify the conclusions.

The difference between the 'self-recrimination' scores of the sacramentalist and non-sacramentalists could be due to the nature of 'self-recrimination'. Self-blame or self-mediated punishment is perhaps undesirable from the point of view of non-sacramentalists but desirable from the point of view of sacramentalists. So it might be that non-sacramentalists suppress these feelings, consciously or unconsciously - whilst the sacramentalists sensitise their feelings of remorse and self-recrimination. Both groups are thus, in their different ways, attempting to appear "socially desirable". Certainly their 'social desirability scale' scores indicate a "need for social approval". However, if the members of the groups are trying to give what they consider is a 'favourable impression'

then one would expect there to be a positive correlation between sacramentalists' self-recrimination and the social desirability measure: and a negative correlation between non-sacramentalists' social desirability and self-recrimination. However, this is not the case, there appears to be no linear relationship of any significance at all between either of the groups' scores on self-recrimination and social desirability ratings. It does not seem that either of the groups' results on the self-recrimination measures is related to the 'need for social approval'.

Another possible explanation is that - as the non-sacramentalists score higher on moralism - so this facilitates their avoidance of guilt-producing situations. This is to be considered later in this section. Though there does appear to be a small and insignificant inverse relationship between "moralism" (degree and extent of expectation of self-mediated punishment) and self-recrimination, this does not provide an adequate explanation of the differences between the sacramentalists and the non-sacramentalists. The main objection to this "inverse relationship" idea between moralism and self-recrimination as an explanation of the sacramentalist/non-sacramentalist dichotomy is that the 'moralism' measures relate primarily to the question of dogmatic Christian Belief. The mean 'dogmatic' score of the non-sacramentalists (248.3) is slightly, but not significantly in excess of that of the sacramentalists (241.6). Also on measures of moralism derived from the manifest guilt questionnaire there is no significant difference between the two groups. This all suggests that the 'inverse relationship', even if it holds true, is not on its own an adequate explanation of this group differential.

A third explanation, which most fits the background to hypothesis '5B' involves the consideration of a 'repressor-sensitiser' hypothesis. The non-sacramentalists could be described as "repressors" in that as a result of their religious beliefs they repress, or otherwise avoid, feelings of self-criticism and self-recrimination. One significant justification of this conclusion is that nonconformists tend to emphasise God's unconditional acceptance and forgiveness of those who 'become Christians'. This is clearly an integrative concept, and if it is believed, is likely to promote feelings of "self-acceptance". Phrases such as "Children of God", "Co-heirs with Christ of Eternal Glory" are the biblically-based beliefs - especially of the nonconformists. This is not to say that there are not large numbers of sacramentalists who believe similarly. Those who do are more likely to be found among the dogmatic Anglican group. The 'Reformation' doctrine of "Justification by Faith" can be associated with an attitude of mind which might, if this isn't too bespoiled a word, be described as "self-righteousness". This concept of 'self-righteousness' is involved very closely with moral idealism and the avoidance of situations where moral standards could be violated. Nearly all the doctrines of the nonconformist Churches stem directly from Biblical references. The 'Bible' is thus the absolute authority on all matters of Faith and Conduct. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical traditionalism of the sacramentalists has led to the evolution of liturgical worship which in some cases (particularly in the Eastern Orthodox tradition) is believed to be as important as Bible-based, dogmatic beliefs. It could well be, therefore, that the liturgies of the

sacramentalists have a profound effect on self-evaluation and self-recrimination (N.B. the 'dogmatic', 'evangelical' Anglicans would also agree that the Bible was the final authority on all matters of Faith and Conduct).

The importance of liturgical and private confession in the traditional sacramentalist churches - markedly differentiates them from the non-conformist Churches. The self-examination involved in the liturgies, or in auricular confession, encourages the sensitisation of feelings of guilt and self-recrimination. One might thus expect the sacramentalist respondents to be more self-critical and more aware of feelings of sinfulness. The sacramentalist liturgies serve to perpetuate the sequence of "contrition, confession, penance, and forgiveness". As a regular religious practice this is not as evident in the various nonsacramentalist denominations. It is not the purpose of this Thesis to decide whether one or other of the groups is more or less adjusted and integrated. Both systems seem, in different ways, to lead to integration in self-awareness and self-evaluation. This is discussed elsewhere (Chapters 1 and 3).

The sensitisation/repression hypothesis would seem to be the best explanation of the differentiation between the Christian groups. The term 'repression' has so many connotations that it seems to have a "magical" component. In this usage it is meant to indicate the suppression of negative self-evaluations by the counterbalancing of proportionately larger positive self-evaluations. Self-recrimination, as a negative self-evaluation is thus 'repressed' by the nonconformists - but 'expressed' by the sacramentalists.

B. The Moralism/Guilt-proneness Dichotomy

This has already been referred to in the previous section, but now it must be considered rather more fully. This dichotomy is first noted as a result of the bipolar nature of the second unrotated factor. Of course this bipolar attribute is very much a mathematical artifact - but it does nevertheless discriminate between statements associated with moralism and statements associated with guilt proneness. 'Moralism is indicated by statements concerned with the expectancy of guilt feelings for violation of moral standards. High scores on these statements relate to the factor. 'Guilt-proneness' is indicated by statements associated with the susceptibility to feelings of guilt, and manifestation of 'currently felt' remorse, and anxiety because of guilt. Low scores on these statements relate to the factor. This revelation of the infrastructure of the questionnaire suggests an inverse relationship between moralism and self-recrimination, between anticipated guilt and manifest guilt, between guilt 'potential' and guilt 'proneness'.

The question to be answered is: How much of this apparent inverse relationship is accountable to the dichotomous content of the questionnaire and is thus an artifact of the structure of the questionnaire, and how much is accountable to influences in the respondent group?

From an analysis of the infrastructure of the guilt questionnaire, statements associated with moralism and expectations of guilt feeling, appear to be incompatible with statements involving self-recrimination and morbid guilt feelings. One statement, in particular, from the manifest

guilt questionnaire, by comparison with thirteen other statements, emphasises the dichotomous content of the questionnaire. It is statement '9' of the manifest guilt questionnaire:

"I would avoid doing anything my conscience told me was wrong"

This implies obedience to a morally stringent conscience which does differentiate between 'right' and 'wrong'. Obedience to the dictates of conscience is thus considered to be imperative. This statement is related positively, and statistically significantly to seven other statements on the questionnaire. These are listed below and the coefficients of correlations with statement '9'.

<u>coefficients</u> (r)	<u>significance</u>	<u>statement</u>
0.275	(p = 0.01)	(7) I feel very guilty and ashamed of myself if I tell a lie.
0.193	(p = 0.01)	(26) When I lose my temper I feel guilty afterwards.
0.187	(p = 0.01)	(18) If I found anything that was not my own and I kept it, my conscience would keep troubling me.
0.182	(p = 0.01)	(20) Arguments leave me feeling ill-at-ease and ready to renew a friendship.
0.177	(p = 0.05)	(24) I worry a lot when I feel I have fallen short of my moral and ethical standards.
0.148	(p = 0.05)	(3) I am very self-critical especially concerning my moral and ethical behaviour.
0.145	(p = 0.05)	(28) I feel awful when I break a promise.

On these statements most closely related to statement '9' there is not a difference between the scores for the sacramentalist and non-sacramentalist sub-groups (69.5% and 69.6% mean percentage affirmations respectively). But statement '9' is correlated negatively with six other statements. These statements are manifestations of self-recrimination and guilt-proneness.

<u>coefficients</u> (with statement '9')		<u>statements</u>
	<u>significance</u>	
-0.260	(p = 0.01)	(6) Sometimes people make me feel guilty by accusing me of doing something even though I am innocent.
-0.199	(p = 0.01)	(29) I sometimes think I am suffering now because of the wrong things I have done in the past.
-0.181	(p = 0.01)	(17) I am troubled by morbid depressing thoughts of my own shortcomings and guilt.
-0.177	(p = 0.05)	(2) I punish myself with guilty feelings.
-0.152	(p = 0.05)	(1) I hate myself for the bad things I have thought and done in the past.
-0.151	(p = 0.05)	(34) I am often bothered by nagging thoughts of the wrongs I have done in the past.

On these statements, the mean percentage affirmation of the sacramentalists and non-sacramentalists differ significantly (27.4% and 17.2% respectively).

This suggests that whereas the "inverse" relationship does not affect the sacramentalist/non-sacramentalist differential - it does exist to some extent in terms of intercorrelations among questionnaire items. If this relationship is to mean more than this, then measures of self-recrimination

from the manifest guilt questionnaire should correlate negatively with a measure of moralism external to, and independent of, the manifest guilt questionnaire. This possibility is considered in the following section. But first the intercorrelations expressed in the foregoing analysis must be considered in a little more detail. The response to statement '9' is in part related to the particular respondent group. This is exemplified by a comparison between the 'non-Christian' group and the group furthest removed from this in terms of "Dogmatic Christianity" measures. It might have been expected that an affirmative response to statement '9' would indicate 'moralism' inasmuch as this entails obedience to the dictates of conscience. Indeed, for the dogmatic nonconformist group there was a significant ($p = 0.05$) positive correlation between obedience to the 'voice of conscience' and the anticipated guilt (moralism) score. The coefficient in this case was: $r = 0.315$. However, for the 'non-Christian' group there was no meaningful comparison at all between 'obedience to conscience' and moralism ($r = -0.009$).

The statements most negatively correlated with statement '9' are mainly those associated with Factor '9', and one associated with susceptibility to feelings of guilt. On this comparison between Factor '9' (morbid guilt feelings) and statement '9', there is again a marked difference between the two respondent groups. For the non-Christian group there is virtually no meaningful relationship between 'obedience to conscience' and morbid, anxious guilt feelings. For the dogmatic nonconformist group, however, there is a negative correlation of $r = -0.328$ ($p = 0.05$). So it would seem

that for some Christians, anyway, obedience to conscience is inversely proportionate to feelings of self-recrimination. Also, 'obedience to conscience' is related statistically to the social desirability measure, in a significant positive direction, for the dogmatic nonconformist group: $r = 0.353$ ($p = 0.05$). Whereas, for the non-Christian group there is a negative relationship, not significant, of $r = -0.189$.

This additional information leads to the conclusion that the inverse relationship suggested in the intercorrelations may hold true for some Christian groups where obedience to conscience is socially desirable and where this 'obedience' is positively related to guilt potential and negatively related to proneness to feelings of self-recrimination. The train of thought accompanying this 'inverse relationship' between guilt potential and guilt proneness would be associated with the idea that if one obeys one's 'conscience' then one can avoid feelings of guilt and self-recrimination. This seems only to be related to the moralist and dogmatic Christian groups, however.

Further comparisons between moralism (guilt potential) and self-recrimination (guilt proneness)

It may not be self-evident that there is even a possibility of an inverse relationship between responses to a measure of moralism and responses to a measure of guilt proneness. However, it is possible to postulate a theoretical relationship between the two. If the anticipation of feelings of guilt predisposes the individual to avoid the guilt-producing situation then this 'moral' individual should be less prone to feelings of guilt and

self-recrimination. The moral stringency of an individual thus predisposes him to develop the necessary self-control, inhibition of impulse, to maintain the status quo. Strict control over behaviour should thus be accompanied by avoidance of guilt feelings - and a 'clear conscience'. Of course, inasmuch as the 'moralist' has a very high 'guilt potential,' - so contravention of his self-imposed moral standards would presumably lead to extreme feelings of self-recrimination. Nevertheless the moralist has considerably diminished proneness to guilt - so long as he remains in strict obedience to his moral codes. This reasoning is partially supported in the foregoing analysis relative to the dogmatic nonconformist group. There now follows a further comparison of 'guilt potential' and guilt proneness measures.

Four of the factors from the factor analysis of items from the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire are now considered since they explicitly relate to proneness to feelings of guilt and self-recrimination. These four factors are compared separately with a measure of 'guilt potential'. The measure of 'guilt potential' used is the sum of the item scores, for each respondent, on the 'anticipated guilt' questionnaire.

1. A comparison of 'Factor 3' with guilt potential

The referents for this factor are 'remorse' and 'the need for peace of mind'. Affirmations to statements on this factor indicate the proneness of respondents to feelings of regret because of past wrongdoing - coupled with a need to be rid of these thoughts and to have peace of mind.

Each of these comparisons will show diagrammatically the positions of the respondents' sub-groups relative to the two comparison 'axes'. In each case the vertical axis represents the guilt proneness scale and the horizontal axis represents the guilt potential scale. The guilt proneness variable will vary from comparison to comparison and will be measured in terms of 'mean percentage affirmations'. The guilt potential axis relates to total 'raw' scores on the anticipated guilt questionnaire (maximum score = 99). Figure I shows the comparison between 'Factor 3' and the guilt potential measure.


Figure I illustrates a positive rather than a negative (inverse) relationship between this measure of guilt proneness and the guilt potential variable. Some of the coefficients of correlation for the comparison are listed below.

<u>group</u>	(n)	<u>coefficient</u> (r)	(significance)
Sacramentalist	(90)	+0.21	(0.05 > p > 0.01)
Nonconformist	(64)	+0.21	(0.10 > p > 0.05)
Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	+0.22	(0.10 > p > 0.05)
Roman Catholic	(40)	+0.18	(0.20 > p > 0.10)
Control group	(48)	+0.09	(very insignificant)

Except for the sacramentalist group, the coefficients are not very significant but they are noticeably larger for the Christian sub-groups than for the control group.

Ordinates for Figure I

	<u>ordinates</u>	
	<u>Horizontal axis</u>	<u>Vertical axis</u>
		(%)
Dogmatic Anglican	60.1	65.0
Roman Catholic	59.5	62.0
Non-dogmatic Anglican	50.7	51.0
Control group	45.3	51.3
'Anti-Christian' control group	39.2	44.3
Dogmatic nonconformist	71.7	41.3
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	57.7	37.7
	(means)	(percentage means)



The content of 'Factor 3' may be the principal reason for this positive association with guilt potential. In retrospect it seems logical that expressions of regret because of past wrongdoing, and the need to have peace of mind, are factors commensurate with the moral idealism of the strict, 'well delineated Christian conscience'. This type of moral attitude may be associated with rather more 'goading' by the conscience and hence the 'need' to find peace of mind'. Here, 'the conscience', is used as a convenient term to describe an internalised system of moral codes and attitudes - a kind of standard against which thoughts, impulses and behaviours are considered.

The rather obvious exception to all this is the position of the non-conformist sub-groups, as shown in Figure I. They are suppressing any response indicative of 'self-criticism' and 'need', i.e. lack of peace of mind. These particular groups of nonconformist Christians are either far more self-satisfied and have far 'easier consciences' than the other respondent groups or they are repressing the response that some of the others are sensitising.

2. A comparison of scores on 'Factor 9' with guilt potential scores

The referents for this factor include expressions of morbid guilt-feelings and self-recrimination.

Figure II shows that those sub-groups manifesting a high Christian religious belief score have high 'guilt-potential' ratings but low 'morbid guilt' ratings. However, in spite of the graphical trend, there is only one negative correlation for the individual sub-group comparisons between guilt-

potential and guilt proneness. When the sample is considered as a number of individuals, rather than as a number of groups with 'group means', then there is very little evidence of any association between the guilt-proneness and the guilt potential measures. This suggests that the primary reason for the 'negative' gradient in the plots of the means is the differing group reactions to the comparison variables rather than to any inverse or negative association between the comparison variables. Thus the tentative suggestion, prior to this analysis, that the results might show evidence of a negative correlation between guilt potential and guilt proneness, is probably not applicable to this sample. What is more certain is that different groups of respondents have widely diverging 'mean scores' for guilt potential and guilt proneness measures.

Some of the coefficients of correlation relating to the comparison from individual sub-group results are listed below:

<u>group</u>	(n)	coefficient (r)		
Sacramentalist	(90)	+0.07	(very insignificant)	
Nonconformist	(64)	+0.10	"	"
Roman Catholic	(40)	+0.14	"	"
Dogmatic Nonconformist	(41)	-0.05	"	"
Control Group	(48)	+0.14	"	"
Entire Sample	(202)	+0.0002	"	"

There is no foundation in these results for drawing any conclusions about the association of the comparison variables: guilt proneness and guilt-

potential. It is just that some group means show that some groups are 'biased' towards one variable rather than the other.

As far as some of the 'dogmatic' Christian groups are concerned it is probably expected of them that they have strict moral controls - hence the high guilt potential scores; and they are expected not to be susceptible to morbid feelings of guilt and self-recrimination

3. A comparison of scores on 'Factor 13' with guilt-potential scores

The main referent for factor 13 is the 'manifestation' of 'current' feelings of guilt. The statement principally loaded on this factor is statement '22' of the manifest guilt questionnaire:


"At the present moment I am aware of feelings of guilt about some things"

Figure III confirms the trend established in comparison 2. The coefficients of correlation for individual groups are again very small as is shown below.

<u>group</u>	(n)	<u>coefficient</u> (r)	
Sacramentalist	(90)	0.000	(very insignificant)
Nonconformist	(64)	+0.07	" "
Roman Catholic	(40)	+0.10	" "
Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	-0.04	" "
Control group	(48)	+0.05	" "
Entire sample	(202)	+0.02	" "

Ordinates for Figure II

<u>Group</u>	<u>ordinates</u>	
	<u>Horizontal axis</u>	<u>Vertical axis</u> (%)
Non-dogmatic Anglican	50.7	32.3
Roman Catholic	59.5	28.0
'Anti-Christian' control	39.2	26.0
Control	45.3	23.8
Dogmatic Anglican	60.1	20.5
Dogmatic nonconformist	71.7	15.8
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	57.7	12.3
	(means)	(percentage means)



Thus it is confirmed that the positions of the groups in the diagrams are not determined by any association between the comparison variables of guilt-proneness and guilt potential. Figure III demonstrates the difference in the group positions.

4. A comparison of scores on 'Factor 10' with guilt potential scores

This factor is related to the proneness to feelings of guilt because of past shortcomings and to a 'lingering regret' because of past wrongdoing.


The coefficients of correlation for the individual sub-groups, between the comparison variables of 'Factor 10' and 'guilt potential', are in this case rather more positive than was the case in the previous two comparisons. This is shown in the following list:

<u>Group</u>		coefficient (r)	significance
Sacramentalist	(90)	+0.11	(not significant)
Nonconformist	(64)	+0.23	($0.10 > p > 0.05$)
Roman Catholic	(40)	+0.11	(not significant)
Dogmatic nonconformist	(41)	+0.27	($0.10 > p > 0.05$)
Control group	(48)	+0.19	(not significant)

These results indicate at least a slight positive association between the stringency of conscience and 'lingering regret and self-annoyance because of past shortcomings'. This sort of persistent, negative feeling would be a function of a punitive, morally stringent conscience. However,

Ordinates for Figure III

	<u>ordinates</u>	
	<u>Horizontal axis</u>	<u>Vertical axis</u> (%)
Roman Catholic	59.5	55.0
Non-dogmatic Anglican	50.7	47.0
Control	45.3	46.0
Dogmatic Anglican	60.1	43.0
'Anti-Christian' Control	39.2	41.0
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	57.7	39.0
Dogmatic nonconformist	71.7	34.0
	(means)	(percentage means)




the coefficients are rather low and cannot therefore be regarded as reliable or valid evidence of association and correlation between these comparison variables.

Figure IV emphasises the wide differences in group means on these variables, with the 'dogmatic' groups, particularly, scoring low on the guilt-proneness variable.

Ordinates for Figure IV

	<u>ordinates</u>	
	<u>Horizontal axis</u>	<u>Vertical axis</u> (%)
'Anti-Christian' Control	39.2	40.0
Roman Catholic	59.5	34.5
Control	45.3	33.0
Non-dogmatic Anglican	50.7	32.5
Dogmatic nonconformist	71.7	23.8
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	57.7	22.8
Dogmatic Anglican	60.1	17.3
	(means)	(percentage means)



Conclusions

In each of the last three comparisons it is worth noting again that the Roman Catholic group scores higher on the guilt proneness factors than the other Christian respondent groups. This seems to underline their greater sensitisation of feelings of guilt.

The foregoing analysis, however, shows no evidence for a strong relationship between guilt-potential, as an indicator of moral stringency, and proneness to feelings of guilt. The only very faint hint at an inverse relationship between the two variables comes from the results of the dogmatic nonconformist group which happens to be the most extremely 'pro-Christian' group and also the most extremely 'moralist' group. It may well be considered that there is some degree of 'motivation' in this group to emphasise those aspects likely to give a good impression. In this way 'guilt potential' and 'guilt-proneness' scores may be distorted in opposite directions so that the 'moralist' Christian respondents suppress any manifestation of feelings of self-recrimination whilst suggesting that they have 'stringent consciences'.

Both the Christian and the non-Christian groups show a small positive correlation between guilt potential and measures of guilt-proneness associated with regret for past shortcomings, and the need for peace of mind. But the Christian groups, otherwise, show rather less of a positive relationship between the comparison variables, than does the control group.

An examination of the response choices of the respondents shows that the Christian group readily discriminates between 'guilt-proneness' and

'guilt-potential' items. The study of the frequency distribution of the 41 manifest guilt questionnaire items (at the beginning of this chapter) has shown that four out of five Christian sub-groups produce a bipolar response pattern. These sub-groups are differentiating between statements associated with 'guilt potential' - which they wholeheartedly accept, and statements associated with 'guilt-proneness' which they very largely reject. This differential between 'guilt potential' and 'guilt proneness' is reflected in the comparison of total scores from the 'anticipated guilt questionnaire' with mean percentage affirmations on some factors of guilt associated with proneness to guilt feelings.

The correlational analysis has shown that 'guilt potential', as measured by the anticipated guilt questionnaire, is strongly related to scores on the measure of dogmatic Christian belief, whereas 'guilt proneness' and self-recrimination is not. This would account for the disassociation of 'guilt proneness' from 'guilt potential' responses - by the Christian sub-groups and the 'association' of these responses by the non-Christian subgroup - unaffected as it is by the Christian Belief variable.

The question still remains as to why the Christian group should disassociate guilt potential from guilt proneness - particularly in the case of the dogmatic nonconformist sub-group, and why the non-Christian group should not disassociate them. One reason is that for the Christian it is acceptable, indeed desirable, for him to possess a stringent system of moral standards especially if he is a member of a 'dogmatic Christian group'. In this type of group 'moralism' is normative - in contrast with other, more

radically minded Christian groups and the 'non-Christian' control groups where 'moralism' would be a rather contemptuous indictment. The moral idealism of traditional conservative Christian belief necessitates stringent control of behaviour and the inhibition of self-indulgent impulses. The guilt potential measure is an indicator of the extent of this 'moral behaviour', because expectancy of guilt mediates moral behaviour by encouraging avoidance of guilt-producing situations. Thus the primary motivation is to avoid wrongdoing because of fear of punishment for offending other people, or God, and this induces the secondary motivation which is to avoid guilt feelings and self-recrimination. Moral behaviour is thus rewarding and consequently self-reinforcing particularly within Christian groups.

Moral behaviour for some Christians is accordingly incompatible with self-recrimination - as self recrimination is contingent upon perceived violations of moral standards. So, in order to avoid feelings of guilt and susceptibility to guilt feelings - the Christian must avoid guilt producing situations and create an 'illusion' of 'morality' and 'righteousness'.

Directly associated with this are the responses of the Christians, particularly from the dogmatic sub-groups, to the various measures of guilt feeling. Some Christians may be creating the impression of "righteousness" as an attempt to gain the approval of others. They could do this in one of two ways, either they could give a false "high" rating on the guilt-potential measure, or they could give a false "low" rating on some measure of self-recrimination and susceptibility to feelings of guilt. In the

former case, by giving this 'favourable' response they would be weakening any relationship between guilt potential and guilt proneness. The dogmatic nonconformist group have a much higher 'moralism', or guilt-potential rating, than any of the other Christian sub-groups ($p \leq 0.01$, in each comparison with other sub-groups), and this sub-group also has some small negative correlation coefficients for the regression of guilt potential on guilt proneness scores. In the second case, it is clear that the nonconformist respondents are not so ready to sensitise feelings of guilt as the sacramentalists. This has already been discussed in terms of a 'repressor/sensitiser' hypothesis. This 'reduction' in the guilt proneness rating would weaken any relationship with guilt potential. A combination of these two effects, or either of them acting independently could serve to disassociate responses, by any individual, on 'guilt potential' measures from responses on 'guilt-proneness' measures.

Alternatively, though on balance this may seem rather less likely, it may be that dogmatic Christians are being completely frank. In this case, their extremely high scores on the guilt-potential measures are a reasonably fair indication of their comparatively severe moralism and 'capacity' for 'self-control'. Also, their relative lack of 'self-recrimination' and lower scoring on measures of guilt proneness, are then a function of true 'peace of mind' and a 'guilt-free' conscience. Whether the 'need for approval', and some 'defensive' response set, or 'real' self-acceptance and peace of mind cause the dogmatic Christians to respond as they do - is difficult to decide. Either explanation can account for the

disassociation of guilt-proneness from guilt potential.

It is important to notice the contrasting results from the control groups. By comparison, the non-Christian group does not disassociate guilt potential from guilt proneness. Rather, the extensiveness of conscience activity and censoriousness appears, in their case, to be a factor affecting proneness to feelings of guilt.

CHAPTER 9

Results: Self-evaluation, and some relationships
with feelings of guilt.

Chapter 9

Self-evaluation and some relationships with feelings of guilt

This chapter concerns the analysis of results obtained from the use of the measures of self-evaluation. Various comparisons will be made between scores on these measures and scores on other variables tested in this research. The relationship between 'self-esteem' and guilt feelings, moralism, and religious belief will be studied. The chapter is divided into five sections:

1. The Self-evaluation measures and religious belief.
2. The self-esteem factors.
3. Comparisons between sub-groups.
4. Self-evaluation and feelings of guilt.
5. A summary of results obtained and conclusions.

1. The self-evaluation measures and religious belief

In all, eight measures purporting to indicate 'self-esteem' were derived from the two self-evaluation forms. The semantic differential supplied three basic indices: one of 'self-acceptance', one of 'ideal self' and an index of self-ideal discrepancy based on the 'generalised distance formula' applied by Osgood (171). This formula is expressed as:

$$D_{il} = \sqrt{\sum_j d_{il}^2}$$

where j = the number of bipolar scales

i = first concept

l = second concept.

Here ' D_{il} ' is the linear distance between the points in the semantic space representing two concepts ' i ' and ' l '. In this case the two concepts are 'self' and 'ideal self'. The linear distance between them is measured by summing the squares of the differences in scale position of the 'self' and 'ideal self' responses - over each of the 23 descriptive scales. The square root of the resultant figure is equivalent to D_{il} - or the 'Self 'ideal' discrepancy score as used by Osgood. The greater the distance between a respondent's perceptions of "what he is" and "what he would like to be" - so the greater is the D_{il} index.

The 'adjective check list' produces five measures of self-esteem and self-criticism. The total number of unfavourable words underlined by the respondent is one measure of his self-criticism, and the total number of favourable adjectives that are underlined is a measure of his self-acceptance. However, respondents differ among themselves, often considerably - as to the total number of adjectives, positive and negative, that are underlined. In order for fair comparisons to be made it is necessary to use 'ratios' as indices of self-acceptance and self-criticality. Gough (108) uses two ratios:

(i) The self-acceptance ratio:

$$\frac{a}{b}$$

where a = the number of favourable adjectives checked

b = the total number of adjectives checked

(ii) The self-criticality ratio:

$$\frac{c}{b}$$

where c = the number of unfavourable adjectives checked

b = the total number of adjectives checked.

$$(so \ a + c = b)$$

To these two ratios a third is added to be called the 'self-approval' index:

$$\frac{a}{c}$$

where a = the number of favourable adjectives checked

c = the number of unfavourable adjectives checked.

Thus the larger this index is - the greater the proportionate expression of self-approval.

These eight indices of self-evaluation are listed in Table I with the correlation coefficients between them and measures of religious beliefs and practices. The top half of the table is concerned with the comparisons involving the 'self-criticism' indices and the bottom half of the table is

concerned with comparisons involving the 'self-acceptance' indices. (N.B. the self-acceptance ratio is the complement of the self-criticality ratio - i.e. $\frac{a}{b} + \frac{c}{b} = 1.0$).

The coefficients between self-criticism, or negative self evaluation, and religious belief and practices are all negative - though the coefficients with self-ideal discrepancy are not statistically significant. The reverse is the case in terms of the coefficients between religious belief and self-acceptance. In this case all the coefficients are positive and statistically significant - except for the comparison involving the 'number of favourable adjectives checked' - where there was no statistically significant coefficient of correlation.

These results lead one to the conclusions that manifestations of self-esteem are, for this sample, associated with the degree of identification with dogmatic Christian beliefs and practices. The dogmatic Christian respondents are, by their own avowal, more self-accepting and less self-critical than other sub-groups. Thus hypothesis '3' is partly confirmed. Hypothesis '3a' is confirmed in that there is a positive correlation between dogmatic Christian belief and self-esteem. Following from this: Hypothesis '3b' is confirmed because there is found to be an inverse relationship between the dogmatic Christian belief variable and the variable of 'self-criticality'. There was no statistically significant relationship between dogmatic Christian belief and 'self-ideal' discrepancy so hypothesis '3c' is not wholly confirmed - although the coefficients of correlation in this latter case were negative, which is the direction of association suggested by the hypothesis.

Table I

Self Criticism Indices	coefficients of correlation with:	
	Religious Belief	Religious Practices
1. Number of unfavourable adjectives checked ('check list')	-0.3313	-0.3198
2. Self-criticality ratio ('check list')	-0.2906	-0.3215
3. Self-Ideal discrepancy (semantic differential)	-0.0815	-0.1003
Self Acceptance Indices		
1. Number of favourable adjectives checked ('check list')	+0.0782	+0.1247
2. Self acceptance ratio ('check list')	+0.2905	+0.3213
3. Self approval index ('check list')	+0.1778	+0.2063
4. "Self" evaluation (semantic differential)	+0.2707	+0.3006
5. "Ideal self" (semantic differential)	+0.3244	+0.3485

(coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level of confidence where $r = 0.181$; or significant at the 0.05 level where $r = 0.138$).

2. The 'self-esteem' factors

The factor analysis of the 39 principal variables, derived from all the measures used in this study, produces three factors that are related to self-esteem and self-evaluation. These are rotated factors. They are the second, fourth, and fifth factors.

(a) The Second factor

This was evidently a comprehensive 'self-esteem' factor. The positive loadings were related to favourable self evaluation and the negative loadings were related to unfavourable self-evaluation.

<u>loadings</u>	<u>self-evaluative measure</u>
+0.91157	self-acceptance ratio (check list)
+0.79661	"self" (semantic differential)
+0.55960	self-approval index (check list)
+0.48704	social desirability scale
+0.46726	"ideal self" (semantic differential)
-0.91159	self-criticality ratio (check list)
-0.86982	number of unfavourable adjectives checked (check list)
-0.61872	"self-ideal" discrepancy (semantic differential)
-0.59501	manifest anxiety
-0.54724	neuroticism .

'Manifest anxiety' and 'neuroticism' have higher loadings on this factor than on any other. It is significant that they do not, in this analysis, form a unique factor, but are negatively loaded on a factor of 'self-esteem'.

It can be construed from these factor loadings that high scores on the self-acceptance measures are indicative of proneness to give a favourable self-evaluation, whereas high scores on the 'self-critical' indices and measures of maladjustment are indications of the proneness to give an unfavourable self-evaluation.

The 'repressor', 'sensitiser' hypothesis might be applied here. Those who suppress a self-critical response might also be expected to suppress a response indicative of personal maladjustment, insecurity, and failure. The assumption here is that it is 'desirable' for individuals to be 'self-confident', 'well-integrated', with a likeable, mature, personality. Feelings of anxiety and irrational fears one presumes to be 'undesirable' and unlikely to create a good impression in others. 'Sensitisers', on the other hand are those who like to talk about their failures and worries and may even exaggerate their 'negative' feelings. In so doing they may hope to gain some sympathy or support. Sensitisers appear to be 'dissatisfied' with themselves and generally appear to adopt a basically intrapunitive self-attitude. (Altrocchi: 16). This hypothesis may explain the relationship between 'self-esteem' and the self-assessment measures of anxiety and neuroticism. This relationship is shown in Table II where the comparisons are tested on the strength of the coefficient of correlation.

Thus the self-esteem variable is shown in this analysis to be closely linked to the self-assessment of 'anxiety' and 'neuroticism'.

The alternative to a hypothesis similar to the 'Repressor, sensitiser' hypothesis would be that the absence of anxiety and neuroticism would leave

Table II

Self-evaluation measure	Manifest Anxiety	Neuroticism
Self-criticality (Adjective check list)	+0.5154	+0.4870
Self-ideal discrepancy (semantic differential)	+0.4708	+0.4077
Self-acceptance ratio (check list)	-0.5155	-0.4869
Self-approval index (check list)	-0.3377	-0.3757
'Self' rating (semantic)	-0.5153	-0.4750
'Ideal self' (semantic)	-0.2245	-0.2447
Social desirability scale	-0.3074	-0.4384

All coefficients are significant at the 1% level of confidence (n = 202)

the individual as a self-satisfied, confident, person. Thus one would expect an individual who scores low on measures of maladjustment to be self-accepting. However, counter to this hypothesis, is the result indicating that 'social desirability' is strongly negatively related to the measures of maladjustment used in this research. So whilst it may seem reasonable to suppose that anxiety and insecurity do help to reduce self-esteem and self-acceptance, this research rather emphasises that those respondents manifesting a positive and favourable self-attitude are also biased to manifest a 'well-adjusted' self-assessment.

(b) The Fourth factor

This consists entirely of measures derived from the adjective check list, and appears to relate most strongly to the readiness of respondents to check as many adjectives as possible - particularly the 'favourable ones'. This degree of responsivity suggests a certain disregard for a 'thoughtful' self-criticism and self-assessment. In the self-assessment of many of the Christian respondents, they check an extraordinarily high proportion of 'favourable' adjectives. As, however, this factor is related to the adjective check list results, the number of 'unfavourable adjectives' checked is also a variable positively loaded on this factor.

fourth factor loadingsvariable

+0.96374	The total number of adjectives checked.
+0.94660	The number of favourable adjectives checked.
+0.38866	The number of unfavourable adjectives checked.
-0.94679	The number of favourable adjectives not responded to.
-0.38866	The number of unfavourable adjectives not responded to.

(c) The Sixth factor

The variables loaded on this factor are measures derived from the Semantic Differential. The factor is particularly related to the concepts of the "ideal self" and the 'self-ideal' discrepancy score.

<u>Loadings</u>	<u>Variable</u>
-0.77551	self-attitude points
+0.59509	"ideal self" rating
+0.55913	self-ideal discrepancy

The variable "self-attitude points" represents for each respondent the number of descriptive scales on which he gives an identical rating for "self" and "ideal self". This variable is thus a measure of 'self-satisfaction' and is inversely related to the self-ideal discrepancy score: $r = -0.56$. High scores on the "self-ideal discrepancy variable" indicate a lack of congruence between the evaluation of 'self' and the awareness of the 'ideal'.

3. Comparisons between sub-groups on measures of self-evaluation

(a) The Semantic Differential analysis

A "self" rating was devised for each subject on the basis of summing their scale positions over the 23 descriptive scales associated with this "self" concept. This produced mean ratings for the various Christian and 'non-Christian sub-groups - as shown below.

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean total positive rating</u>
Dogmatic nonconformist	34.07
Roman Catholic	29.85
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	29.00
Dogmatic Anglican	27.76

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>mean total positive rating</u>
Control group	20.71
"Anti-Christian" control	19.89
Non-dogmatic Anglican	19.24

The Christian sample (mean rating: 29.23) scored significantly differently from the control group (mean rating: 20.71). The disparity in scores was significant at the 0.01 level of confidence ($t = 3.6576$, degrees of freedom = 200). A high score on this measure is equated with high "self-acceptance" and a highly favourable "self-evaluation". This is particularly so for the dogmatic nonconformist sub-group which scores significantly higher than both the Anglican groups. Compared with the dogmatic Anglican group: $t = 2.0996$ (72 degrees of freedom); which is statistically significant ($p = 0.05$); compared with the non-dogmatic Anglican group: $t = 3.4442$ (56 degrees of freedom) and $p = 0.01$, which is quite significant. All the Christian sub-groups except the non-dogmatic Anglican group, evaluate themselves more highly than the control groups and all these comparisons are also statistically significant. So this is an indication of the comparative disparity, between the manifestation of self-esteem, of the Christian and non-Christian groups.

The "ideal self" rating was compiled in the same way as the "self" rating producing the following mean ratings for the sub-groups:

	<u>mean rating</u>
Dogmatic nonconformist	58.59
Dogmatic Anglican	56.15
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	55.83
Roman Catholic	55.65
Non-dogmatic Anglican	50.18
Control	49.23
Anti-Christian control	48.44

These "ideal self" ratings actually correlated rather strongly with the "self" ratings of the respondents ($r = 0.57$). In other words the higher the "self" rating, the higher the "ideal self" rating and vice versa. "What one is" can be associated with "what one would like to be" - and one's 'ideals' are likely to be reflected in 'self'-evaluation as one strives to become what as yet one is not. Considering the sub-groups on this concept above - the dogmatic nonconformist group again scores highest. In fact there is a significant positive relationship between scores on the measure of dogmatic Christian belief and scores on this concept: $r = 0.32$. There is also a correlation between this concept and 'moralism' (guilt potential) of $r = 0.36$. Moral idealism is thus seen to be associated, by the respondents response choices, with 'general' idealism. On this 'ideal self' concept all the Christian groups except the 'non-dogmatic Anglican' group score significantly higher than the non-Christian groups.

The responses to these two concepts of "self" and "ideal-self", provide the basis for calculating each respondent's 'self-ideal' discrepancy index. This, as has been explained elsewhere (Chapter 9, section 1) is based on Osgood's " D_{il} " formula. It is regarded as an estimation of disparity between "what one is" and "what one would like to be". As such, it is an index of 'self-dissatisfaction' and 'self-criticality'. The "mean" self-ideal discrepancies for the various sub-groups are tabulated below. A degree of moderation in assessing these results is necessary because of wide within-group differences - clearly the "mean" group scores are not as meaningful as the individual subject scores. They are, however, of some interest in comparisons among the various sub-groups.

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>self-ideal discrepancy</u>
Non-dogmatic Anglican	8.9405
Anti-Christian control	8.3129
Control	8.2161
Dogmatic Anglican	7.8914
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	7.4607
Roman Catholic	7.3833
Dogmatic nonconformist	7.0225

The main result from this analysis is that the dogmatic nonconformist group again scores very low on a measure implying self-criticism and dissatisfaction with 'self'. The only statistically significant difference is between this sub-group and the non-dogmatic Anglican sub-group which

consistently scores least on self-acceptance and highest on self-criticality and self-recrimination. The principal component of disparity between these two sub-groups is that whereas the dogmatic nonconformist group claims to possess a rigid, secure belief system and self-satisfaction, the non-dogmatic Anglican group does not. The latter sub-group is more introspective and far less assured in terms of their Christian faith, so their 'self' and 'belief' concepts are rather less integrated. They thus give "the impression" of being more 'maladjusted' than the other sub-groups (where "adjustment" is demonstrated by the level of "self-acceptance").

On only three of the 23 descriptive scales did the Christian group show a significantly greater "self-ideal discrepancy" than the non-Christian group. These results are shown in Table III.

Table III

scale	mean self-ideal discrepancy	
	Christian	non-Christian
1. Moral-immoral	0.9	0.5
2. Good-bad	1.4	1.0
3. Righteous-sinful	2.1	0.8
	(average response category difference)	

Of course, these three scales, especially the last one, are rather more meaningful perhaps for the Christian group than for the non-Christian group.

Nevertheless, this result, taken in conjunction with other results, shows that there is a great deal of difference between a Christian's cognitions of this sort of 'self-ideal' discrepancy - and his feelings or emotions about it. For instance, the whole of the dogmatic nonconformist group admit to being "far from the sort of person they ought to be" - yet this admission, apparently, is completely dissociated from any emotions of fear and guilt or self-criticism. It may be that "self-acceptance" and ideas of 'forgiveness' and 'acceptance by God' are the counterbalancing cognitions to the cognition of sinfulness and shortcoming. Thus for some Christians - admissions of sinfulness and shortcomings are not contingent upon feelings of self-recrimination - they merely refer to an accepted condition or state.

On six of the 23 descriptive scales the Christian group scored rather less "self-ideal" discrepancy than the 'non-Christian' group. (Table IV). The greatest difference between the Christian and non-Christian groups is clearly that on the "complete-incomplete" scale. If the disparity between the two groups on these scales is a "real" rather than a "contrived" one, it would be an indication of the "integrative" function of Christian belief. (The bracketed figures in Table IV, below, are the equivalent "self-ideal" discrepancies of the dogmatic-nonconformist group).

(b) The adjective check list analysis

This produced two principal measures: the self-criticality ratio and the 'self-acceptance' ratio. For each respondent the sum of these two ratios should equal unity, or 100 in terms of percentages. Table V contrasts the scores of the various sub-groups on these measures, the mean number of

Table IV

scale	mean 'self-ideal' discrepancies		
	Christian	(dogmatic nonconformist group)	Non-Christian
1. Complete - Incomplete	1.4	(1.3)	2.3
2. Successful - Unsuccessful	1.0	(0.9)	1.7
3. Optimistic - Pessimistic	0.5	(0.6)	1.0
4. Happy - Sad	0.8	(0.4)	1.3
5. Active - Passive	0.8	(0.8)	1.3
6. Calm - Nervous	1.9	(1.7)	2.3
	(average response category difference)		

favourable or unfavourable adjectives checked are also included.

The results in Table V show that the critical difference between the sub-groups is a function of the number of unfavourable adjectives checked by the respondents. The control group, for instance, checks nearly twice as many unfavourable adjectives as are checked by the 'nonconformists'. The majority of Christians in this sample do not make an unfavourable or negatively evaluative self-assessment. This may be because Christians cannot apply many of the 'unfavourable' adjectives to themselves. They are

Table V

sub-group	mean number of favourable adjectives checked	self-acceptance ratio %	mean number of unfavourable adjectives checked	self-criticality ratio %
1. Dogmatic nonconformist	49.7	79.6	12.4	20.4
2. Non-dogmatic nonconformist	39.2	77.5	10.3	22.5
3. Dogmatic Anglican	46.7	76.4	14.1	23.6
4. Roman Catholic	47.8	73.0	16.9	27.0
5. Control Group	43.1	66.7	21.9	33.3
6. 'Anti'-Christian control	43.9	63.4	25.2	36.6
7. Non-dogmatic Anglican	41.9	62.1	25.8	37.9

either giving an honest and reliable assessment as objectively as possible or they are responding in a manner which accords with their conception of the 'expectations' of others. Thus many of the Christians in the sample could be, albeit inadvertently, giving a 'favourable' rather than a 'frank' self-assessment.

The difference between the Christian and non-Christian groups is underlined by the following comparison, in Table VI, of the twenty (unfavourable) adjectives which show the most differentiation between the Christian group and the non-Christian control group.

Many of the adjectives listed in Table VI would be 'taboo' to Christian ministerial students such as: "aimless, stingy, fickle, aloof, insecure, apathetic, greedy, confused," - and so on. These may be more tolerable in society generally. Nearly half of the non-Christian group indicate that they are 'insecure' and 'dissatisfied' - compared with the percentages for the Christian group of 16 and 18 respectively. It is questionable whether such differences can be explained away, simply in terms of the disparate need for social approval between the two groups. The difference between the self-criticality ratios of the Christian and the control groups was, as might be expected, quite significant: $t = 3.34$ (with 200 df), which is significant at the 1% level of confidence. There were also some significant differences within the Christian sample especially between nonconformist sub-groups and sacramentalist sub-groups. The difference between the Roman Catholic sub-group and the non-dogmatic nonconformist sub-group was significant at the 5% level of confidence: $t = 2.59$ (with 61 df). Also the

Table VI

adjective	% of Christian group checking the adjective (n = 154)	% of non-Christian group checking the adjective (n = 48)
1. Aimless	1	20
2. Hostile	3	18
3. Unbalanced	3	16
4. Empty	3	14
5. Stingy	4	20
6. Fickle	3	14
7. Lethargic	7	24
8. Aloof	5	18
9. Insecure	16	48
10. Failure	5	16
11. Careless	14	38
12. Dissatisfied	18	48
13. Apathetic	9	24
14. Greedy	10	26
15. Confused	15	38
16. Immature	13	28
17. Cynical	31	56
18. Restless	28	48
19. Lazy	27	46
20. Moody	27	46
(nearest whole number)		

difference between the Roman Catholic sub-group and the dogmatic nonconformist group was again significant at the 5% level: $t = 2.02$ (with 79 df).

Thus it seems that the sacramentalists are rather more self-critical than the other groups - with the exception of the dogmatic Anglican group which scores rather more closely to the scores of the nonconformist sub-groups.

(c) The measures of maladjustment

Considering the link found between the 'self-esteem' responses and scores on the measures of maladjustment, it would be interesting to see which Christian sub-groups scored lowest on the measures of maladjustment. Results from the correlation matrix suggest that Christian religious belief is negatively related to manifest anxiety and neuroticism, the coefficients of correlation being: $r = -0.18$ ($0.05 > p > 0.01$), and $r = -0.27$ ($0.01 > p > 0.001$) respectively.

The average scores on the measures of maladjustment are shown below:

<u>sub-group</u>	<u>Mean Neuroticism score</u>	<u>Mean 'Anxiety' score</u>
Control group	13.6	17.5
Nondogmatic Anglican	12.8	19.2
Roman Catholic	12.0	17.1
Dogmatic Anglican	10.9	14.4
Dogmatic nonconformist	9.6	12.1
Non-dogmatic nonconformist	8.6	11.5

The difference between the Christian group's mean scores and those of the 'control group' is significant for both comparisons: for the neuroticism variable: $t = 4.1$ (200 df) which is significant at the 1% level of confidence. For the manifest anxiety variable: $t = 2.2$ (200 df) which is significant at the 5% level of confidence. Other significant differences in scores exist between the nonconformist and the sacramentalist groups.

The results previous to this have already indicated the high 'self-acceptance' of the nonconformist groups and this is reflected in their low scores on the measures of maladjustment.

Conclusions

The Christian sub-groups certainly score higher on measures of self-esteem than the non-Christian sub-groups. Thus Hypotheses 6(c) and 6(e) are confirmed. Hypothesis 5(c) is largely supported - that the sacramentalist groups, as compared with other Christian groups, will score lower in 'self-esteem'. These two hypotheses are supported by results from the 'semantic differential' and 'adjective check list measures'.

The most striking differentiation in the respondent groups is found in the comparison between the nonconformist group and the others. The nonconformists appear to score highest in 'self-esteem' and, conversely, lowest of the groups in 'self-criticality'. This differentiation among the groups is illustrated in Table VII, where comparisons are made of the proportion of the respondent groups who rate in the 'high' self-criticality categories. ('High' is a relative term and here refers to a score of greater than 9.0, D_{11} ; or $> 26\%$ for the self-criticality ratio).

Table VII

Group	Categories	
	"High" self-ideal discrepancy (>9.0 , D_{il})	"High" self- criticality ratio ($>26.0\%$)
(n)	(n)	(n)
1. Nonconformist (64)	0.20 (13)	0.27 (17)
2. Sacramentalist (90)	0.30 (27)	0.43 (39)
3. Control Group (48)	0.35 (17)	0.67 (32)

(proportion of group responding)
maximum = 1.00

From the results shown in Table VII it may be concluded that either the nonconformist group is suppressing self-criticism to a remarkable extent, or it is genuinely more self-accepting than the other groups. To what extent this is a 'defensive' response will be considered in the next chapter.

The hypothesised positive correlation between Christian religious belief and self-esteem (Hypothesis 3a), and the hypothesised negative correlation with the measures of self-criticism (Hypothesis 3b) are also supported by the results in this chapter. One could summarise these results by stating that in spite of higher manifestations of 'potential', or anticipated, guilt feelings and of 'constructive' guilt feelings among the Christian respondents, there is a strong association between the variables of Christian religious belief and self-acceptance. To what extent the

respondents give a 'falsely' favourable response, and whether there are any differences between the groups on the measure of 'social desirability', will be considered in Chapter 10.

4. Self-evaluation and feelings of guilt

(a) Linear relationships

Nicholas (167) hypothesised a significant negative relationship between guilt scores and self-acceptance scores, which was largely confirmed by his researches. He also specified a significant positive relationship between 'self-ideal' discrepancy and guilt feelings - which was not sustained. Bethlehem (31), however, did find a significant positive relationship, in this latter comparison, which confirmed results obtained by Achenbach and Zigler (1). The results from this present research also support those of Achenbach and Bethlehem - in so far as the measures of guilt used refer to 'proneness' to feelings of guilt. When 'guilt-potential' measures are involved the results are rather different. In Table I, subcategories of the 'guilt potential' measure are compared with measures of self-acceptance and self-criticality.

The results in Table I show that 'guilt potential' measures tend to be 'positively', rather than 'negatively', related to self-acceptance scores. The 'guilt potential' measure relates to the concept of 'moralism' vis-a-vis strict moral standards reinforced by the expectation of guilt upon the infringement of the moral laws. For those respondents to whom violation of moral codes is an anathema it is desirable to express their stringency of conscience.

Table I

sub-category (anticipated guilt questionnaire)	self-criticality ratio	discrepancy scores (OSD)	self- acceptance	"self" rating (OSD)
	(r)	(r)	(r)	(r)
1. Total score	-0.20	+0.01	+0.20	+0.22
2. 'Aggression'	-0.17	+0.02	+0.17	+0.16
3. 'Sex'	-0.10	+0.04	+0.10	+0.15
4. 'Stealing'	-0.13	+0.03	+0.13	+0.14
5. 'Cheating'	-0.19	+0.02	+0.19	+0.12
6. Drinking, gambling.	-0.19	-0.05	+0.19	+0.19

($r > 0.18, = 0.01 > p > 0.001$; $r > 0.14, = 0.05 > p > 0.01$), ($df = 200$)

From previously obtained results (Chapter Seven) it is known that those who have strict moral standards are likely to be the more 'dogmatic' Christians, who are very 'self-accepting' and who regard strict moral control of behaviour as desirable. Therefore, many of the respondents who give a very favourable impression may feel they are enhancing this impression by intensifying their reaction to the thought of violating their moral standards. These results are rather different from those obtained with the 'manifest guilt' questionnaire. Some of these comparisons are shown in Table II.

Table II

sub-categories (manifest guilt questionnaire)	Self- criticality ratio	self-ideal discrepancy (OSD)	self- acceptance ratio	'self' rating (OSD)
	(r)	(r)	(r)	(r)
1. Total score	+0.10	+0.23	-0.10	-0.13
2. "Falling short of standards"	+0.10	+0.17	-0.10	-0.12
3. Remorse	+0.26	+0.30	-0.26	-0.25
4. 'Destructive' guilt	+0.18	+0.27	-0.18	-0.22
(r > 0.18, = 0.01 > p > 0.001; r > 0.14, = 0.05 > p > 0.01) (df = 200)				

These results confirm Nicholas' hypothesis of a significant negative relationship between guilt scores and self-acceptance scores - so long as

the guilt scores relate to proneness to self-recrimination. The coefficient for the regression of self-acceptance measures on the 'remorse' sub-category is -0.25 (for the self-acceptance ratio) and -0.26 (for the 'self' rating) - both these coefficients are significant at the 1% level of confidence. With the 'destructive' guilt category the coefficients are slightly less -0.18 (with the self-acceptance ratio) and -0.22 (for the 'self' rating). Again, both these coefficients are significant at the 1% level of confidence. The results also confirm Bethlehem's finding of a significant positive relationship between 'self-ideal' discrepancy and guilt proneness. The coefficients for this comparison are $+0.305$ with the 'remorse' category and $+0.270$ with the 'destructive' guilt category. Guilt proneness is thus shown to be positively linearly related with self-criticism and the 'self-ideal' discrepancy. Additional confirmation of the results involving the 'remorse' and 'destructive' guilt categories is given by the regressions of self-criticism and 'self-ideal' discrepancy on Factor '9' - the 'morbid guilt' factor that is produced by factor analysing the manifest guilt questionnaire statements. The coefficient of correlation between scores on this factor and 'self-ideal' discrepancy scores is $+0.401$, and a comparison with 'self-criticality' ratios yields a coefficient of $+0.382$. The table below summarises the comparisons of three measures of self-recrimination (proneness to guilt feelings) with the two measures of self-criticism.

There is thus clear confirmation of a linear relationship between self-criticism and self-recrimination, and between 'self-ideal' discrepancy and self-recrimination. A point worth noting here is that the coefficient of

correlation for the regression of self-criticism on 'self-ideal' discrepancy scores is +0.602.


<u>self-recrimination measure</u>	<u>'self-criticality' ratio</u>	<u>'self-ideal' discrepancy</u>
1. "Remorse"	+0.26	+0.30
2. "Destructive" guilt	+0.182	+0.27
3. Morbid guilt feelings (Factor 9)	+0.38	+0.40

All these coefficients are significant at the 1% level of confidence (df = 200)

(b) Curvilinear relationships

Bethlehem (31) has suggested, in his first hypothesis, that there is a curvilinear relationship between 'discrepancy' scores and guilt. He noted that people with a high self-ideal discrepancy could intuitively be expected to feel guilty just for failing to match their concept of the ideal, on the other hand, people who see themselves as close to this ideal are likely, again intuitively, to be able to maintain this position only "by the exercise of considerable effort" - a likely 'goad' to which is guilt. Freud hints at such a relationship suggesting that good conduct reflects a strong superego and thus more guilt. Persons in the middle areas of discrepancy scores are likely to be comparatively complacent - which would reflect in a low average of guilt. Bethlehem found confirmation for this hypothesis. Block and Thomas (38) found that both high and low

self-ideal discrepancy scores relate to maladjustment and personality disorders - so a measure of morbid guilt feeling should also show a curvilinear regression on self-ideal discrepancy scores. Bethlehem also found a linear component - which in fact he had not predicted. This linear component, as this study shows, is quite large. The linear component is explained by Bethlehem by applying Altrocchi's (16) sensitiser/repressor hypothesis. 'Sensitisers' who appear on the face of it to be more guilt-prone, have comparatively high discrepancies, but repressors have low discrepancies. A schematic representation of the linear and curvilinear hypotheses is show below:



In order to test for the curvilinear component, various measures of guilt feeling are compared with 'self-ideal' discrepancy scores and with the 'self-criticality ratio'. The 'self-criticality' and 'discrepancy' variables have much in common. Both are measures of the extent of favourable or unfavourable self-evaluation. They intercorrelate quite highly, the coefficient being: $r = 0.602$ ($df = 200$). It will be recalled that the measure of 'self-criticality' is derived from the adjective check list which contains equal numbers of both: favourable and unfavourable self-descriptions. So, in effect, the response of the subject is a choice of a ratio of favourable to unfavourable descriptions. To some extent this occurs with the semantic differential construct. Each decision by the respondent is based on a consideration of positive and negative valences implicit in the semantic differential scale. The ultimate response is thus a ratio of: 'good to bad', and 'desirable to undesirable'.

However, discrepancy scores indicate a relationship between two responses on identical pairs of scales presented separately with a time lapse between the two presentations (the instructions vary of course, as the 'concept' changes). Consequently one might expect the 'discrepancy' scores to be less accessible to response manipulation by the subjects. In spite of this possibility there is a correlation coefficient of: $r = 0.738$ ($df = 200$) for the comparison of the 'self' rating on the semantic differential construct with the self-acceptance ratio produced by the adjective check list.

The following comparisons were made between measures of guilt feeling and the two measures of self-criticality:

1. The manifest guilt score and self-criticality.
2. The 'constructive' guilt score and self-criticality.
3. The 'remorse' subcategory and self-criticality.
4. Morbid feelings of guilt (Factor 9) and self-criticality.

The last two comparisons mentioned above represent the general concept of 'self-recrimination' or proneness to feelings of guilt and intra-punitiveness.

(1) A comparison of the total manifest guilt score with the measures of self-criticality

a. With the Self-ideal discrepancy score

For the purpose of all these analyses the sample of 202 respondents was subdivided into the sacramentalist, nonconformist, and 'control' groups. Five categories of discrepancy scores were used as a 'baseline' reference:

<u>category</u>	<u>range of discrepancy scores</u>
1	0-4.99 (D_{il})
2	5-6.99 (D_{il})
3	7-8.99 (D_{il})
4	9-10.99 (D_{il})
5	11, and above (D_{il})

The comparison between the manifest guilt scores and the discrepancy categories is illustrated in Figure I.


Both the sacramentalist and control groups show a clear positive relationship between manifest guilt scores and discrepancy scores. For the control group the coefficient of correlation is $r = 0.363$ ($p = 0.01$), and for the sacramentalist group: $r = 0.206$ ($p = 0.05$). However, for the nonconformist group: $r = 0.190$, which with 62 degrees of freedom is not statistically significant. Further computation reveals that there is a nearly statistically significant nonlinear component in this latter instance: $F = 2.489$ (with 3, 59 degrees of freedom) which is just not significant at the 5% level of confidence. Neither of the other two groups show any kind of nonlinear component as the 'F ratios' are almost zero.

For the entire sample of 202 respondents there was a correlation of $r = 0.236$ between the manifest guilt scores and the discrepancy scores. This result and the graphical evidence suggests that the linear component is the most important one. There is rather more support, in this comparison, for Altrocchi's 'repressor-sensitiser' hypothesis than for a 'curvilinear component' hypothesis. Those respondents who repress feelings of guilt are also those who repress self-criticism and manifest low self-ideal discrepancy scores.

The nonlinearity in the nonconformist result is interesting. Those respondents in this group who score very high on 'discrepancy' scores, equally appear to score very high on the 'manifest guilt' measure. However, if the first and fifth categories of 'discrepancy' are omitted there is a

Ordinates for Figure I

<u>Category</u>	<u>control</u>	(n)	<u>sacramentalist</u>	(n)	<u>nonconformist</u>	(n)
1	12.0	(5)	19.9	(14)	17.6	(12)
2	14.6	(12)	21.1	(17)	19.7	(23)
3	17.9	(14)	20.7	(32)	17.7	(16)
4	17.7	(9)	23.3	(16)	15.3	(7)
5	18.9	(8)	25.7	(6)	25.7	(6)



negative correlation and trend between 'discrepancy' scores and manifest guilt. There is thus some evidence for 'nonlinearity'. The respondents with 'low' discrepancy scores (categories 1 and 2) show, on average, more feelings of guilt than the respondents with 'moderate' discrepancy scores (categories 3 and 4). Reference to Figure I also shows that the respondents in category 5 score highest of all on the guilt measure. The other two groups show a rather more straightforward positive and linear relationship.

b. With the self-criticality ratio

Five categories of self-criticality are used for the baseline reference:


<u>category</u>	<u>range of the self-criticality ratios</u>
1	0-10%
2	11-20%
3	21-30%
4	31-40%
5	41% and above

In this comparison there is no known significant positive correlation between the self-criticality ratio and the guilt measure. The correlation coefficients are: $r = 0.21$, for the control group ($n = 48$); $r = 0.10$, for the nonconformist group ($n = 64$); and $r = 0.10$, for the sacramentalist group, ($n = 90$). None of these are significant.

Figure II shows a certain degree of nonlinearity in this comparison. Statistically, however, there is no significant curvilinearity. The 'wild'

Ordinates for Figure 11

Category	control (n)	sacramentalist (n)	nonconformist (n)
1	15.0 (2)	19.0 (11)	19.4 (16)
2	19.0 (8)	22.2 (24)	18.4 (18)
3	13.7 (13)	21.1 (21)	19.1 (19)
4	16.7 (10)	22.3 (18)	22.0 (7)
5	19.6 (15)	22.2 (16)	19.0 (4)



fluctuations in a graph are not necessarily evidence of curvilinearity. The graph is dependent on the particular base line categories which are chosen arbitrarily. However, the statistic used to assess the extent of nonlinearity (see Guilford (113) p.308f) takes into account such factors as the unequal distribution of respondents in categories. If one category mean deviates greatly from the linear trend then this deviation only plays a significant part in the analysis if the proportion of respondents associated with the mean is comparatively high.

In this comparison, the largest nonlinear component was found with the control group. This produced an 'F' ratio of 1.91, with 3, 42 degrees of freedom. This was not statistically significant.

These two comparisons (a) and (b) both show a more or less positive correlation between the manifest guilt score, i.e. the sum of the affirmations to the items on the manifest guilt questionnaire, and the measures of self-criticality. This particular measure of guilt does not confirm that there is any curvilinear relationship. However, this measure of guilt is rather general and covers a variety of feelings associated with guilt. The following three sets of comparisons involve more specific types of guilt feeling.

(2) A comparison of the 'Constructive guilt' variable with the measures of self-criticality

a. With the self-ideal discrepancy score

This category is quite closely related to the 'anticipated guilt questionnaire' in that it is concerned with 'moral behaviour' and

contraventions of personal and specific moral standards. This category indicates whether or not feelings of guilt are encountered because of some violation, or thought of violation of moral standards. For example, these feelings of guilt might be associated with 'hostile' or 'sexual' impulses or generally with 'the loss of self-control'. The term 'constructive' is thus a value judgement, the operational assumption being that these feelings are a necessary, and common, aid to 'socialisation' and self-control. The word 'constructive' is used to differentiate these feelings from feelings relating to morbid preoccupations with guilt and sinfulness which are entirely 'destructive' in effect. The 'constructive guilt' category contains sixteen of the 41 questionnaire items.


Figure III shows the graphs for the three respondent groups over the five baseline categories already introduced.

Again, however, there is no statistically significant nonlinearity. The highest factor of nonlinearity occurs with the nonconformist group where $"F" = 1.12$ with: 3, 59 degrees of freedom. The most significant difference is without doubt the greater moral stringency manifested by the Christian groups.

It has been said that the 'constructive guilt' category is related in content to the 'anticipated guilt questionnaire'. Bethlehem's (31) guilt measure is similar in structure to the anticipated guilt questionnaire. Following up a study by Robinson and Argyle (181), Bethlehem produced a list of 32 items which might be guilt-provoking to students. These items consisted of such statements as 'boasting' and 'self-pity' about which

Ordinates for Figure 111

Category	control	(n)	sacramentalist	(n)	nonconformist	(n)
1	41.6	(5)	64.6	(14)	63.3	(12)
2	47.8	(12)	67.4	(17)	68.8	(23)
3	57.9	(14)	68.2	(32)	67.4	(16)
4	50.9	(9)	68.6	(16)	56.4	(7)
5	54.2	(8)	72.3	(11)	79.3	(6)



students sometimes feel guilty. He found a strong linear and curvilinear coefficient of regression between admission of guilt feelings and discrepancy scores. Though the content varies, the Bethlehem questionnaire, the anticipated guilt questionnaire, and the constructive guilt section of the manifest guilt questionnaire all claim to measure the censoriousness of the conscience in a variety of situations. Only Bethlehem's, however, purports to show significant curvilinearity.

b. With the self-criticality ratio

None of the nonlinear components are statistically significant and there are no significant coefficients of correlation between the 'constructive guilt' measure and the 'self-criticality' ratios.

Thus far the analysis does not confirm Bethlehem's finding of a significant nonlinear regression coefficient. The difference between the Christian and non-Christian groups on the measure of 'manifest guilt' is basically caused by the disparity in the scores on the 'constructive guilt' category. Christians are more morally stringent, but this, on the whole, does not appear to be associated with the amount of self-criticality or self-ideal discrepancy. There is no linear or curvilinear component of any significance. However, two measures of self-recrimination and proneness to feelings of guilt are now considered in this series of comparisons.


(3) A comparison of the 'remorse' category with the measures of self-criticality

a. With the discrepancy scores

The correlation matrix shows that there are strong linear

Ordinates for Figure IV

Category	control	(n)	sacramentalist	(n)	nonconformist	(n)
1	41.0	(2)	70.7	(11)	69.7	(16)
2	63.6	(8)	72.1	(24)	65.1	(18)
3	42.3	(13)	64.2	(21)	65.0	(19)
4	47.9	(10)	71.0	(18)	68.9	(7)
5	56.5	(15)	67.0	(16)	58.0	(4)




relationships between guilt proneness and self-ideal discrepancy scores. The coefficient for the comparison of these variables, where the guilt proneness factor is 'remorse' was: $r = 0.31$ ($df = 200$). High scores on the 'remorse' category represent a degree of dissatisfaction and regret which one might expect to be associated with a manifest discrepancy between the 'self' assessment and the concept of the 'ideal self'.

Figure V shows rather more clearly than the other comparisons that there is a positive and to some extent linear relationship between some feelings of guilt and the manifest self-ideal discrepancy. The 'ordinates' table shows that for each respondent group the highest average 'remorse' score coincides with the largest discrepancy category. In spite of the graphical representation of this comparison there was no evidence of a significant nonlinearity component in the results of the nonconformist group ($"F" = 0.65$, with 3, 59 degrees of freedom). Neither was the linear component of the regression significant in the case of the nonconformist group: $r = 0.17$ (with 62 df). Nevertheless the linear components were significant for the other two comparison groups at the 1% level of confidence. The coefficients of (linear) correlation were: 0.44 for the control group and 0.27 for the sacramentalist group.

Only in the case of the first two categories do both the Christian groups score higher on 'remorse' than the control group. In other words, those Christian respondents who evaluate themselves as close to their ideal appear to be rather more prone to feelings of remorse. This may be a function of the comparatively greater 'idealism' manifested by the Christian

Ordinates for Figure 1

Category	<u>control</u>	(n)	<u>sacramentalist</u>	(n)	<u>nonconformist</u>	(n)
1	14.3	(5)	27.6	(14)	27.4	(12)
2	21.5	(12)	30.3	(17)	27.4	(23)
3	42.9	(14)	32.6	(32)	26.8	(16)
4	36.5	(9)	45.6	(16)	24.5	(7)
5	46.5	(8)	46.8	(11)	40.5	(6)




respondents. For example, the mean 'ideal self' rating of the nonconformist group was 57.6 (Sum of semantic scale ratings) as compared with the control group's: 49.2 ($t' = 5.0$, with 87 degrees of freedom, $p = 0.01$). One might tentatively suggest that the reason for the disparity, in the 'remorse' scores for the first two discrepancy categories, is that Christians who try and live according to stringent ideals and values are more likely to be prone to feelings of sorrow and regret because of the inevitable mistakes and faults committed in the past. For those who try to live according to altruistic ideals and high moral standards one source of motivation can be the persevering intrapunitiveness of 'conscience' by way of the recall of past misdeeds. This recollection precipitates feelings of sorrow and regret commensurate with the estimated seriousness of the misdeed. In Bethlehem's words, this acts as a 'goad' to encourage good conduct and thus helps the individual to avoid repeating past wrongs. Many Christian groups emphasise the importance of penitance and contrition for wrongs committed so it is perhaps not so surprising that those Christians who report a low discrepancy between self and ideal-self also tend to manifest more feelings of 'remorse' than the control group.

b. With the self-criticality ratio.

The analysis of results has already shown that there is a significant positive correlation between 'remorse' and the self-criticality ratio: $r = 0.26$ ($p = 0.01$). The individual respondent groups show linear coefficients but the nonlinear component in each case is insignificant. Figure VI shows the graphical relationships.

Ordinates for Figure VI

Category	control	(n)	sacramentalist	(n)	nonconformist	(n)
1	28.5	(2)	23.8	(11)	21.7	(15)
2	30.3	(8)	36.1	(24)	25.6	(19)
3	26.2	(13)	33.4	(21)	27.8	(19)
4	37.2	(10)	39.7	(18)	40.9	(7)
5	40.1	(15)	45.6	(16)	25.0	(4)



The 'eta' coefficients and nonlinear components for the three groups are as follows: (For the calculation of 'eta' and the nonlinearity component see Guilford (113) p.308 f).

<u>group</u>	<u>'eta' coefficient</u>	<u>significance of nonlinear components</u>
Control	0.45	F = 1.4 (n = 48)
Sacramentalist	0.26	F = 0.0 (n = 90)
Nonconformist	0.27	F = 1.2 (n = 64)

In this comparison, as Figure VI shows, the difference between the groups is quite small, bearing in mind the unequal distribution of respondents indicated in the table of ordinates. As with the comparison involving the discrepancy categories the dominant trend is linear.

Thus far the results suggest that feelings of self-recrimination tend to be linearly and positively related to the manifestation of self-criticality.

(4) A comparison of the "Morbid guilt factor" (Factor 9) with the measures of self-criticality

a. With the discrepancy scores

The ninth factor produced by the factor analysis provides a measure of the extent of, and susceptibility to, rather extreme feelings of self-recrimination. Statements associated with this factor include expressions of morbid intrapunitiveness, and of anxiety because of guilt. As this measure of guilt expresses a rather distorted and excessive proneness to feelings of guilt, it to some extent represents a measure of


'maladjustment'. According to Block and Thomas (38) there is a curvilinear component in the relationship between maladjustment, personality disorders and self-ideal discrepancy scores. The term 'maladjustment' in relation to guilt feelings can be understood as inferring an excessive preoccupation with 'right and wrong' accompanied with morbid feelings of self-hate and anguish because of wrongs actually committed or thought to have been committed. It may be that these feelings are actually associated with 'over-adjustment' or 'over-socialisation' related to excessive and stringent upbringing by the parents and other authoritative influences.

It is not surprising that these feelings of guilt, outlined in the questionnaire statements, produce a strong linear correlation with the self-ideal discrepancy scores. Semantically, the morbid feelings are incompatible with any congruence between the 'self' and the 'ideal self'. The coefficient of correlation for the comparison of the 'morbid guilt' factor (F9) results and the discrepancy scores is: $r = 0.40$ ($df = 200$), which is significant at: 0.1% level of confidence.

Figure VII shows the direction of the linear relationship. What is particularly noticeable is the increase in the 'gradient' of the graphs for the higher discrepancy categories. This produces a 'semi-parabolic' configuration which approaches the 'abbreviated parabolic' form of Bethlehem's scattergram for the regression of guilt scores on discrepancy scores.

Ordinates for Figure 4.1

Category	<u>control</u>	(n)	<u>sacramentalist</u>	(n)	<u>nonconformist</u>	(n)
	%		%		%	
1	10.1	(5)	18.3	(14)	11.7	(12)
2	13.3	(12)	18.3	(17)	11.7	(23)
3	26.7	(14)	20.0	(32)	15.0	(16)
4	21.7	(9)	40.0	(16)	10.2	(7)
5	50.0	(8)	45.0	(11)	30.0	(6)
mean percentage affirmations						



Below are listed the 'eta' coefficients and nonlinear components for the three respondent groups:

	<u>'eta' coefficients</u>	<u>significance of nonlinear components</u>
Control (n = 48)	0.55	F = 0.85 (all not
Sacramentalist (n = 90)	0.26	F = 2.30 (significant
Nonconformist (n = 64)	0.31	F = 1.14 (at the 5%
		(level of
		(confidence

The nonlinear component of the sacramentalist group results is not far from significance (For significance at the 5% level of confidence 'F' should be: 2.70). This implies that there was some degree of curvilinearity in the regression, for this respondent group alone. Basically, however, the more significant trend is again linear as is indicated by the correlation coefficients and graphical representation (Figure VII). Bethlehem has already claimed to have found a strong linear component in the regression of scores relating to feelings of guilt on discrepancy scores, but there is here no confirmation of his impressive nonlinear component.

b. With the self-criticality ratio

The correlation coefficient for this comparison was 0.38 (n = 202) and confirms the preceding analysis that there is a strong linear relationship between the self-criticality measures and proneness to morbid feelings of guilt. Figure VIII confirms visually the linear and positive trends.

Ordinates for Figure VIII

Category	control	(n)	sacramentalist	(n)	nonconformist	(n)
1	16.7	(2)	10.0	(11)	10.4	(16)
2	12.5	(8)	25.0	(24)	10.5	(19)
3	12.8	(13)	25.4	(21)	14.9	(19)
4	30.0	(10)	26.9	(18)	16.7	(7)
5	36.6	(15)	41.7	(16)	29.2	(4)

mean percentage affirmations




Figure VIII shows the pronounced linearity in the comparison. The relevant 'eta' coefficients and nonlinear components were as follows:

<u>group (n)</u>	<u>'eta' coefficients</u>	<u>significance of nonlinear components</u>
Control (48)	0.60	F = 1.7
Sacramentalist (90)	0.30	F = 1.8
Nonconformist (64)	0.28	F = 0.1

{ not
significant }

Yet again there is little evidence to suggest that those respondents with low self-ideal discrepancies are more prone to feelings of guilt than those respondents with moderate self-ideal discrepancies.

5. Summary of results obtained and conclusions

(a) The comparison between measures of guilt feelings and self-criticality

These comparisons did not show any significant curvilinear component. The linearity in the comparisons increased as the measure of guilt, used as a comparison variable, expressed more morbid and self-recriminating feelings. 'Constructive' guilt, or the expectation of self-mediated punishment for the contravention of codes of conduct, did not appear to be related to self-criticality. There was some evidence for high self-acceptance to be related to high guilt potential. The link between these two variables may be that moral idealism, for Christians, is associated in their responses with self-satisfaction and self-acceptance. In this case the 'constructive' guilt feelings relate to the concept of

'negative reinforcement' rather than the concept of 'punishment' and self-recrimination.

Persistent self-condemnation has a 'destructive' rather than a 'constructive' effect. Thus the discrepancy scores and the self-criticality scores are affected accordingly. In this latter case there is overwhelming evidence for a linear rather than a nonlinear regression.


(b) Guilt potential and self-evaluation

For the Christian group, the 'inhibiting' or 'controlling' aspects of moralism are rather more closely associated with the concept of the 'ideal' than is the case for the control group. The comparisons between the Christian and control groups on the 'constructive guilt' category of the manifest guilt questionnaire also show a similar disparity in their results as is shown in section 4 (II) of this chapter. Figure IX shows the comparison between scores from the 'guilt potential' measure (the anticipated guilt questionnaire) and the discrepancy scores.

The figure shows that, for the control group, relatively high guilt potential scores correspond with the 'large discrepancy' category which is an index of self-dissatisfaction. Low guilt potential scores relate to the 'small discrepancy' category. For the 'non-Christian' there is some hint that a lack of moral inhibition is associated with a small discrepancy between the 'self' and the 'ideal-self'. For the Christian groups, depending on the degree of the acceptability and desirability of a morally stringent conscience, so there is a negative function relating guilt-potential and discrepancy scores. In this case high guilt-potential ratings

Ordinates for Figure 1a

<u>range (D_{il})</u>	<u>category</u>	<u>control</u> (n)	<u>sacramentalist</u> (n)	<u>nonconformist</u> (n)
0-6.9	1	42.2 (17)	56.6 (31)	68.7 (35)
7-10.9	2	46.0 (23)	59.7 (48)	63.2 (23)
11 and above	3	49.5 (8)	54.9 (11)	68.0 (6)
		(means)		



are more definitely associated with the 'low', 'self-satisfied', category of discrepancy.

(c) Guilt proneness and self-evaluation

These comparisons have shown a much closer similarity between the scores of the Christian and control groups. Also there is a rather stronger linear relationship between these measures of guilt and the measures of self-criticality.

Figure X shows the plots for the entire sample relating the variables of 'remorse' and 'morbid guilt' to the categories of self-ideal discrepancy.


It may be reasonable to assume that, excepting the case of some kind of moral and religious masochism, feelings of 'remorse' and persisting feelings of anguish and morbidity, act to diminish, and ultimately exclude, feelings of self-acceptance and self-esteem. Results suggest that, whereas it may be possible to sustain a high level of self-acceptance - whilst manifesting a very stringent conscience (high guilt potential), one cannot be both self-accepting and self-punishing at the same time.

The greater the 'sensitisation' of feelings of guilt, the greater is the self-critical nature of the self-assessment.

The results, taken at face value, would appear to suggest the conclusions that a stringent system of moral attitudes and inhibitions is not associated with a 'negative' or 'condemning' self-attitude. The reverse, in fact, appears to be the case - especially with the Christian respondent

Ordinates for Figure 1

Categories (Discrepancy)	variables	
	<u>Remorse</u> (n = 202)	<u>Morbid guilt</u> (n = 202)
1	25.4 (31)	14.4 (31)
2	27.0 (52)	14.2 (52)
3	33.4 (62)	20.2 (62)
4	38.4 (32)	28.3 (32)
5	45.2 (25)	43.0 (25)
mean percentage affirmations		



groups. It may be that stringent controls of behaviour enable the individual to avoid self-criticism and the condemnation of others - who might share his moralistic attitudes. Hence obedience to the Christian moral and ethical teaching, is an essential component, in the character and personality of the practising Christian - essential in that it provides a 'self-stability' through fostering 'self-acceptance'. Moral values are a vital part of Christian idealism, and 'self-control', in particular, is a virtue that should appertain to the concept of the 'model Christian'. For the Christian, this 'self-control' has both negative as well as positive propensities. The 'inhibitory potential', i.e. the negative aspect, involves obedience to the dictates of moral codes which may be restrictive and repressive. However, the positive aspects may compensate for this. Strict control of behaviour, as has already been remarked, may help the individual to avoid causing himself feelings of guilt and remorse. Also, the living of a 'moral' life as defined by religious teaching, may be self-satisfying intrinsically and may in turn create a feeling of 'goodness' and 'self-righteousness'. Thus for the orthodox Christian, 'self-esteem' would depend, very largely, on the acceptance of, and successful application of, the moral precepts of the Christian religion.

Understandably, inasmuch as 'self-esteem' and 'moralism' are important to the Christian, so both may be somewhat inflated as a way of ensuring that 'others' are given a favourable impression. Likewise feelings of guilt such as 'remorse' and 'morbid guilt feelings' may be denied. These aspects will be discussed at some length in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 10

The Social Desirability Variable

Chapter 10
The Social Desirability Variable

This variable describes the exaggeration of a 'favourable' orientation in an individual's self-assessment (cf. Edwards: 76). There are basically three types of response bias which might cause an individual to manifest a 'socially desirable' self-assessment. In the first case it may be that the individual is generally 'self-satisfied' and so his self-assessment is consequently a very favourable and positive one. Alternatively, the respondent may give a deliberately false self-evaluation so as to gain social approval. Another possibility is that the individual, inadvertently, gives a 'favourable self-assessment', for the reason that the majority of people 'need' social approval and so 'automatically' try to show themselves to the best advantage. This 'need' for social approval is regarded as a fundamental component in self-attitude by Marlowe and Crowne (66).

So it may be that those individuals, who are self-accepting within a group or community, may wish to appear socially acceptable to groups and communities peripheral to their own. Also, some people, and some communities may be rather more keen than others to give a favourable impression to those outside. In studies involving a degree of self-evaluation, therefore, one cannot rule out the existence of a factor of deception or suppression of self-criticism. 'Deception' may be too strong a word to use, since a truly objective and fair self-assessment independent of the known opinions and attitudes of others, would be an impossible task. A person may not be: "as he would like to be ideally",

but this does not always prevent an attempt on his part to give the impression that he is living in accordance with his ideals, i.e.: "as he would like to be". It may be, therefore, that the self-assessment that is given, resembles the 'ideal' rather more closely than the 'actual'. It is assumed that most people are concerned to be acceptable to their fellow beings. Those people who give a rather more overtly self-critical assessment presumably are less worried about appearing 'socially desirable or acceptable'.

The previous chapter contained some evidence to show that Christians, on average, record a higher rating for 'self-esteem' than 'non-Christians'. From their responses Christians appear to be more ('integrated', more 'mature', more 'well-behaved' and generally speaking more 'socially desirable'. It is conceivable that Christians, especially those undergoing ministerial training of one kind or another, might wish to give a favourable impression commensurate, as they see it, with their 'Christian status' and their present and future role as leaders and ministers in the churches. Also, one must take account of the fact that Christians are expected to live according to certain high moral and ethical standards. They are expected, and required, to show integrity, unselfishness, and many other such desirable and altruistic behaviours and character traits. Their training is supposed to emphasise the concepts of service and example within their vocation. One might conclude that Christians, and especially Christian ministers, 'must' give a good impression by living in accordance with their high standards and principles.

The danger here is that if Christians 'ought to' live in accordance with certain ideals and standards, then they may feel compelled to give the impression that they do, even though they may well have 'failed' in some ways to live up to these ideals. Thus the 'need' for one's behaviour to be socially approved may be associated with a rather 'defensive' self-assessment and with a rather exaggerated self-acceptance. Another problem may be that many Christians are striving to maintain codes of conduct and moral standards far beyond what is 'just acceptable' to society in general. This may enhance the 'self-righteousness' and 'self-acceptance' of the Christian respondent.

Contents

1. The Social Desirability Variable in Relation to other Measures.
2. The Social Desirability Factor.
3. Social Desirability and Feelings of Guilt.
4. Conclusions and Discussion.

1. The social desirability variable in relation to other measures

Crowne and Marlowe claim that the measure of social desirability they devised measures the 'need for social approval'. There is some controversy as to whether it precisely does measure this 'need'. However, it does at least seem a useful instrument for distinguishing between respondents who are giving a 'good impression' in order to create a favourable response from others, and respondents who do not seem so motivated.

The results in the following table suggest that the need to be socially approved is related to measures associated with Christian religious belief and practices. These relationships are statistically significant and show strong positive correlation coefficients between the religious variables and the social desirability variable. The social desirability variable also correlates positively and significantly with the various measures of self-esteem and negatively with the measures of self-criticism and maladjustment. A summary of the coefficients for some of these comparisons is shown in Table I.

The evidence certainly points to a relationship between self-evaluative responses and social desirability. Therefore the results from the self-evaluative measures, in part at least, reflect the respondent's need to represent themselves as 'socially desirable' by avoiding self-depreciative responses. However, the weighting that should be attached to this need for approval is an imponderable factor in the assessment of the self-evaluation results. Nevertheless the correlation analysis indicates that the social desirability measure cannot be regarded as inconsequential in the consideration of these results.

Table I

Comparison variable	coefficients of correlation with the social desirability measure
1. Self-acceptance ratio (adjective check list)	+ 0.456 (p < 0.01)
2. 'Self' rating (semantic differential)	+ 0.381 (p < 0.01)
3. Religious practices measure	+ 0.299 (p < 0.01)
4. Religious beliefs measure	+ 0.283 (p < 0.01)
5. Self-criticality ratio	- 0.456 (p < 0.01)
6. Neuroticism	- 0.438 (p < 0.01)
7. Self-ideal discrepancy	- 0.312 (p < 0.01)
8. Manifest anxiety (Taylor)	- 0.307 (p < 0.01)

(df = 200)

The social desirability scale does not correlate significantly with the manifest guilt questionnaire results in any way. The extent of affirmation to statements on this questionnaire is in no significant way related to the need for approval. Nor does the social desirability scale correlate with the 'ascetic guilt' category as measured by the 'anticipated guilt questionnaire'. There is, however, a positive linear relationship between social desirability and 'social guilt' potential, - that is - anticipated feelings of guilt for thoughtless behaviour or for violation of social codes relating to stealing, cheating, lying, and racialism. In this instance the coefficient of correlation is: $r = 0.331$. The correlation of social

desirability with the 'hostile guilt' category of the anticipated guilt questionnaire likewise produces a positive linear coefficient of $r = 0.352$.

As these guilt potential categories relate to aspects of 'social' morality one might well expect rather extreme scores on these to be related to 'social' desirability. The term 'social desirability' almost by definition implies the manifest acceptance of social mores. One obvious way to gain social approval would be for the respondent to give the impression that he was a 'moral' and 'honest' person. Hence the positive relationship of the social desirability and social guilt potential variables can be explained in part by certain common factors in their terms of reference.

2. The social desirability factor

This was the seventh factor produced by the rotated factor matrix of the 39 variables. (In all eight factors were isolated). There were just two 'above-criteria' loadings on this factor - these were the variables of 'social desirability' and the 'lie scale' scores from the 'Eysenck personality inventory'. This 'lie scale' could be termed an index of 'social desirability' since it measures the extent to which a respondent is attempting to give a favourable impression.

<u>loading</u>	<u>variable</u>
+0.82432	Eysenck: "Lie scale" (Form B)
+0.47613	Marlowe-Crowne : social desirability

It is worth noting the various significant coefficients of correlation

involving comparisons with the 'lie-scale' variable. Firstly, however, this variable does not correlate significantly with either the religious beliefs measure or the religious practices measure. The significant coefficients are indicated in Table II.

Table II


Comparison variable	Coefficient of correlation with the 'lie scale' variable	Statistical significance of correlation
1. Social desirability	+0.271	$p \leq 0.01$
2. Racialism (anticipated guilt)	+0.271	$p < 0.01$
3. 'Social' guilt (anticipated guilt)	+0.178	$p < 0.05$
4. 'Lying' (anticipated guilt)	+0.170	$p < 0.05$
5. 'Hostile' guilt (anticipated guilt)	+0.158	$p < 0.05$
6. Anticipated guilt (Total)	+0.148	$p < 0.05$
7. Stealing (anticipated guilt)	+0.139	$p < 0.05$
8. Sex guilt (manifest guilt)	+0.139	$p < 0.05$
9. Neuroticism	-0.140	$p < 0.05$

(df = 200)

To some extent, it would appear that high scoring on the anticipated guilt questionnaire represented an attempt by some respondents to appear socially desirable and acceptable. However, the correlation coefficients are not very large and the lie scale itself contains items similar in effect to some items on the 'anticipated guilt questionnaire' relating to 'losing one's temper', boasting, and lying. Nevertheless, one can conclude that one intrusive variable affecting scores from this questionnaire is probably the desire to give a 'favourable' self-report. This also seems to be so for the measures of self-criticism and maladjustment.

3. Social desirability and feelings of guilt.

The preceding analysis shows that overall, there is no significant linear coefficient for the regression of the 'social desirability' measure on the manifest guilt scores. This might be expected, bearing in mind Bethlehem's fourth hypothesis (31) to the effect that people with low and high levels of guilt feeling are likely to value the approval of others. Those with low levels of guilt feeling are 'well-adjusted' - is Bethlehem's point - and part of being 'well-adjusted' is to make oneself agreeable to others. Those with high levels of guilt feeling need the approval of others to make up for the comparative lack of self-approval. Persons who experience a moderate level of guilt are likely to have only a moderate or low need for approval from others. Bethlehem's results showed this predicted curvilinear relationship between need for approval and guilt feelings. Bethlehem's fourth hypothesis can be represented as follows:



In this present research, the author found that there was only a very insignificant linear correlation between social approval and guilt feelings ($r = 0.04$) which compares with Bethlehem's result ($r = 0.06$). However, the curvilinear component was not in every case similar to that discussed by Bethlehem. The following results compare the social desirability measure with four measures of guilt proneness: the total manifest guilt score, the constructive guilt category, the 'remorse' subcategory and the "Morbid guilt feeling" factor (Factor 9).

(a) Social desirability and manifest guilt

The baseline for this comparison consists of six categories of guilt scores. In this first comparison the categories are delineated as follows.

<u>category</u>	<u>Range of (raw) manifest guilt scores</u>
1. (low)	0-10
2.	11-15
3.	16-20
4.	21-25
5.	26-30
6. (High)	31 and above


The 'low' and 'high' categories each have a range of 10 points compared with a range of 5 points for each of the other four categories. The reason for this was that the number of respondents scoring either extremely low or extremely high on the manifest guilt questionnaire is very small. Thus the merging of two categories gives a somewhat clearer configuration.

Figure I shows that only the control group reveals something approaching the anticipated curvilinear trend. The coefficients of correlation for the comparison of manifest guilt scores and 'social-desirability' scores is: $r = 0.001$ ($n = 202$). However, there is indeed a significant nonlinear component. The 'F' ratio for the significance of the nonlinear component is: 2.9 (with 4,42 df) and the 'eta' coefficient in this calculation is 0.479. This nonlinearity is significant at the 5% level of confidence. The nonlinear components for the other two groups are near zero. For the non-conformist group in particular, social desirability scores are high across all the guilt categories. Social desirability appears to be more strongly related to religious belief than to the levels of manifest guilt. Perhaps

Ordinates for Figure 1

<u>category</u>	<u>control</u>	(n)	<u>sacramentalist</u>	(n)	<u>nonconformist</u>	(n)
1	10.5	(8)	10.5	(6)	13.8	(5)
2	10.4	(16)	13.4	(7)	13.1	(14)
3	7.2	(10)	13.3	(27)	13.7	(17)
4	11.6	(7)	12.1	(27)	14.3	(15)
5	11.5	(4)	11.9	(12)	14.1	(11)
6	9.3	(3)	13.0	(11)	12.5	(2)

social desirability scores



this is why only the predominantly 'non-Christian' control group exhibits the predicted curvilinear relationship. These results must be qualified, however, by the fact that the manifest guilt 'total' score will include a variety of expressions and types of guilt, some of which are examined in the following three comparisons.

(b) Social desirability and 'constructive guilt' feelings.

It will be remembered that this category of the manifest guilt questionnaire refers primarily to feelings of guilt associated with the inhibition of sexual and hostile impulses and with the acceptance of and obedience to certain moral standards.

Figure II shows the graphs for the three respondent groups in this comparison. The control group scored considerably lower than the other respondent groups on the 'constructive guilt' variable and in fact no respondents from the control group scored in the 6th category.


The dominant trend for the nonconformist group is linear and positive. High scores on the 'constructive guilt' measure tend to relate to high social desirability scores. For this group, feelings of guilt, as a form of negative reinforcement acting to inhibit impulsive and self-indulgent behaviour, are accepted as a necessary concomitant of moral living. The dominant trend for the sacramentalist group is basically negative, in this group it is the 'lowish' scores on the constructive guilt measure that are associated with the high social desirability scores. For the less moralist sacramentalist group 'high' constructive guilt scores are perhaps not regarded as giving a favourable impression nor as particularly desirable intrinsically.

Ordinates for Figure II

<u>(range)</u>	<u>category</u>	<u>control</u>	<u>(n)</u>	<u>sacramentalist</u>	<u>(n)</u>	<u>nonconformist</u>	<u>(n)</u>
0-30%	1	9.3	(8)	9.3	(3)	13.3	(4)
31-45%	2	11.0	(14)	13.8	(8)	10.8	(5)
46-40%	3	7.0	(10)	13.1	(10)	13.1	(12)
61-75%	4	12.1	(9)	12.6	(41)	14.0	(21)
75-90%	5	10.1	(7)	12.5	(19)	15.2	(16)
90-100%	6	-		11.7	(9)	13.0	(6)

(mean percentage
affirmations)

social desirability scores



The control group again shows a definite curvilinear function. The non-linearity in this instance is quite significant: $F = 5.613$ ($p = < 0.01$) with 3, 43 degrees of freedom. This adds some weight to the results of Bethlehem that people with low and high levels of guilt feeling are likely to value the approval of others greatly. However, the religious belief variable disrupts this arrangement fairly comprehensively suggesting that, for the Christian, and in particular the nonsacramentalist, being 'well-adjusted' is positively, rather than negatively, related to 'constructive guilt' feelings. For the control group - existing as it does in a rather more permissive environment, those with low levels of guilt feeling - even of constructive guilt feeling, would be 'well-adjusted' - to that particular situation. Also those with high levels of guilt feeling and 'constructive guilt feeling' in particular, - may need the approval of others to make up for the comparative lack of self-approval through the awareness of guilt feelings and stringent moral standards.

For the Christian groups this is not the case, their environment, training and personal morality predisposes these respondents to regard these guilt feelings as necessary, and, apart from the differential between the sacramentalist and nonsacramentalist groups, as relatively unrelated to the need for social approval - that is found to exist among Christian groups in this sample.

(c) Social desirability and 'remorse'

This guilt category refers to the feelings of persistent sorrow and anguish because of misdeeds and faults. In this comparison the

nonlinearity is rather less obvious and the linear trends are rather more dominant. Figure III shows that there is some disparity in the three graphs for the respondent groups.

For the nonconformist group, those with the higher 'remorse' scores manifest a greater need for social approval. This may not indicate that they need the approval of others because they suffer feelings of remorse, rather it may indicate that this group regards the feeling of sorrow and contrition as a necessary and important aspect of morality. Thus for some the 'repentance' implicit in the feelings of remorse may actually be desirable. Nevertheless, the nonconformists score higher on the social desirability measure on each category of remorse. The sacramentalist group shows a negative function (apart from the first 'remorse' category) which suggests that 'remorse' is rather less desirable and less socially approved. In this case, those who sensitise feelings of remorse give a more self-critical and unfavourable self-assessment than the nonconformists.


Visual inspection of Figure III suggests that the only obvious non-linear component is that involving the results of the control group. However, in this instance there is no statistical significance: $F = 2.068$ (with 4, 42 df), which is not significant at the 5% level of confidence. Nevertheless, those respondents from this group who scored very high or low on the measure of remorse showed relatively more need for social approval than the other members of the group. As with the sacramentalist group it appears that those who score low on 'remorse' are on the whole perhaps giving a 'favourable impression' rather than an accurate or honest self-

Ordinates for Figure III

(range)	category	control	(n)	sacramentalist	(n)	nonconformist	(n)
0%	1	10.0	(6)	10.8	(6)	13.8	(4)
14.3%	2	11.6	(9)	13.5	(22)	13.9	(21)
28.6%	3	10.1	(15)	12.8	(26)	13.1	(22)
42.9%	4	9.3	(8)	12.2	(10)	14.6	(9)
57.2%	5	6.3	(4)	12.1	(14)	14.0	(6)
71.5% f	6	10.7	(6)	11.8	(12)	15.0	(2)

(mean percentage
affirmations)

social desirability ratings



assessment. Thus the most significant component in this analysis is that, in general, those who manifest a 'well-adjusted' response, with, for example, little preoccupation with feelings of self-recrimination, tend also to give a very favourable impression of themselves on other measures.

(d) Social desirability and 'morbid guilt feelings' (Factor 9)

Proneness to excessive feelings of self-recrimination and resultant feelings of anxiety are expressed in the six statements of the manifest guilt questionnaire most clearly affiliated to the ninth factor - produced by the factor analysis (rotated) of the manifest guilt questionnaire items.

The baseline for this measure of guilt feelings is divided into five categories of guilt:

<u>category</u>	<u>mean number of statements affirmed</u>
1	none
2	1
3	2
4	3,4
5	5,6
(maximum = 6)	

The last two categories are larger because of the small number of respondents involved. Even then, no nonsacramentalists score in the 5th category. Results show low negative correlations between this factor and social desirability with rather low linear regression coefficients as well (eta). Figure IV shows that for the sacramentalist and control groups there

is some evidence for curvilinearity but these components are not statistically significant partly because of the unequal distribution of respondents among the categories. The 'F' ratio nearest to statistical significance is that of the control group: $F = 1.7247$ with 3,43 degrees of freedom. (Which is not significant at the 5% level of confidence).


Figure IV shows that relatively high scores on the social desirability measure relate to low scores on the 'morbid guilt' category. There is also some slight evidence to suggest that some respondents in the sacramentalist and control groups show a high need for social approval as well as manifesting a high score on the morbid guilt category. These cannot be ignored although they are few in number. Thus, in spite of the absence of a statistically significant curvilinear component, some individuals, who suffer the morbid feelings of guilt described, do need very much to be seen as "acceptable", "good", and self-respecting people. Their responses appear to indicate that they need the approval of others, their responses exaggerating their "social acceptability".

A linear, and negative, component tends to dominate the analysis. For the whole sample ($n = 202$) the coefficient of correlation for the comparison of this category of guilt with 'social desirability' was: $r = -0.21$ ($0.01 > p > 0.001$). The nonlinearity for the control group is exaggerated in Figure IV, as only three respondents score in the fifth category of 'guilt'. The sacramentalist group had the highest nonlinear component, with: $F = 1.08$ (4,84 df) which indicates that this component was not significant at the 5% level of confidence.

Ordinates for Figure IV

<u>Category</u>	<u>control</u>	(n)	<u>sacramentalist</u>	(n)	<u>nonconformist</u>	(n)
1	10.2	(14)	13.1	(36)	14.4	(32)
2	10.6	(20)	12.5	(19)	13.5	(17)
3	8.8	(4)	11.2	(10)	13.0	(11)
4	7.7	(7)	12.1	(16)	11.0	(4)
5	11.7	(3)	12.7	(9)	-	

social desirability ratings



4. Conclusions and Discussion

(i) Social desirability and feelings of guilt: General Conclusions

The control group exhibits, fairly consistently, the curvilinear component anticipated by Bethlehem (31). It seems that respondents, in this group, need the approval of others as a counterweight to their own lack of self-approval. There is, however, a possible alternative hypothesis to the effect that some respondents may give a 'self-critical' response in order to curry favour with a sympathetic enquirer! This explanation contradicts Bethlehem's fourth hypothesis that:

"People with a high level of guilt need the approval of others to make up for the comparative lack of self-approval"

(31, pages 324-5).


The opinion of the present investigator is that Bethlehem's explanation is rather more valid. Those individuals with a strong need for 'acceptance' and 'approval' in society are often those who are most self-condemning and intrapunitive.

According to Bethlehem, those respondents with low levels of guilt-feeling, are consequently: 'well-adjusted' and so they value the 'appropriate' approval of others. This seems a rather more dubious assumption. It might well be that those individuals who manifest low levels of guilt are suppressing a 'self-critical' response - so as to make a favourable impression.

The disparity in the results - between the control group results, which have just been discussed, and the results from the Christian groups -

is quite marked. Over the 'constructive' guilt and 'remorse' categories the nonconformist groups show a positive trend - suggesting that the 'social desirability' variable is positively associated with these feelings of guilt. Thus one would deduce that this group expects and accepts these feelings as part of the necessary negative reinforcement associated with socialisation and self-control. The slightly less moralist 'sacramentalists' show a small, but negative, relationship over these categories. A comparison of the results is shown, schematically, in the following Figure. (Figure V).

Figure V



Previous results also showed that the results from the social desirability measure also correlate positively with guilt potential (the anticipated guilt variable). This suggests that, particularly for the Christian respondents, a moralist stance is socially desirable and socially approved. Figure VI shows the comparison between the Christian and control groups over three categories of the anticipated guilt questionnaire (total) scores. Figure VI confirms that basically, there is a positive and linear relationship between social desirability and 'guilt potential' or moralism. (The correlation coefficient for the comparison of social desirability with the anticipated guilt total is $r = 0.324$ with $n = 202$).


However, the figure shows an interesting deviation from this trend. Three of the Christian respondents who scored below '30' (anticipated guilt) had social desirability ratings of 18, 18, and 25 respectively. Thus causing the enigmatic result for category '1' (see Figure VI). There are at least three basic explanations of this result. It may be that they are giving a low 'moralism' response in order to gain the approval of some 'other'. Alternatively they may have less rigid personal moral standards than the other Christian respondents. This lack of conformity with the group norm may elicit feelings of insecurity which could be reflected in an enhanced need for social approval. The third possible explanation would be that they had approached the questionnaire in the 'wrong' manner and taken it as a 'judgment of their actual behaviour' rather than as a measure of their 'expected' conscience stringency. This would result in them giving a low score, if they considered themselves to be 'moral' people.

Ordinates for Figure VI

<u>range</u>	<u>categories</u>	<u>Christian</u>	<u>(n)</u>	<u>Control</u>	<u>(n)</u>
(0-30)	1	17.8	(4)	8.3	(11)
(31-60)	2	11.3	(72)	10.4	(27)
(61 and above)	3	14.3	(78)	10.6	(10)

(anticipated
guilt)

means (social desirability)



(ii) Christian religious belief and the social desirability variable

One important factor throughout these results is the consistently higher social desirability rating of the Christian group as compared with the control group, a fact that confirms hypothesis 6(d). There are at least four possible explanations of this. Firstly, the results at face value, suggest that Christians are well-adjusted. On average, Christian respondents tend to score lower on measures of maladjustment, such as the neuroticism and anxiety questionnaires, and lower on measures of self-criticism. The fact that Christian respondents score higher on some measures of guilt feelings may be because these are, among other things, measures of the extent of 'socialisation' and of the 'capacity for self-control'. These, to the Christian moralist, are wholly desirable and signify a well-integrated, moral being. According to Bethlehem (31), part of being 'well-adjusted' is to make oneself agreeable to others, - hence the high need for social approval associated with the Christian respondents.

A second explanation of the high need for social approval of the Christian group is in some way connected with the first explanation. The Christian respondents may desire to give a good impression because of certain role expectations inherent in concepts such as the 'Christian life' and the 'Christian Ministry'. Connected with these concepts would be the importance of 'making oneself agreeable to others'. It is expected that Christians should be altruistic and tender-minded, - good people. It is essential then, for the rapport of the Christian and the community, that the Christian is seen to be socially desirable - even socially necessary.

For example, the good works and unselfish service of the Salvation Army establishes a standard which is both expected of them by others, and required by them of its members. 'Social approval' is necessary for both the ministry and mission of the Christian churches. The church has to be held in high regard by the people. If this is, at least in part, true then the response of Christians in giving a socially desirable impression is understandable - if not associated directly with the concepts of 'adjustment' and personal integration.

A third reason why Christians may tend to give a 'socially desirable' response is that they fear the condemnation of others. Christians believe they are 'accepted by God' but are required to maintain their values and standards of life. For some Christians, the motivation to do this may be fear of the consequences of doing otherwise - fear of the Divine sanction. This sensitivity to condemnation and criticism may also relate to their dealings with fellow human beings and even inquisitive psychologists! Thus some Christians may be giving a 'socially approved' impression simply to avoid the possibility of criticism and of an unfavourable assessment. One difficulty with this third explanation is that the conscious falsification of a self-assessment would be one cause for condemnation and criticism, which presumably Christians are trying to avoid. However, it may be that this explanation is one factor, albeit not the most significant one, in the determination of these results.

On the other hand it may be, and this is the fourth possibility, that the structure of the social desirability scale is itself the main

reason for the differentiation in the results. Though as a measure of social approval it may be appropriate for a general sample, it may be inappropriate for a sample of Christian 'ministerial students'. 'Good conduct' and behaviour of high integrity and strict 'self-control' are expected to be characteristics of a Christian's life. The social desirability scale, however, tends to assume that most people are unlikely to have such high standards and that if they say they have, then they are only making a 'socially desirable' response. This assumption may not be justified over all samples of respondents, one example perhaps being the dedicated Christian respondents in this present sample. The content of the social desirability scale (Appendix G) seems to confirm that it may be an inappropriate measure of the 'need for social approval' for some groups of respondents. Nevertheless, the Christian groups do contain a greater proportion of respondents scoring excessively high (20 points or more) on this scale, in fact no non-Christian respondents score 20 points or more, whereas seventeen Christian respondents do (11%). Thus one can conclude that some Christians are manifesting a 'need for social approval' - in spite of the preceding argument.

Considering the relative merits of these various explanations, it seems that, in spite of the possible inappropriateness of the scale for some Christian respondents, it does reflect the general favourable self-assessment that the Christian respondents give - over a number of measures of self-evaluation. In as much as Christians are 'well-adjusted' or 'well-integrated' so their higher scores on the social desirability scale indicate

their 'need' for the confirmation of their own favourable self-evaluation. On the other hand, if it is thought that the factor of 'social desirability', or the need for social approval, influences the respondents so that they create a 'self-accepting', 'socially approved', self-assessment, then the 'self-acceptance' shown in results from the self-evaluation measures may be invalidated because of this exaggeration.

By way of comment on this latter conclusion, one might hypothesise a certain 'superficiality' in the responses of the Christian groups - particularly the nonconformists. Thus their 'defensive' assessments may not represent deliberately contrived falsehoods, but rather complacent, self-satisfied, superficial responses. In other words they have avoided too rigorous a self-examination.

The relationship between Christian religious belief, social desirability, and self-evaluation is illustrated in the following comparison. Those respondents who are giving a 'socially desirable' response will presumably be most likely to give a self-accepting rather than a self-critical response. The relationship between social desirability and measures of self-criticality is illustrated in Figure VII. This shows two comparisons: one involving the self-criticality ratio, and one involving the 'self-ideal discrepancy' measure.

The graphs show the difference in gradient between the plot for the control group and the plots for the Christian respondent groups. In this case the steeper gradients are indicative of a stronger correlation between the social desirability variable and the self-evaluative measures. Table III

shows the coefficients of correlation representing the comparisons shown in Figure VII.

Table III

Group	comparisons :	coefficients of correlation (r)	
		<u>A</u> social desirability and self-criticality	<u>B</u> social desirability and discrepancy scores
1. Control	(n = 48)	-0.16	-0.07
2. Sacramentalist	(n = 90)	-0.43 ^{xx}	-0.30 ^{xx}
3. Nonconformist	(n = 64)	-0.55 ^{xx}	-0.45 ^{xx}
N ^{xx} = correlations are significant at the 1% level of confidence			

Table III and Figure VII show that for both the Christian groups, but more particularly for the nonconformist group, there is a strong linear and negative relationship between the measures of self-criticality or self-dissatisfaction and the measure of social desirability. The control group comparisons are not statistically significant. For this latter group the need for social approval appears to be only slightly associated with scores on the self-evaluative measures. However, for the Christian groups, the need for social approval, or the extent of the manifested favourable impression, appears to be a factor closely linked with the results from the self-evaluation instruments.

Ordinates for Figure VII

A. Self-criticality


<u>range</u>	<u>category</u>	<u>control</u>	<u>(n)</u>	<u>sacramentalist</u>	<u>(n)</u>	<u>nonconformist</u>	<u>(n)</u>
0-20%	1	11.0	(10)	14.4	(35)	15.6	(34)
21-40%	2	9.8	(22)	12.5	(39)	12.2	(26)
41% and above	3	9.6	(16)	8.6	(16)	6.5	(4)

mean social desirability scores

B. 'Discrepancy'

<u>range</u>	<u>category</u>	<u>control</u>	<u>(n)</u>	<u>sacramentalist</u>	<u>(n)</u>	<u>nonconformist</u>	<u>(n)</u>
0-6.9 (D_{il})	1	10.5	(17)	13.8	(31)	15.2	(35)
7-10.9 (D_{il})	2	9.7	(23)	12.2	(48)	12.6	(23)
11 & (D_{il}) above	3	9.6	(8)	10.6	(11)	9.7	(6)

mean social desirability scores



Bethlehem (31) in his eighth hypothesis predicted no statistically significant relationship between the need for social approval and self-assessment. Specifically, he stated that there was no obvious relation between 'discrepancy' and social desirability scores. These results support Bethlehem's confirmatory results inasmuch as this hypothesis holds true for the 'non-Christian' group. However, for the Christian groups there is evidence of a strong relationship which suggest that the self-assessment of the Christian respondents is very much affected by the desire to give a favourable impression. For reasons already outlined, it is probably difficult for the Christian respondents to avoid giving a socially desirable response. Self-awareness of 'good-conduct' and of the "expectations" associated with Christian behaviour may well combine to facilitate the manifestation of 'self-acceptance' and 'self-esteem'. The fact that these Christian respondents report high standards and ideals may also mean that they try harder to control their behaviour and live up to those ideals. This 'effort' may at least promote a modicum of 'self-satisfaction'. Also, doctrines concerning the love and benevolence shown by God may encourage the believer to 'feel' that he is accepted by God and not condemned. These various possibilities express an explanation of why the Christian respondents manifest more self-esteem than the non-Christian respondents. Thus the results suggest, perhaps rather superficially, that the Christian respondent is "better-adjusted" and "better-integrated". However, whether this is or is not true, the constellations of attitudes and beliefs associated with

personal Christian faith seems, generally speaking, to contrive to create a feeling of self-satisfaction and self-respect. This self-satisfaction relates very closely to the "social desirability" ratings and suggests that Christians wish to be acknowledged as 'moral', 'good' people, and they thereby seek the approval and acceptance of others - even though this does seem to involve the exaggeration of their "favourable" self-assessment.

One might also deduce from the results that the nonconformist group is particularly reluctant to manifest a self-critical response. This lack of self-criticism could perhaps be compared with their uncritical acceptance of the beliefs propagated by their churches. This 'dogmatism' and rigid acceptance and implementation of rules of life and conduct serves to integrate individuals in a group with very well-defined norms. This affiliation through identification and mutual acceptance on the grounds of commonly held values and beliefs is undoubtedly a satisfying experience for many. The more dogmatic the norms of the group are - so the greater the opportunity for the evolution of a cohesive community - so long as 'deviants' fail to enter the group and divert it from its avowed aims; or so long as dissidents are suppressed by, or expelled from, the group. The danger then, is that 'dogmatic' groups and, in particular, 'dogmatic Christian' groups, become self-satisfied to the extent that they are intolerant of other ideas - and of the people that hold those ideas and opinions. However, this discussion is rather speculative at the moment. What does emerge from the results rather more directly is the basic relationship between 'dogmatic' religious belief and 'self-esteem'; and particularly between the 'dogmatic

nonconformist' group scores and self-acceptance. This chapter qualifies this finding with observations that suggest a close relationship between a "self-accepting" religious belief and a "social desirability response set" - purporting to represent the need for social approval, or the need for acceptance and acceptability.

CHAPTER 11
IN RETROSPECT

- (i) Summary of Conclusions.
- (ii) Factor Analysis: Some Conclusions.
(+ revised manifest guilt
questionnaire)
- (iii) Proposals for Further Research.
- (iv) Critique.

Chapter 11
"In Retrospect"

This chapter is an attempt to collate the various results and conclusions derived from the analyses described in the preceding chapters. Also considered in this chapter will be a modified manifest guilt questionnaire, some proposals for future study and a critique of this research.

i. Some interrelationships: A summary of conclusions.

The research has confirmed the prediction that there is some significant association among the principal variables of the Thesis. Also it has been found that there are some differences among the results from the various respondent groups which affect that association. Some results, however, must be qualified in that one cannot ignore wide individual differences within groups, and also that there may be some ambiguity in the results. On the latter point it has been shown that high 'self-esteem' scores may represent a 'defensive' response. Bearing this in mind, the following sections represent a synopsis of the conclusions reached.

1. The Comparison of the Christian Belief Variable with measures of Self-evaluation.

On the whole there was a positive correlation between Christian religious belief scores and scores on the measures of self-evaluation - which included such variables as the 'self-acceptance' ratio, derived from the adjective check list; and the 'self-rating' derived from the semantic differential. The highest self-evaluation scores were generally more

predominant in the 'dogmatic' groups of the Christian respondents, and especially in the dogmatic nonconformist group. This contrasted quite noticeably with the relatively modest self-evaluation of the control groups. This type of result might have been predicted from one aspect of the nature of religious belief deduced by Allport (12). He argued that religious belief, of a 'healthy' kind, facilitates personal integration. These integrative aspects serve to enhance self-esteem. However, one is forced to qualify this conclusion by suggesting that some Christian respondents are responding defensively to the 'noxious' stimuli - represented by 'self-critical' adjectives and suggestions of guilt feelings, but are responding freely to the 'desirable' stimuli - represented by 'self-accepting' descriptions and suggestions of 'self-adjustment'.

This begs the question as to why Christian respondents should appear more prone to give a 'defensive' or 'favourable' response than non-Christian respondents. Some explanations of this have already been given in the preceding chapters. The consensus of the various arguments would run as follows. Christians, especially those engaged in ministerial training, must have high personal and moral standards - they must be 'good people'. Thus certain 'role expectations' would necessitate genuine 'good living' or, at the very least, the manifestation of goodness and uprightness through the expression of a favourable moral and personal self-assessment. Thus it is difficult to judge whether a person is manifesting a genuine response relative to his 'goodness' and 'self-esteem' or whether he is merely giving a response which reflects other people's expectations of him.

This ambiguity of response is underlined by the results from the social desirability questionnaire. Whether or not this variable measures specifically: 'The need for social approval', it does seem to indicate quite clearly the extent to which a person is giving a favourable and 'defensive' impression of himself. The results also show that the relationship, between social desirability and the measures of self-criticality or self-ideal discrepancy, is strongly negative for the Christian groups, but only slightly so for the control groups. This suggests that, given that the social desirability scale is appropriate for a group of Christian ministerial students, the responses of the Christian groups on the self-assessment measures are affected by the desire to give a favourable, acceptable, and self-accepting response.

Self-esteem is considered to be related to 'personal integration' (Rogers: 182) or 'self-adjustment'. Those individuals who have achieved or acquired a life-style that enables them to live in harmony with themselves and others, will thereby be more self-satisfied, and in many ways more self-actualised. It is perhaps not surprising then, from that point of view, that Christians, who score high on self-esteem, score lower on measures of maladjustment than the 'non-believing' control groups. Also, it would seem that the more closely a person does identify himself with the Christian religion, so the more 'adjusted' he appears to be. Once again, however, one must consider the negative relationship between the variables of social desirability and 'maladjustment'.

If a decision must be made as to whether or not the 'self-esteem' and

'adjustment' indicated by the responses of the 'Christian' respondents is a 'bona fide' self-assessment, then the decision reached will depend largely on the nature of one's prejudices and presuppositions. If one presupposes that Christian religious belief is, in general, an 'integrative factor', and likely to foster and enhance personal adjustment, then one might be led to criticise the "social desirability" scale and emphasise the 'self-acceptance' manifested by the Christian students. However, one might take the alternative point of view, which avoids the presupposition that Christian belief is either 'integrative' or 'destructive' in 'self-awareness'. In this case, the results from the social desirability questionnaire, and their strong correlation with the results from the measures of self-evaluation, would suggest that Christian respondents are prone to give a 'defensive' or 'favourable' self-assessment over and above what one finds with an 'uncommitted' group of students.

Perhaps one might favour a compromise of these two viewpoints by accepting the first argument that Christian religious belief does in many cases fulfil an integrative function, but qualifying this with the second argument that a manifested Christian commitment may also mediate a general bias towards a 'defensive' and 'favourable' response set. At the very least, there is nothing in the results to indicate that Christian religious belief fosters self-rejection or morbidity any more than the belief and values of those who are not committed Christians.

2. Guilt feelings and self-evaluation


Much of what has been said already bears some relation to this ensuing summary. Those individuals who regard guilt-feelings as an anathema to their ideals of life - are less likely to behave in a way that would in all probability elicit those feelings. They are also possibly rather less likely to 'manifest' feelings of guilt, because this would give an impression of 'self-dissatisfaction'!

The results do indicate (in Chapter 9) that proneness to feelings of guilt is indeed closely associated with self-criticality, whereas the absence of any strong manifestation of guilt feelings is associated with self-acceptance, a high 'self' rating and a low "self/ideal" discrepancy. This accords with the predictions of Robinson and Argyle (181) concerning the incompatibility of feelings of self-recrimination and self-esteem. However, two further hypotheses somewhat confound this direct explanation. Firstly, these results would also have been predicted by Altrocchi et al (16), but for different reasons. Their 'repressor-sensitiser' hypothesis seems an attractive proposition since it recognises the fact that some people tend to be more openly self-critical and self-dissatisfied, while others tend to avoid self-criticism and adopt a basically 'defensive' stance. Perhaps, however, this hypothesis does not account for all the results, and is possibly a little more doubtful than the more straightforward conceptualisation of the response bias produced by a factor of social desirability. Those individuals who 'need' or 'want' to make a favourable impression for one reason or another, would no doubt suppress

a 'guilt-proneness' response as well as a self-critical assessment.

The linear relationship between guilt-proneness scores and self-criticality, or self-ideal discrepancy scores, is confirmed over several measures of guilt proneness derived from intrinsic subcategories of the guilt questionnaire, or from 'factors' extracted by the factor analysis. There was, for the respondent subgroups, on some comparisons, some evidence to suggest a curvilinear component of the kind found by Bethlehem (31). However, as was pointed out in the introductory chapters, Bethlehem's finding of both a very significant coefficient of correlation ($+0.8$) and of a very significant nonlinear component ('eta' = 0.897; $F = 32.9$; $df = 16, 127$; $P < 0.001$) is unusual - and certainly not reflected in these studies and comparisons. Current results suggest that the more 'self-recrimination' that the item of 'guilt feeling' represents - so the more linear is the relationship with the measure of self-criticality.

One might postulate, bearing in mind the foregoing discussions, two possible representations of the relationship between 'guilt-proneness' and 'self-dissatisfaction'. Firstly,



In the "A" relationship indicated above, one infers that proneness to self-recrimination facilitates a negatively self-evaluative response.

The alternative hypothesis, based on this conceptualisation, also remains valid: that those who could be termed 'sensitisers', who are thus prone to self-criticism and who manifest self-dissatisfaction in terms of high self-ideal discrepancies, - are also those who sensitise feelings of guilt and self-reckrimination.

Secondly, one might postulate an association between low guilt proneness and self-evaluation because of the intrusive factor of social desirability: (The converse of this would then apply to the first postulation)

Low guilt proneness	\longleftrightarrow X	Self-acceptance (High self-evaluation)
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(where "X" represents the social desirability response set)

The factor that 'cements' this relationship is thus a 'social desirability' factor rather than any causal relationship between scores on the two comparison variables. Since the Christian respondents tend to manifest high self-evaluation and low 'guilt-proneness' (this generally holds true) then this 'response set' may be a crucial factor in the results. On some measures of guilt-proneness the 'sacramentalist' Christian respondents do score in excess of scores from other groups of respondents but the 'mean percentage affirmations' are low and do not indicate that large numbers of 'sacramentalists' suffer morbid feelings of guilt and self-reckrimination.

3. Christian religious belief and feelings of guilt

(a) Guilt Potential

Chapter 8 attempted a clear distinction between the variables of "guilt proneness" and "guilt potential". Guilt-potential refers to the anticipations of feelings of guilt associated with certain hypothetical actions: "How guilty would you feel if" This variable is thus a measure, or estimate, of the degree of reported 'conscience' stringency and censoriousness. Of course, the more censorious the 'conscience' is in terms of the avoidance of certain behaviour and the suppression of certain impulses - so the greater likelihood there is of extreme feelings of self-condemnation - should 'inviolable' rules of conduct be contravened. In terms, then, of the 'anticipation' of guilt-feelings for violation of moral standards, the Christian respondents record a much more 'moralist' response through their anticipation of relatively higher feelings of guilt than the non-Christian control groups. Moral beliefs are clearly an important, integral part of 'Christian life' and religious beliefs. To this extent a highly positive self-evaluation would be quite compatible with high scores on the 'anticipated guilt questionnaire' - as these would indicate a degree of self-control or self-discipline, both appropriate and desirable from a 'Christian' point of view. The concept of 'self-righteousness' may be an intrusive variable here. Christians who live in accordance with their moral beliefs, whilst naturally anticipating extreme self-condemnation for disturbing this situation, are prone to be self-satisfied with their moral position - rigidly defined as it often is.

A distinction must also be made between 'social' and 'ascetic' morality (see Chapter 3, 'h' and Chapters 6 and 7), though Christian respondents score higher on both categories than the control groups. The closest relationship, between scores on the measures of Christian religious belief and scores on the anticipated guilt questionnaire, exists when the category involves 'ascetic' morality. Impulse restraint and self-control are clearly important factors in religious belief.

(b) Guilt Proneness


On the whole it is measures of guilt-feelings associated with this concept that serves to differentiate the various Christian groups. The sacramentalist Christians do not appear to be all that less conscious of social approval than the nonconformists, but they seem, at least, to be more ready to 'sensitise' feelings of guilt. From the 'doctrinal' point of view there is a disparity between these two sections of the 'Christian' sample which might be offered as an explanation of either a genuine difference in guilt-proneness, or of a tendency for one group to manifest self-criticism more readily than the other. Again, the decision as to which version of the explanation is more appropriate depends on one's presuppositions. Firstly, if one argued that the doctrines propagated by the sacramentalist churches encouraged a morbid preoccupation with the 'self', sinfulness and shortcomings, and with rituals designed to alleviate feelings of self-dissatisfaction and guilt, then one might predict that Christians affiliated to these Churches would be more prone to feelings of guilt and self-recrimination. However, if one argued that neither the

sacramentalists nor the nonconformists were more prone than the other to 'feel guilt', then the fact of the sacramentalist's relatively greater manifestations of self-criticism and self-recrimination might be explained in terms of their stress on the sensitisation of feelings of self-condemnation through self-examination and self-objectification.

It must be emphasised that whilst the sacramentalist respondents appear predisposed to a greater exteriorisation of guilt-feelings and self-criticism, their average results - are not much in excess of those of the 'control group'. Indeed, particularly on the measures of self-evaluation, it is the control groups who appear relatively more self-dissatisfied.

The most significant divergence from the control group, and sacramentalist group results appears to be the results of the dogmatic nonconformist respondents (see Chapters 8 and 9). This suggests the (ambiguous) conclusion, referred to earlier, that these respondents either have comparatively less susceptibility to feelings of guilt or they are responding 'defensively' - that is giving an "impression" of self-acceptance and self-satisfaction.


Thus one might underline the 'non-unitary' nature of the religious belief variable. In the case of the dogmatic beliefs of the nonconformist respondents, the variable appears to be associated with low guilt-proneness, high 'moralism' and high self-esteem. Thus, superficially, the variable of Christian religious belief appears to be related with a self-assessment indicative of a 'healthy', 'integrated', 'adjusted' self:



However, the symbol " X_I " indicates the possible existence of a strong factor of response bias towards a defensive, favourable response set. This being discussed more fully in Chapter 10. If this is true, then one might go so far as to criticise this type of religious belief for facilitating the development of an insular self-acceptance. This could be expressed as 'self-righteousness' associated with the dogmatic belief that: "I am right, I have the truth".

In the second case referred to above, Christian religious belief may function as a spur to the exteriorisation and sensitisation of feelings of guilt and self-condemnation. It is the sacramentalist churches that emphasise 'confession' and self-examination in private, public, and liturgical devotions. This emphasis on the necessity of introspection and religious duties designed to expiate guilt and shortcomings probably enhances any susceptibility to feelings of guilt and shortcoming. Results suggest this, though, inevitably, the interpretation of these results is rather speculative. The preoccupation with 'self' and sinfulness, and the practice of auricular confession among committed members of the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, is perhaps one explanation of the 'expression'

rather than 'suppression' of feelings of self-recrimination and self-condemnation by the Roman Catholic respondents in this sample. Thus the tripartite relationship for the sacramentalist respondents does differ from that of the nonconformist respondents:



The symbol " X_{II} " refers to the possible existence of a 'sensitisation' variable that biases the respondents to affirm feelings of guilt, because of their proneness to self-criticism, rather than to deny them.

The control group is more self-critical on average than the two Christian groups, but manifests slightly less proneness to feelings of guilt than the sacramentalist Christians (Chapter 8, and Chapter 9, section 4.b).

ii. The Factor Analysis and the Proposed Shorter Manifest Guilt Questionnaire

The factor analysis of the 41 items of the 'Manifest Guilt Questionnaire' confirmed the predicted referents of guilt - such as "self-hate", and "remorse". It also showed quite clearly the multiple origins and functions of guilt within the wide compass of the expression:

"The capacity for self-mediated punishment".

The factor analysis also served to emphasise the distinction between "guilt-potential" and "guilt-proneness" over items and categories of items. This differentiation enabled a more comprehensive comparison between measures of "guilt feeling" and scores on the religious belief measures.

The unrotated factor matrix, produced by the principal components method, revealed that 33 of the 41 items were loaded on the first factor - above the commonly accepted 'cut-off' point of 0.3000 (loading) (Harman: 221). This indicates a reasonable communality of variance of these items on this factor. These 33 items are found to refer to manifestations of feelings of guilt and susceptibility to experience feelings of guilt, listed below, in order of the most highly loaded items to the least highly loaded:

<u>Questionnaire Number</u>	<u>loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
23	0.603	I detest myself for thoughts I sometimes have.
1	0.554	I hate myself for the bad things I have thought and done in the past.
35	0.546	I am troubled by feelings of guilt and remorse over quite small matters.
10	0.543	I hate myself when I give in to some temptation I ought to have ignored and avoided.
11	0.540	I feel very anxious and guilty when I am tempted to do something wrong.
41	0.518	If I am caught doing something wrong - however harmless and trivial it may be - I feel very ashamed and guilty.
34	0.513	I am often bothered by nagging thoughts of the wrongs I have done in the past.

<u>Questionnaire Number</u>	<u>loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
24	0.493	I worry a lot when I feel I have fallen short of my moral and ethical standards.
25	0.492	I wish I was able to go back in time so that I could change parts of my past life that I still remember with feelings of guilt and regret.
12	0.491	I feel extremely upset and annoyed with myself when I do something I know is not strictly right by my own values and standards.
(2)	0.489	I punish myself with guilty feelings.
7	0.486	I feel very guilty and ashamed if I tell a lie even though it is only a harmless one.
39	0.462	When I do something wrong and get into trouble I feel I have not only let myself down - but also those who think a lot of me.
15	0.444	I feel guilty when my mind is preoccupied with sexy thoughts and daydreams.
16	0.441	I feel very embarrassed and uncomfortable when I meet people I have offended in some way.
5	0.435	When I have sexual desires I often feel guilty and anxious.
40	0.432	I long for forgiveness for the wrongdoing and sin in my life so that I can have peace of mind.
13	0.424	I get worried sometimes because of a personal failing or habit that I don't want anyone to find out about.
19	0.423	If I have spoken sharply or bitterly to someone I feel very upset and annoyed with myself.
26	0.416	When I lose my temper I feel guilty afterwards.

<u>Questionnaire Number</u>	<u>loading</u>	<u>Statement</u>
17	0.395	I am troubled by morbid, depressing, thoughts of my own shortcomings and guilt.
4	0.387	I seem to have a keener conscience and suffer more guilt-feelings than my friends.
3	0.383	I am very self-critical especially concerning my moral and ethical behaviour.
33	0.381	I still feel much regret and guilt when I recall the times I have been angry with someone I am very fond of.
30	0.368	Even when I am in the company of other people I am sometimes overcome by feelings of worthlessness and sinfulness.
28	0.364	I feel awful when I break a promise.
36	0.363	I feel I deserve punishment for my wrong deeds, thoughts, and desires.
37	0.362	My mind is seldom free from feelings of guilt and remorse.
29	0.345	I sometimes think that I am suffering now because of the wrong things I have done in the past.
22	0.338	At the present moment I am aware of feelings of guilt about some things.
38	0.316	When I do something wrong and get into trouble I feel a need to talk to someone about it.
18	0.316	If I found anything that was not my own and I kept it - my conscience would keep troubling me.
14	0.302	I would feel very guilty and concerned if I thought I had hurt someone's feelings.

iii. Further Proposals

(1) The dual character of Christian religious belief

This research confirms the importance of the factor of 'Christian religious belief' in any measure of self-assessment. It may also suggest that Christian religious belief is one determinant of self-acceptance and 'personal integration', and as such, is, at one level, of considerable therapeutic value. This latter consideration relates to studies that have examined the effect of religious belief as a catalyst in the development of neurosis; or the effect of religious belief in aiding the restoration of the individual to 'normal' and 'healthy' self-accepting life. What effect religious belief does have depends very much on the individual's own conceptualisation of his beliefs. If his religion is seen as a moralising potentially punishing, rigidly authoritarian system then this may exacerbate any awareness of guilt. However if his religion is believed to be founded on 'love' and 'acceptance' then it is likely to help a person to come to terms with himself, rather than destroy his self-respect.

That Christian religious belief is associated with 'reports' of self-acceptance is confirmed by this research (see Chapter 9). One might well propose that a further study of the factor of Christian belief in mental illness - both as 'cause' and 'cure' - would prove fruitful.

(2) Emotion associated with worship and prayer

It would be very interesting to have some deeper knowledge of the feelings associated with various aspects of worship and devotion. For instance, one might examine the differences, if any, in feelings between

those Christians who are sacramentalists and those who are nonconformists. It would be profitable to test further the emotional reaction to confession and the sacrament of penance. Do those who partake regularly in these, genuinely feel better for it? - or do some individuals find 'confessing' a traumatic experience? In either case it would be interesting to see how these two types of reaction relate to personality, and self-awareness of "guilt" and "sinfulness". It may be that regular and frequent observance of religious duties becomes very much a habit, which is not broken because of the fear of guilt arising from such a failure. It would be interesting to attempt to differentiate those whose religious behaviour is a form of habitual self-discipline - from those whose religious behaviour depends more on "whether or not they feel like it". In this comparison one might examine religious belief as a form of 'self-denial' with consequent emotions of self-abasement; as compared with religious belief as a form of 'self-indulgence' with the corresponding emotion of self-satisfaction.

(3) 'Extreme' forms of religious behaviour

An extension to this research would be to study the beliefs and 'self-feelings' of a group of Christians who deviate from the 'usual' Christian pattern of religious behaviour. For example this would involve studying Christians who were members of staunch Pentecostal sects and, Christians who had dedicated their lives to religious observances and duties - monks and nuns. The role of such feelings as those of guilt and sinfulness, and other factors such as self-esteem and 'self-adjustment' could then be seen in relationship to the more overtly dramatic and extreme expressions of religious belief.

(4) A comparison of ministers and congregations

This research was principally concerned with 'ministerial' students. These young people were in training to be ministers and religious leaders. Their commitment to, and acceptance of, the beliefs of their respective churches was thus, on average, very high. It would be interesting to follow these results up by studying both the ministers and the congregations. In this case, however, it would be necessary to control for age and intelligence and maybe socioeconomic background. It would be interesting to see whether the attitudes and feelings of the minister, or leader, were reflected in the attitudes and feelings of the congregation. Are the ministers, on average, more committed, and more 'religious' than the members of their congregation; or are they genuinely representative of the Christian people they lead?

IV. A Critique

(1) The Sample

The last question raised in the preceding section is in fact one possible criticism in the choice of the sample. The committed religious students were almost all intending to become leaders or ministers in their respective churches. They were all studying at theological colleges and thus, one might suppose, they were at least reasonably intelligent and very much committed to their Church and religion. In some ways then this sample is not representative of the 'rank and file' Christians. The age range and range of intelligence of the students was much narrower than that

of an average congregation. Most of the students were aged under 23 years and most were capable of academic study. The answer to this criticism is twofold. Firstly, the fact that the students were 'overtly' very committed to their religious belief - meant that they were good representatives of the 'Christian' religion. Secondly, the narrowness in age range and relative narrowness in intelligence range found in a student population, is in itself a justification for choosing such a sample. This point is very important as both 'age' and 'intelligence' could be vital intrusive variables in the analysis.

It goes without saying, that the sample of theological students was rather more accessible, and amenable to this kind of research; involving as it did the administration of forms and questionnaires, and the 'faithful' completion of these over a period of five weeks.

The sample was necessarily a rather heterogeneous one and contained 'Christian' subgroups of unequal size. In some ways this was unfortunate, though unavoidable. Some theological colleges in London are much larger than others and this to some extent accounts for the variation in the numbers of students representing the various denominations and subgroups. Anyhow, the statistical formulae take into consideration unequal size groups, and adjust the significance of the results according to the size of the comparison groups within the sample. The sample was in fact biased in size towards the 'sacramentalist' churches, that is the Anglican and Roman Catholic denominations ($n = 50$ and 40 respectively). The content and subdivision of the sample is discussed fully in Chapter 6.

(2) The validity and reliability of responses.

It is very difficult for one unique piece of research to establish its own validity and reliability without considerable replication of the tests and techniques used. The intention is that further interest and further research should be stimulated in order to follow up various ideas and findings generated by the original study. If a research gives rise to the proliferation of studies concerned with the components of that original research, then this will be the most satisfactory test of a hypothesis or theory. Nevertheless, certain conclusions, some rather speculative, are made in this study. These conclusions must be put to the test by further researches. It is hoped that the results do represent the feelings and attitudes of a wide spectrum of committed Christian students as they are reported by themselves.

Whether or not the results represent what they purport to represent is a question discussed at some length in this thesis. If the measures used are inappropriate, then the conclusions based on the results obtained will be invalidated - unless the conclusions are qualified by an understanding of the imperfection of the measures used. For instance: in the case of the association of "self-assessment" and the "social desirability response set".

Two questions could be asked concerning the procedure of using questionnaires and any form of 'self-assessment':

- (i) Do the responses reflect a frank and genuine self-assessment?

- (ii) Is it possible for any individual to make a meaningful self-assessment?

The first question presupposes that the answer to the second is "Yes".

Perhaps one might add a supplementary question to the first: "Does the type of self-assessment procedure permit a genuine self-assessment?" In answer to this, and the first question in general, one must refer back to the earlier chapters incorporating a justification of the measures used in this study, and also to the 'confidentiality' that was emphasised throughout the research. It is concluded that the results represent a 'genuine' self-assessment even if this is affected by some response bias (e.g. social desirability). Scores on the self-assessment measure refer to 'direction' and 'ordinal position' rather than to 'intensity', or some other psychologically misappropriated expression (cf. Peabody 175). Considerable preliminary work was done to remove irrelevant, clumsy or ambiguous statements from questionnaires. The inclusion of the Eysenck 'Lie scale' (Form B) and the "social desirability scale" enabled a 'check' on the nature of the self-assessment being given by the respondents. One does not claim that one has an 'infallible' methodology, one has to devise the most appropriate method - given the imperfections that exist concerning the availability of time and subjects.

The second question is basic to the entire enquiry and to much psychological research. "Self-assessment", rather than 'observer' or 'experimenter' assessment is open to abuse by the subject, or the subject may not be capable of making a meaningful assessment. However, for the

psychologist, 'meaningfulness' is not dependent on objectivity,- that is,- a person's self-assessment, however biased and incomplete, is a very useful data source. The conclusions one draws from a "self-assessment" must be modified by the value that one places on it. If one considers that 'self-objectification' is a viable proposition, then responses that necessitate a self-examination, however superficial, represent some of the 'attitudes' and self-descriptions that the psychologist is attempting to discover.

Ideally, perhaps, one should be able to combine self-assessment procedures, such as were utilised in this study, with 'Projective Tests' and interview techniques. This would certainly generate more data about individuals. In this case the "self-assessment" scores could be compared with 'observer assessment' for variables such as: 'self-acceptance' 'feelings of guilt' and 'religious belief'. Nevertheless, 'observer assessment', is subject to the criticism of 'subjectiveness' which may well be a factor in the experimenter's evaluation of the uncontrolled, verbal responses of subjects. Hence, in these researches, where facilities and opportunities were somewhat restricted in terms of 'time' and 'scope', this latter technique was not preferred to the method of research actually used. However, one cannot ignore the fact that any form of a 'self-assessment' and 'questionnaire' enquiry is open to interference of 'defensive', 'repressive' and 'social desirability response set' factors. Indeed these factors have been considered in this thesis as constituting an important variant in the relationships studied.

CODA

It is perhaps not wholly inappropriate to conclude with something of an exhortation to all those who concern themselves with the study of human behaviour. All must renew their efforts, in a sociocentric rather than egocentric drive, to study the behaviour of man - particularly in relation to integrative and disruptive elements in society. It is vital that there should be a greater, and more generally appreciated, understanding of such crucial facts of life as those associated with 'moral' and 'religious' behaviour in society. Jung (131), Allport (12), and Mowrer (164), among others, have advocated consideration of these factors as two potentially vital and integrative elements for the sustenance of the individual and the perpetuation of a secure and viable community.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIXContents

- A. The Anticipated Guilt Questionnaire. (original version)
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- G. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Questionnaire.
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mean percentage affirmations for the various subgroups.
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Appendix AThe Anticipated Guilt Questionnaire (original version)

List of items to which respondents were required to anticipate their feelings of guilt:

1. Social drinking (going to a pub)
2. Smoking
3. Striking another person in anger
4. Looking at sexy magazines and films
5. Falling in love with a married person
6. Striving to do better than other people at one's work
7. Taking part occasionally in a sweepstake (e.g. on the "Grand National")
8. Showing anger in an argument
9. Cheating in exams
10. Discriminating against a coloured person
11. Aggressively, but honestly, striving for personal success
12. Competing with others for personal gain
13. Getting drunk
14. Gambling at cards or dice
15. Petting
16. Blaspheming (using bad language)
17. Breaking a promise to a friend
18. Feeling hostility towards a friend
19. Stealing
20. Flirting
21. Premarital intercourse
22. Attacking an evil person
23. Gambling on sport (e.g. football pools)
24. Using contraceptives
25. Lying
26. Sexually stimulating one's own body

Appendix A contd.

27. Giving charity in order to gain the approval of others
28. Disobeying ones parents
29. Thinking sexy thoughts, having sex fantasies, or daydreams
30. Cheating in a game
31. Letting someone else take the blame for something that was
really ones own fault
32. Going to a party where there is plenty of alcoholic drink

Appendix BThe religious beliefs measure (original version)

Respondents were required to agree or disagree with the following statements:

1. God is the Creator of the Universe
2. Jesus Christ is the Son of God
3. God acts in response to prayer
4. It is good to become a keen and active member of a church
5. Everlasting life is the reward for all Christians
6. Much of the Bible is myth and legend
7. Only the Christian Religion gives real peace of mind
8. I can get along all right without God
9. Jesus Christ did not actually perform any miracles
10. Prayer is a waste of time, it achieves nothing
11. The church is out of touch with the modern world
12. Death is the end, there is no life beyond the grave
13. The writers of the Bible wrote nothing but the truth, because
their thoughts were guided by God
14. People of all religions are acceptable to God - not just Christians
15. God hears and sees everything that happens
16. Because of man's disobedience the death of Christ on the cross
was the only way to reconcile man and God
17. When I pray I am more aware of the presence of God
18. The church plays an important part in my life
19. All men have souls which do not die with their bodies
20. The stories of Jesus are very inaccurate records and cannot
be trusted
21. The world would be a far worse place to live in without the
Christian religion
22. God does not really exist, He is only an idea created by men
23. Christ was not Divine, but the teachings and example set by his
life are invaluable

Appendix B contd.

24. God does not listen to our prayers, but praying does a person good
25. I think that the church is a parasite on society
26. Heaven is just "Pie in the sky"
27. Nobody should question the Divine authority of the Bible
28. It is best to pray frequently and regularly
29. It is good to go to Church at least once a week to worship God
with other people
30. Everyone will be judged by God at the 'last judgement'
31. The Bible is illogical and contradictory
32. God cannot tolerate moral imperfection of any kind
33. Christ was born of a virgin
34. The Christian religion is a form of escapism
35. The Christian religion brings out the best in people
36. Scientific discovery has disproved the existence of God.
37. It makes no difference to me if the Christian religion is
true or false
38. I believe there is a 'Hell'
39. The Gospels contain strong evidence that Christ was the Son of God
40. If one leads a good and decent life it is not necessary to go
to Church
41. The church should be the centre of life in the community
42. God desires that people should pray
43. The Bible should not be taken seriously
44. The Christian religion offers a solution to the problems of
the world
45. God loves everyone in the world
46. Jesus Christ rose from the dead
47. Jesus Christ was a deluded eccentric
48. I don't pray, because praying is not beneficial to me or to
anyone else
49. Nobody can be sure that there is life after death
50. I believe that some supernatural force exists, but I do not
know what it is

Appendix B contd.

51. Jesus Christ was a failure, he achieved nothing
52. Praying to someone that cannot be seen is a sign of mental instability
53. It is more important to seek pleasure and recreation on a Sunday than to go to church
54. I think there is some sort of existence after death, but I do not know what it is
55. The Bible should be read more often
56. In this materialistic and scientific age the Christian religion is irrelevant
57. I am sometimes very conscious of the presence of God
58. Jesus Christ is the only person to have lived a perfect life
59. Prayer is communication with God
60. I believe that membership of a church helps people to live better lives and thus to increase their usefulness to Society
61. Jesus Christ is alive today
62. The Bible is becoming more and more out of date and irrelevant
63. The Christian religion gives meaning and purpose to life
64. Man can control his environment without God's help
65. If Christ had lived longer he could have been a greater power for good
66. Prayer is a demonstration of ignorance and helplessness
67. The church is a harmful institution, breeding narrow mindedness, fanaticism and intolerance
68. I think that it is more important to live a good life now than to be bothered by life after death
69. When I read the Bible I become more aware of God
70. There are so many different doctrines and beliefs within the Christian religion, that I cannot accept that it is the true religion

Appendix C
The Semantic Differential (Religious concepts)

The instructions given were the standard ones, as given by Osgood and Tannebaum (1971).

Respondents were asked to evaluate the concepts of: God, Jesus Christ, Prayer, Church, The Christian Religion, Life after Death, and The Bible.

Scales

- | | | |
|----------------|---|---------------|
| 1. Good | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Bad |
| 2. Immature | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Mature |
| 3. Wise | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Foolish |
| 4. Unimportant | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Important |
| 5. Interesting | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Uninteresting |
| 6. Harmful | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Beneficial |
| 7. Meaningful | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Meaningless |
| 8. Wrong | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Right |
| 9. Positive | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Negative |
| 10. Worthless | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Valuable |
| 11. Complete | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Incomplete |
| 12. Unpleasant | _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ | Pleasant |

Appendix D
The Personal Data Inventory

1. Age
2. Sex: MALE FEMALE (underline one)
3. Would you describe yourself as an active member of a church?
YES NO (underline one)
4. If YES to question (3) to which denomination do you belong?
.....
5. If NO to question (3) in which denomination were you brought up?
.....
6. How many times did you attend church during the last month?
.....
7. Are you a member of any student religious group?
.....
8. Do you say private prayers? YES NO (underline one)
9. If so, do you say them:
At least once daily YES NO
At least once weekly YES NO
Less frequently YES NO
10. Do you consider yourself to be Christian? YES NO
11. If NO to the previous question, which of the following categories best describe your beliefs?
a. Agnostic YES NO
b. Atheist YES NO
c. Other YES NO
12. Please add here any other information or comments you consider useful or relevant to the survey:

Appendix EThe Item Analysis of the Anticipated Guilt Questionnaire

The items are listed below according to the four subcategories. They are also listed in order of their guilt-producing potential. The three columns of figures represent, from left to right, the 'mean', coefficient of correlation with total anticipated guilt score, and the coefficient of correlation with relevant sub-total.

1. Subcategory: SEX (n = 126)

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>r-total</u>	<u>r-subtotal</u>
1. Premarital intercourse	3.8	0.49 **	0.64 **
2. Sexually stimulating ones own body	3.7	0.22 *	0.36 **
3. Falling in love with a married person	3.6	0.21 *	0.34 **
4. Looking at sexy magazines and films	3.5	0.47 **	0.50 **
5. Thinking sexy thoughts (having sex fantasies and daydreams)	3.1	0.35 **	0.47 **
6. Flirting	3.0	0.38 **	0.40 **
7. Petting	2.7	0.34 **	0.53 **
8. Using contraceptives	2.6	0.13ns	0.34 **

2. Subcategory: ag (drinking, gambling, etc.)

1. Getting drunk	3.8	0.49 **	0.53 **
2. Blaspheming (using bad language)	3.7	0.43 **	0.43 **
3. Gambling at cards or dice	3.4	0.41 **	0.67 **
4. Gambling on sport (e.g. football pools)	3.1	0.45 **	0.63 **
5. Smoking	3.0	0.12ns	0.21 *

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>r-total</u>	<u>r-subtotal</u>
6. Taking part occasionally in a Sweepstake (e.g. on the Grand National)	2.8	0.36 **	0.56 **
7. Going to a party where there is plenty of alcoholic drink	2.3	0.40 **	0.53 **
8. Social drinking	2.2	0.24 **	0.38 **

3. Subcategory: HOSTILE

1. Striking another person in anger	4.3	0.29 **	0.47 **
2. Feeling hostility towards a friend	4.0	0.17ns	0.16ns
3. Showing anger in an argument	3.6	0.22 *	0.35 **
4. Disobeying one's parents	3.6	0.01ns	0.02ns
5. Competing with others for personal gain	3.1	0.18 *	0.35 **
6. Attacking an evil person	3.0	0.19 *	0.37 **
7. Aggressively (but honestly) striving for personal success	2.7	0.27 **	0.46 **
8. Striving to do better than other people at ones work	2.2	0.5ns	0.24 **

4. Subcategory: sg (stealing, lying, etc.)

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>r-total</u>	<u>r-subtotal</u>
1. Stealing	4.7	0.14ns	0.30 **
2. Letting someone else take the blame for something that was really ones own fault	4.6	0.11ns	0.39 **
3. Cheating in exams.	4.6	0.29 **	0.51 **
4. Breaking a promise to a friend	4.4	0.15ns	0.43 **
5. Discriminating against a coloured person	4.4	0.21 *	0.39 **
6. Lying	4.2	0.20 *	0.37 **
7. Cheating in a game	4.1	0.12ns	0.37 **
8. Giving charity in order to gain the approval of others	3.9	0.17ns	0.36 **

KEY

x** = significant at the 1% level of confidence

x* = significant at the 5% level of confidence

ns = not significant

r = The Pearson product-moment coefficient of correlation

Appendix F
Revised Anticipated Guilt Questionnaire

Respondents were asked to indicate how guilty they would feel if they engaged in the following activities. There were four response categories: VG = very guilty; QG = quite guilty; LG = a little guilty; and OG would not feel guilty.

1. You take something from a shop with no intention of paying for it
2. You do not keep to the truth whilst supposedly relating a factual experience.
3. You cheat in a game whilst playing with friends.
4. You let someone else take the blame for something that was really your own fault.
5. You become involved in a heated argument in which you lose your temper.
6. You think sexy thoughts and have sex-fantasies and daydreams.
7. You drink too much at a party or in a Pub and become tipsy.
8. You deliberately avoid sharing a table with a coloured person in a Restaurant.
9. You have been staying at an Hotel, when you are leaving you take some small "souvenir" from the Hotel such as an ash-tray or hand-towel.
10. You tell a lie to cover up for a friend who is in trouble.
11. You cheat in an important exam or test by looking to see what the person next to you is writing.
12. You lose your self-control and hit a person who has provoked and angered you.
13. At a party, you openly flirt with a good-looking member of the opposite sex.

14. You gamble frequently on horse-racing, football or Bingo.
15. You spend an evening drinking in a Pub.
16. You laugh and joke about coloured people and Jews.
17. You tell a deliberate lie in order to get yourself out of trouble.
18. You avoid helping a blind or infirm person across the road, you let someone else do it.
19. You consider hurting someone, in some way, who has annoyed you very much.
20. You indulge in mutual petting with a member of the opposite sex before marriage.
21. You are persuaded to wager a small sum of money in a sweepstake or on a private bet.
22. You say uncomplimentary things about people behind their backs - you are unkindly critical of them.
23. You compete aggressively against other people for personal gain.
24. You have sexual intercourse before marriage.
25. You resort to using violence against someone you consider to be an evil person.
26. You fall in love with a married person.
27. You show anger and impatience towards someone who means a lot to you - someone you are fond of.
28. You sexually stimulate your own body, i.e. masturbation.
29. You read a sexy magazine or a pornographic book.
30. You remain seated on a bus when an old lady is having to stand.
31. You find a bank-note in the street, you pick it up and later spend it on yourself.
32. You gamble heavily at cards and dice and thus risk losing what for you is a large sum of money.
33. You make unkind remarks about coloured people behind their backs.

Appendix GThe Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

Listed below are the items of the scale which has been slightly revised from the original scale as per Marlowe-Crowne.

The 'socially desirable' response, either 'true' or 'false', is indicated after each item: (T) or (F) respectively.

1. Before voting in any election I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. (T)
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. (T)
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (F)
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. (T)
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. (F)
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. (F)
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. (T)
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a Restaurant. (T)
9. If I could go to the Cinema without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it. (F)
10. On a few occasions I have given up doing something, because I thought too little of my ability. (F)
11. I like to gossip at times. (F)
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right. (F)
13. No matter who I am talking to, I am always a good listener. (T)
14. I can remember 'paying sick' to get out of something. (F)
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. (F)
16. I am always willing to admit when I make a mistake. (T)

Appendix G contd.

17. I always try to practice what I preach. (T)
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, obnoxious people. (T)
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than to forgive and forget. (F)
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. (T)
21. I am always courteous even to people who are disagreeable. (T)
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. (F)
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. (F)
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. (T)
25. I never resent being asked to return a favour. (T)
26. I have never been aggravated when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (T)
27. There have been times when I have been quite jealous of the good fortune of others. (F)
28. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. (T)
29. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me. (F)
30. I have never felt I was punished without cause. (F)
31. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. (F)
32. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. (T)

Appendix I
The Adjective Check List

Below are listed the 200 adjectives used to form the adjective check list.

unbalanced	infantile	withdrawn	foolish	sulky
active	obliging	cheerful	responsible	dignified
immoral	immature	worrying	fickle	suggestible
adaptable	optimistic	civilised	self-confident	discreet
bigoted	hostile	whiny	fearful	stingy
affectionate	patient	clear-thinking	self-controlled	efficient
empty	highly-strung	weak	fault-finding	spineless
alert	pleasant	clever	sensitive	enterprising
lethargic	headstrong	vindictive	evasive	spendthrift
ambitious	persevering	confident	sharp-witted	fair-minded
passive	hard-hearted	unfriendly	dull	fore-sighted
attractive	progressive	conscientious	shrewd	snobbish
unorganised	greedy	timid	distractible	smug
calm	rational	considerate	sincere	forgiving
aimless	gloomy	tense	dissatisfied	sly
capable	relaxed	courageous	sociable	friendly
rigid	fussy	talkative	disorderly	show-off
cautious	reliable	dependent	sophisticated	generous
touchy	frivolous	tactless	despondent	shiftless
charming	resourceful	determined	stable	gentle

Appendix I contd.

impatient	shallow	pessimistic	autocratic	commonplace
co-operative	good-natured	sympathetic	kind	unassuming
demanding	severe	obnoxious	arrogant	cold
frank	handsome	tactful	logical	thoughtful
deceitful	selfish	nervous	argumentative	coarse
jolly	healthy	thorough	loyal	realistic
cynical	self-punishing	nagging	apathetic	changeable
organised	honest	tolerant	mannerly	energetic
curious	self-pitying	moody	anxious	careless
original	imaginative	unselfish	potent	creative
cruel	self-centred	lazy	aloof	bossy
practical	independent	wise	mature	moral
cowardly	rude	irritable	affected	boastful
reasonable	industrious	warm	absent-minded	balanced
confused	restless	irresponsible	methodical	blustery
robust	ingenious	versatile	insecure	adjusted
conceited	resentful	intolerant	modest	bitter
self-denying	initiative	thrifty	failure	successful
complaining	prejudiced	inhibited	natural	awkward
stolid	strong	appreciative	helpful	intelligent

Appendix J
The Revised Religious Beliefs Measure

There were five response categories: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree.

1. God is the creator of the Universe
2. Jesus Christ is the Son of God
3. God acts in response to prayer
4. It is good to become a keen and active member of a Church
5. Everlasting life is the reward for all those who follow Christ
6. Only the Christian Faith gives me real peace of mind
7. I can get along all right without God
8. Jesus Christ did not actually perform any miracles
9. Prayer is a waste of time - it achieves nothing
10. Death is the end, there is no life beyond the grave
11. God is able to hear and see everything that happens
12. Because of man's disobedience, the death of Christ on the cross
was the only way to reconcile man with God
13. When I pray I am more aware of the presence of God
14. The Church plays an important part in my life
15. All men have souls which do not die with their bodies
16. The stories about Jesus are very inaccurate records, and
cannot be trusted
17. The world would be a far worse place to live in without the
Christian Religion
18. God does not really exist he is only an idea created by men

19. I think that the Church is a parasite on Society
20. "Heaven" is just a foolish hope held by some deluded people
21. I believe that the Authors of the Books of the Bible were inspired by God to write what they did
22. It is best to pray regularly and frequently
23. It is good to go to Church at least once a week to worship God with other people
24. The Bible is illogical and contradictory
25. Christ was born of a virgin
26. The Christian Faith is a form of escapism
27. Scientific discovery has disproved the existence of a God
28. It makes no difference to me whether the Christian Faith is right or wrong
29. I believe there is a hell for those who die who have rejected the Christ of the New Testament
30. The Gospels contain strong evidence that Christ was the Son of God
31. If one leads a good and decent life it is not necessary to go to Church
32. The Church should be at the centre of life in the community
33. The Bible should not be taken too seriously
34. The Christian Faith offers a solution to the problems of the world
35. God loves everyone in the world - and that includes me
36. Jesus Christ was a deluded eccentric
37. Nobody can be sure that there is life after death
38. I believe that some supernatural force or power may exist but I do not know what it is
39. Jesus Christ was a failure, he achieved nothing.

Appendix J contd.

40. Praying to someone that cannot be seen is a sign of mental instability
41. It is more important to seek pleasure and recreation on a Sunday than go to Church
42. The Bible should be read more often
43. In this materialistic, scientific and technological age the Christian religion is irrelevant
44. I am sometimes very conscious of the presence of God
45. Jesus Christ is the only person to have lived a perfect life
46. Prayer is communication with God
47. Jesus Christ rose from the dead and is alive today
48. The Christian Faith gives meaning and purpose to life
49. Man can control his environment without God's help
50. Prayer is a demonstration of ignorance and helplessness
51. The Church is a harmful institution - breeding narrow mindedness, fanaticism and intolerance
52. I think that it is more important to live a good life now than to be bothered about life after death
53. When I read the Bible I become more aware of God
54. There are so many different doctrines and beliefs within the Christian Religion that I cannot accept that it is the true religion

Appendix K
The Religious Practices Questionnaire

Items:

- A. i. Age
 ii. Sex

The following sections contain some questions about your religious activities and beliefs. Please answer all the sections and questions as honestly and accurately as you can.

- B. During the past six months how often have you gone to Church?

- i. About once a week (or more)
 ii. About once every other week
 iii. On an average once a month
 iv. Once or twice only
 v. Not at all

(Please answer by putting a cross or tick in the appropriate space)

- C. How would you rate your activity in the Church congregation?

- i. Very active
 ii. Fairly active
 iii. Inactive
 iv. Completely nonexistent

- D. How often do you spend evenings at Church or in Church work?

- i. Regularly
 ii. Occasionally
 iii. Rarely
 iv. Never

Appendix K contd.

E. How often have you prayed in the last six months?

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| i. Daily | |
| ii. Fairly frequently | |
| iii. Occasionally | |
| iv. Rarely | |
| v. Never | |

F. Do you enjoy taking part in the more Religious and Spiritual activities of the Church?

- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| i. Yes | |
| ii. Not sure | |
| iii. No | |

G. Do you keep Sunday as a Holy Day and a day of rest?

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------|
| i. Yes - always | |
| ii. More often than not | |
| iii. Occasionally | |
| iv. Never | |

H. How often do you go to prayer meetings?

- | | |
|----------------------------|-------|
| i. Never | |
| ii. Occasionally | |
| iii. At least once a month | |
| iv. At least once a week | |

Appendix K contd.

I. How often do you read your Bible?

- i. Every day without fail
 - ii. At least once or twice a week
 - iii. Occasionally
 - iv. Never

J. Do you enjoy giving money to the Church?

- i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. Not sure

K. Do you often confess your sins to God and ask Him for his forgiveness?

- i. Often
 - ii. Sometimes
 - iii. Very occasionally
 - iv. Never

L. How often do you feel that you should worship God?

- i. Frequently
 - ii. Occasionally
 - iii. Never

M. How often do you take the opportunity to tell other people about your Faith and religious beliefs?

- i. I take very opportunity
 - ii. Occasionally I do
 - iii. Never
 - iv. I have no religious belief

Appendix L

The items of the Manifest Guilt Questionnaire and the mean percentage affirmations per item by seven subgroups.

The subgroups are numbered as follows:

1. The dogmatic nonconformists (n = 41)
2. The nondogmatic nonconformists (n = 23)
3. The dogmatic Anglicans (n = 33)
4. The non-dogmatic Anglicans (n = 17)
5. The Roman Catholics (n = 40)
6. The 'Pro-Christian' control group (n = 21)
7. The 'Anti-Christian' control group (n = 27)

(The 'mean percentage affirmation' represents the average response of the group to the specific item)

ITEM	subgroups :-	percentage affirmations						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.	I hate myself for the bad things I have thought and done in the past	32	35	36	41	48	33	37
2.	I punish myself with guilty feelings	7	22	18	41	35	33	26
3.	I am very self-critical especially concerning my moral and ethical behaviour	59	61	67	65	68	43	48
4.	I seem to have a keener conscience and suffer more guilt-feelings than my friends	29	22	36	47	45	24	33
5.	When I have sexual desires I often feel guilty and anxious	15	13	9	53	45	5	4

Appendix L contd.

ITEM	subgroups	<u>percentage affirmations</u>						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6.	Sometimes people make me feel guilty by accusing me of doing something even though I am innocent	24	30	30	24	30	48	56
7.	I feel very guilty and ashamed of myself if I tell a lie even though it is only a harmless one	61	26	64	47	43	29	30
8.	If I spend a lot of money on amusement and pleasure for myself I feel guilty about it	63	61	46	65	55	43	22
9.	I would avoid doing anything my conscience told me was wrong	80	57	64	71	68	67	48
10.	I hate myself when I give into some temptation I should have ignored and avoided	76	65	52	71	80	62	59
11.	I feel very anxious and guilty when I am tempted to do something wrong	15	17	30	29	40	33	30
12.	I feel extremely upset and annoyed with myself when I do something I know is not strictly right by my own values and standards	66	61	61	71	68	52	59
13.	I get worried sometimes because of a personal failing or habit that I don't want anyone to find out about	42	48	58	82	58	48	48
14.	I would feel very guilty and concerned if I thought I had hurt someones feelings	95	74	94	100	98	95	85
15.	I feel very guilty when my mind is preoccupied with sexy thoughts and daydreams	42	22	18	29	53	14	0

Appendix L contd.

ITEM	subgroups	<u>percentage affirmations</u>						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16.	I feel very embarrassed and uncomfortable when I meet people I have offended in some way	61	61	58	59	70	52	67
17.	I am troubled by morbid, depressing thoughts of my own shortcomings and guilt	7	14	24	47	23	19	41
18.	If I found anything that was not my own and I kept it, my conscience would keep troubling me	88	78	76	71	78	62	52
19.	If I have spoken sharply and bitterly to someone I feel very upset and annoyed with myself	95	78	88	82	90	81	37
20.	Arguments leave me feeling ill-at-ease and ready to renew a friendship	90	74	85	82	90	81	48
21.	When I have sexual desires I usually try to curb them	49	52	67	47	95	57	15
22.	At the present moment I am aware of feelings of guilt about some things	34	39	43	47	55	52	41
23.	I detest myself for thoughts I sometimes have	54	30	33	41	50	38	26
24.	I worry a lot when I feel I have fallen short of my moral and ethical standards	44	43	21	65	53	38	52
25.	I wish I was able to go back in time so that I could change parts of my past life that I still remember with feelings of guilt and regret	29	26	18	29	45	33	56
26.	When I lose my temper I feel guilty about it	90	61	85	65	80	67	41

Appendix L contd.

ITEM	SUBGROUPS	<u>percentage affirmations</u>						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27.	When I think of the way I have lived my life up to now and the sort of things I have done that I am ashamed of, I feel that my life has been worthless	0	4	3	12	5	0	11
28.	I feel awful when I break a promise	93	74	100	82	78	90	70
29.	I sometimes think that I am suffering now because of the wrong things I have done in the past	5	9	6	18	10	10	22
30.	Even when I am in the company of other people I am sometimes overcome by feelings of sinfulness	22	22	40	29	20	14	15
31.	If I know I have wronged someone I don't have peace of mind until I have apologised or made amends to that person	95	65	91	65	73	76	59
32.	I have to admit I am far from being the sort of person I really ought to be	100	87	85	94	85	71	67
33.	I still feel much regret and guilt when I recall the times I have been angry with someone I am very fond of	39	43	55	35	53	57	56
34.	I am often bothered by nagging thoughts of the wrongs I have done in the past	17	13	24	18	30	14	30
35.	I am troubled by feelings of guilt and remorse over quite small matters	24	4	15	28	25	29	19
36.	I feel I deserve punishment for my wrong deeds, thoughts and desires	56	26	36	12	48	10	4

Appendix L contd.

ITEM	subgroups	<u>percentage affirmations</u>						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37.	My mind is seldom free from feelings of guilt and remorse	0	0	6	12	10	10	7
38.	When I do something wrong and get into trouble I feel a need to talk to someone about it	61	48	79	65	73	71	70
39.	When I do something wrong I feel I have not only let myself down but also those who think a lot of me	85	70	85	88	78	76	63
40.	I long for forgiveness for the wrong doing and sin in my life so that I can have peace of mind	24	22	61	53	60	52	7
41.	If I am caught doing something wrong, however harmless and trivial it may be, I feel very ashamed and guilty	80	52	82	65	60	62	70

Appendix M

An outline of the theory underlying the interpretation of the results from the anticipated guilt questionnaire

Prologue

Guilt feelings act as a type of 'negative reinforcement' where they are associated with the inhibition of impulses and the avoidance of behaviour that would involve the violation of moral codes. Any such behaviour ('B') through conditioning and learning becomes associated with the negative reinforcement (R_{G-}). This is termed: 'self-mediated punishment', or feelings of guilt. Thus:

$$1. \quad B \longrightarrow R_{G-} \quad (\text{cf. Introductory chapters})$$

For feelings of guilt to be evoked there must first be the cognition that 'B' is wrong and bad, which in turn implies the existence of moral codes of behaviour. Then must follow the feelings of self-condemnation to the appropriate misdemeanour. Hence the negative reinforcement can act to modify or discontinue 'B' or, if 'B' has already been committed, feelings of self-recrimination result which may discourage the individual from repeating 'B'. In either of these two cases the negative reinforcement acts to motivate the individual to inhibit 'B' (This is referred to by the expression I_B)

$$2. \quad B \longrightarrow R_{G-} = I_B$$

Of course, guilt feelings are not only dependent on the actual perpetration of some forbidden act. The thought of, or impulse to, behave, may also elicit feelings of guilt:

$$3. \quad iB \longrightarrow R_{G^-}$$

(where iB represents the behavioural impulse)

The decision to avoid committing 'B' is not only taken because of the fear of the 'external' consequences of 'B', but also because the behavioural impulse itself becomes associated with the negative feelings so that the individual is self-aggressive if he has thoughts about committing some immoral act or some violation of his conscience, e.g. he is tempted to flirt with a married woman. Thus where the behavioural impulse is judged as 'bad' the negative reinforcement provided by the self-punishing feelings acts not only to forestall 'B', but also to suppress ' iB '. This would be especially relevant to many of the Christian respondents since the teaching of Christ emphasised that the 'thought' was as bad as the 'deed'.

$$4. \quad iB \longrightarrow R_{G^-} = IiB$$

(where ' IiB ' is the inhibition of the behavioural impulse)

Guilt Potential, or Anticipated Guilt Feelings

The anticipation of feelings of guilt is required of the respondent by the anticipated guilt questionnaire. Most human beings are able to 'anticipate' their feelings in a given situation because of past experience

or because of a 'cognitive' system that contains various attitudes and values that enable them to prejudge their feelings in a hypothetical situation. Moral values are not only the result of actual experience but are in part based on the moral idealism of the particular social group. For both these reasons, then, the expectation of behaviour ('eB') that is considered to constitute a violation of some moral value, and the delineation and differentiation of all such immoral acts, is of paramount importance if the moral principles both of the individual and society are to be sustained. The anticipation of 'B' produces the expectancy of negative reinforcement ('eR_G⁻') which in turn will serve to inhibit the behaviour. In other words 'avoidance conditioning' facilitates the perpetuation of moral behaviour through the capacity to anticipate negative reinforcement. Thus:

$$5. \quad eB \longrightarrow eR_{G}^{-} = IB$$

The anticipation of a behavioural impulse, perhaps 'aggressive', or 'sexual', will also lead to expectations of guilt feelings commensurate with the strength of the impulse and moral significance of the behaviour:

$$6. \quad e(iB) \longrightarrow eR_{G}^{-} = IiB$$

(where 'e(iB)' is the anticipated impulse, and 'IiB' is the inhibition of that impulse)

The 'Anticipated Guilt Questionnaire' is thus a measure of the stringency of moral codes of behaviour and is consequently concerned with the range of moral control and the concomitant intrapunitive potential.

This guilt potential is a sum of the feelings of guilt anticipated. These feelings of guilt are associated with a variety of behaviours and behavioural impulses. Therefore if it is possible to determine a person's guilt potential relative to the particular content of this questionnaire, then this could be expressed as:

$$7. \quad \Sigma(eR_{G-}) = \Sigma(eB \longrightarrow eR_{G-}) + \Sigma(e[iB] \longrightarrow eR_{G-})$$

(where $\Sigma(eR_{G-})$ represents the total anticipated guilt)

'Moralism' and guilt 'potential' are interchangeable expressions because the avoidance of guilt-producing situations, leading to 'good conduct', involves the ability to anticipate the emotional consequences of those situations. Thus:

$$8. \quad \Sigma(eR_{G-}) \longrightarrow [\Sigma IB + \Sigma IiB]$$

(Where ΣIB = the sum total of inhibitions of 'bad' behaviours.

Where ΣIiB = the sum total of inhibitions of 'bad' impulses.)